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ABSTRACT
In the vision of Cyber-Manufacturing System (CMS) , the physical components such as
products, machines, and tools are connected, identifiable and can communicate via the industrial
network and the Internet. This integration of connectivity enables manufacturing systems access
to computational resources, such as cloud computing, digital twin, and blockchain. The connected
manufacturing systems are expected to be more efficient, sustainable and cost-effective.
However, the extensive connectivity also increases the vulnerability of physical
components. The attack surface of a connected manufacturing environment is greatly enlarged.
Machines, products and tools could be targeted by cyber-physical attacks via the network. Among
many emerging security concerns, this research focuses on the intrusion detection of cyberphysical attacks.
The Intrusion Detection System (IDS) is used to monitor cyber-attacks in the computer
security domain. For cyber-physical attacks, however, there is limited work. Currently, the IDS
cannot effectively address cyber-physical attacks in manufacturing system: (i) the IDS takes time
to reveal true alarms, sometimes over months; (ii) manufacturing production life-cycle is shorter
than the detection period, which can cause physical consequences such as defective products and
equipment damage; (iii) the increasing complexity of network will also make the detection period
even longer. This gap leaves the cyber-physical attacks in manufacturing to cause issues like overwearing, breakage, defects or any other changes that the original design didn’t intend.
A review on the history of cyber-physical attacks, and available detection methods are
presented. The detection methods are reviewed in terms of intrusion detection algorithms, and alert
correlation methods. The attacks are further broken down into a taxonomy covering four

dimensions with over thirty attack scenarios to comprehensively study and simulate cyber-physical
attacks.
A new intrusion detection and correlation method was proposed to address the cyberphysical attacks in CMS. The detection method incorporates IDS software in cyber domain and
machine learning analysis in physical domain. The correlation relies on a new similarity-based
cyber-physical alert correlation method. Four experimental case studies were used to validate the
proposed method. Each case study focused on different aspects of correlation method performance.
The experiments were conducted on a security-oriented manufacturing testbed established for this
research at Syracuse University.
The results showed the proposed intrusion detection and alert correlation method can
effectively disclose unknown attack, known attack and attack interference that causes false alarms.
In case study one, the alarm reduction rate reached 99.1%, with improvement of detection accuracy
from 49.6% to 100%. The case studies also proved the proposed method can mitigate false alarms,
detect attacks on multiple machines, and attacks from the supply chain.
This work contributes to the security domain in cyber-physical manufacturing systems,
with the focus on intrusion detection. The dataset collected during the experiments has been shared
with the research community. The alert correlation methodology also contributes to cyber-physical
systems, such as smart grid and connected vehicles, which requires enhanced security protection
in today’s connected world.
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Chapter 1

1

Introduction

Cyber-physical attacks started emerging in manufacturing systems at the beginning of this
research in 2015.
In this chapter, the security trend in manufacturing systems is discussed, and the
terminologies: Cyber-Manufacturing System (CMS), cyber-physical attack, and intrusion
detection system are defined. Next, the problem of why current intrusion detection mechanisms
fail to address cyber-physical attacks in the context of Cyber-Manufacturing System is discussed,
along with attack surface analysis and detection duration analysis. The hypothesis and objective
of the research is stated and discussed. Finally, Chapter 1 is concluded with a dissertation overview.

1

1.1

Security in Manufacturing: Overview
In Cyber-Manufacturing System (CMS), physical machinery and equipment are fully and

seamlessly integrated with computational resources such as machine learning, cloud computing,
sensors, via computer networks, and the Internet (Z. Song and Moon 2016a). This visionary system
promises dramatic improvements in productivity, quality, cost, flexibility, and sustainability (Z.
Song and Moon 2016c). Over the years, the manufacturing industry is developing CyberManufacturing System into different extents, such as “Industry 4.0”, “Cloud Manufacturing”,
“Industrial Internet”, and “Smart Manufacturing”.
However, the openness to the Internet increases the risks of cyber-related attacks. Recently,
the cyber-attacks targeting manufacturing system are active. In 2015, report revealed that the
manufacturing sector is the second most attacked industry; in the following year, the
manufacturing sector received the most confirmed attacks (IBM-Security 2016). Furthermore,
among various attack incidents reported in manufacturing, cyber-physical attacks are emerging.
Those cyber-physical attacks intrude into manufacturing systems in digital format, carrying a
payload that can cause manufacturing equipment or products to develop over-wearing, breakages,
scraps or any other unintended changes (Wu, Song, and Moon 2019). One example of cyberphysical attack—Stuxnet worm (Langner 2011)—illustrates that such an attack can be active for
months or years before being detected.

2

1.2

Definitions
To better understand the scope, target and aim of this research, the terminologies are

defined: Cyber-Manufacturing System, cyber-physical attack, and intrusion detection system in
this section.
1.2.1

Cyber-Manufacturing System
Cyber-Manufacturing System (CMS) is defined as an advanced manufacturing system

where physical components are fully integrated and seamlessly networked with computational
processes (Z. Song 2018). In CMS, manufacturing resources and capabilities are digitized and
encapsulated into production services, and then shared with all users and stakeholders in the
network.
Similar manufacturing visions and concepts around the world have been emerging since
the early 2010s. They are developed to different extents and under different names, such as
“Industry 4.0” by the German government, “Cloud Manufacturing” (L. Zhang et al. 2014) in China,
“Industrial Internet” by GE in the US, and “Smart Manufacturing” by NIST in the US. Each
concept emphasizes different aspects of the manufacturing system.
1.2.2

Cyber-Physical Attacks
The cyber-physical attack is defined as an attack initiated inside or outside CMS

environment as a digital format that intrudes via cyber, causing physical components such as
machines, equipment, parts, assemblies, and products to have problems such as over-wearing,
breakage, defects or any other change that their original design didn’t intend (Wu, Song, and Moon
2019). Since 2010, cyber-physical attacks have emerged in the sectors of critical infrastructure and
developed in manufacturing system.
3

The most infamous cyber-physical attack is Stuxnet in 2010. The Stuxnet worm targeted
the centrifuges in an Iranian nuclear facility. The worm compromised the programmable logic
controllers (PLC) with unknown flaws—undiscovered computer software vulnerability—to make
the centrifuges spin faster than normal speed and tear themselves apart. The victim Windows
operating system and Siemens controller are commonly used in manufacturing systems (Langner
2011).
The first ever confirmed cyber-physical attack in manufacturing happened in Germany,
2014. Multiple attackers gained access to the industrial control system in a German steel mill using
emails with a malicious attachment. The attack disrupted the blast furnace control system and
could not be shut down by employees, ultimately causing significant damage (R. M. Lee, Assante,
and Conway 2014).
Those cyber-physical attacks in a manufacturing system are unique from cyber-attacks in
manufacturing: a cyber-attack aims at digital domain consequences, while a cyber-physical attack
aims for causing physical consequence via a cyber-attack. A detailed cyber-physical attack
analysis is presented in Section 2.2.
1.2.3

Intrusion Detection System
An intrusion detection system (IDS) is designed to alarm malicious activities and security

violations. For example, a security camera monitors that if anyone is fiddling with the front door
of a house, and gives alarms can be viewed as a home intrusion detection system. In general, an
IDS comprises two core functions: auditing data regarding suspects and analyzing the data
(Mitchell and Chen 2014). There are various intrusion detection products available today, such as
Snort (Roesch 1999a), and OSSEC (Karthikeyan and Indra 2010).
4

The limitation of the intrusion detection system are high false alarm rates, large quantity
of alarms and slow response time. In some cases, an intrusion takes more than two months to detect
and even longer to remediate. As the complexity of network grows in CMS, the case can take much
longer (Jon Minnick 2016), which is longer than a production cycle. This puts the safety and
security of manufacturers and customers at risk.
1.3

The Problems
For Cyber-Manufacturing System, the current intrusion detection methods cannot detect

cyber-physical attacks in a timely manner. More specifically, (i) the chances of being under attack
increase is enlarged due to the Internet connection through product development and
manufacturing life-cycle; (ii) currently, it takes time for an IDS to reveal true alarms, sometime
over months; (iii) CMS production life-cycle is shorter than a detection period, which increases
the chances of physical consequence in production and the consumer market; and (iv) the
increasing complexity of networks will take an even longer detection period.
1.3.1

Attack Surface
The attack surface of a connected manufacturing system is the combination of points where

the attacker can intrude into the system and leave a cyber or physical consequence. Different from
the attack surface for software, hardware, or operating system, the attack surface of a CMS should
implicate both cyber and physical domain assets in the manufacturing system. It comprises system
actions externally visible to the CMS users together with cyber and physical resources accessed or
modified by each action (Manadhata and Wing 2010).

5

Figure 1 Attack surface analysis for Cyber-Manufacturing System.
The CMS’s system constitution can be represented by a five-layer hierarchical architecture:
application/customer layer, application interface layer, core service layer, integrated connection
layer and physical provider layer, as shown in Figure 1. In each layer, the attack surface is
6

analyzed by enumerating (i) the system actions that are provided by each layer’s service and (ii)
cyber or physical domain data that could be injected or extracted for malicious purposes by
attackers. Five categories of data can be compromised in manufacturing systems (Hutchins et al.
2015a): high-level manufacturing data, low-level manufacturing data, financial data, physical data,
and user data are examined in the architecture. Additional cyber payload data for cyber-attacks are
also incorporated.
As shown in Table 1, targeted data and attack methods are listed (Wu and Moon 2017b).
The attack methods are generalized. For example, a privilege compromise attack can be achieved
by attack vectors such as Shellshock (Mary 2015) or Buffer Overflow (Moore et al. 2016)
depending on different computer environments.
Table 1 Data extraction and injection in a manufacturing security breach.

Customer Layer
Application
Interface Layer
Core Service
Layer

Data Extraction

Method

Data Injection

• Low-level manufacturing
data: machine program or
model.
• Financial data: user financial
information.
• User data: user personal
information.
• High-level manufacturing
data: design specification.

• Privilege
compromise.
• User
compromise.

• Low-level manufacturing
data: machine program or
model.
• High-level manufacturing
data: Design specification.
• Cyber payload data: network
traffic flooding, executable
code.

• File Compromise.
• Privilege
compromise.
• User
compromise.
• Denial of Service.

• User data: user personal
information.
• High-level manufacturing
data: design specification.
• Low-level manufacturing
data: machine program or
model.

• Privilege
compromise.
• Access
control
compromise.

• High-level manufacturing
data: design specification.
• Low-level manufacturing
data: machine program or
model.

• Spoofing.
• Access control
compromise.
• Privilege
compromise.
• Malware
installation.

• Financial data: user and
service provider financial info.
• User data: user personal
information.
• High-level manufacturing
data: operational schedule,
inventory, productivity (ERP).

• Privilege
compromise.
• Access
control
compromise.

• High-level manufacturing
data: operational schedule,
inventory, productivity (ERP).
• Financial Data: malicious
financial info.

• Spoofing.
• Access control
compromise.
• Privilege
compromise.
• Malware
installation.
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Method

Integrated
Connection Layer
Physical Provide
Layer

• High-level manufacturing
data: operational data,
inventory data.
• Low-level manufacturing
data: machine program or
model.
• Physical data: tooling,
quality, control, monitoring
data.

• Privilege
compromise.
• Access
control
compromise.

• High-level manufacturing
data: operational data,
inventory data.
• Low-level manufacturing
data: machine program or
model.
• Physical data: tooling, quality,
control, monitoring data.

• Spoofing.
• Access control
compromise.
• Privilege
compromise.
• Malware
installation.

• Physical data: tooling,
process, monitoring data.
• Low-level manufacturing
data: machine program or
model.
• High-level manufacturing
data: production plan.

• Privilege
compromise.
• Access
control
compromise.

• High-level manufacturing
data: production plan.
• Low-level manufacturing
data: machine program or
model.
•Physical data: tooling, process,
monitoring data.

• Supplier
Compromise.
• Spoofing.
• Access control
compromise.
• Privilege
compromise.
• Malware
installation.

In conclusion, the attacks surface of a five-layer CMS architecture is greatly enlarged, with
various attack methods to manipulate the cyber and physical domain of CMS. Following section
1.3.1.1 to section 1.3.1.5 explains Table 1 in detail.
1.3.1.1 Customer Layer
The customer layer receives manufacturing service requests from consumers. In this layer,
the system action is receiving customers’ uploaded design requirements, models, or purchased
designs. This layer contains cyber-physical data resources including customer’s personal and
financial information, as well as high-level and low-level manufacturing data. As a result, the
attack surface compromises the system action of file uploading and cyber and physical data. For
example, an attacker can intrude via uploading a malicious design model or injecting malicious
payload via cyber and physical data. Moreover, the attacker could steal data from the customer
layer, such the intellectual property (customer’s design specification, design drawing or model),
personal information or financial information.
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The attacker can intrude via the file uploading system action. The attacker can compromise
user accounts by SQL injection or cross-site scripting to access individual customers’ data.
Moreover, the attacker can inject malicious commands, malicious CAD/CAM code into the cyber
and physical data in the customer layer, such as editing the design or product specification in the
database. Moreover, the system action in this layer is externally visible and heavily relies on
network service. As a result, the attacker can send a large amount of network traffic to cause a
denial-of-service attack.
1.3.1.2 Application Interface Layer
The application interface layer transfers a production request into a sequence of
implementable production procedures. In this layer, the system action includes services such as
computer-aided design or manufacturing (CAD/CAM) provided by CMS. This layer contains
cyber and physical data: processed high-level and low-level manufacturing data that could be
manipulated to cause a physical consequence, or be stolen.
The attacker could target both the high-level and low-level data, as well as users’ personal
information. Different from the customer layer, the attack method of compromising a user account
will not grant access to the application interface layer. However, compromise to the access control
via a CMS insider, such as an employee or supplier, can also allow access to read and download
the critical data.
Alongside reading the data, the attacker can also maliciously edit the critical manufacturing
data to cause a cyber-physical consequence. Attack methods such as malware, spoofing, access
control compromise, and privilege compromise can allow a hacker to edit manufacturing critical
data in the application interface layer.
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1.3.1.3 Core Service Layer
The core service layer provides system action that allocates manufacturing job requests to
the production service provider globally. This layer contains high-level data such as operational
schedule, inventory information, productivity, etc. Moreover, this layer also contains financial data
from both the customer and manufacturing service provider.
Using similar attack methods in the second layer, the attacker can extract those data to
cause financial fraud or intellectual property theft. Moreover, malicious data injection in the
database or job allocation algorithms can cause high-level operational chaos in CMS production
flow.
1.3.1.4 Integrated Connection Layer
The integrated connection layer provides system actions that control, analyze and predict
the manufacturing conditions in the physical provider layer via techniques such as real-time
simulation, machine-learning, and digital-twin. The manufacturing data at this level contains both
high and lower levels: operation, inventory, machine programs or model. Moreover, there are
physical data, such as tooling data, quality data, and monitoring data from the manufacturing
process.
The attacker can extract the data from this layer for intellectual property in the physical
domain, such as control algorithm, factory layout, etc. The attacker can also inject malicious data
that can cause mistakes in decision-making, such as editing the inventory data or machine
availability data to mislead job allocation. The attacker can also inject low-level manufacturing
data in the machine program or model to influence the physical provider layer further (Wu, Song,
and Moon 2019).
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1.3.1.5 Physical Provider Layer
The physical provider layer provides system action in manufacturing the customer’s order
via geographically distributed service providers. Physical assets such as equipment, machines, and
sensors are integrated into this layer. The cyber and physical data resources, such as high-level and
low-level manufacturing data, directly operate and monitor the machines and production plant.
The attacker can extract the data from this layer for the details of the manufacturing process.
Design and machine programs, as well as the manufacturing processes data, such as acoustic
emission (C. Song et al. 2016), can be exploited for intellectual property theft. The injection of
malicious data in this layer, such as editing the machine program or control algorithm can cause a
defective product, machine breakage or even safety incidents. The malicious data may infiltrate
the local network or even connected manufacturing equipment.
Alongside the attack methods, such as spoofing, access control compromise, privilege
compromise, and malware installation, the compromise of the supplier can also cause cyberphysical consequences in this layer. The supplier of a service provider may possess intellectual
properties, production plans, or even access control credentials. One service provider’s security
breach can influence multiple related manufacturers.
1.3.2

Detection Duration
To discuss the cyber-attack detection duration, attacks are categorized into two categories:

unknown attack and known attack.
The unknown attacks exploit vulnerabilities that have not been disclosed publicly. The
signature of unknown attack can hardly be defined ahead of time for IDS. As a result, the unknown
can hardly trigger any alerts. Unknown attacks commonly last between 19 days and 30 months
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without being detected, with a median of 8 months and an average of approximately 10 months
(Bilge and Dumitras 2012). It is typically longer than a production cycle, which can cause the
defective products on market.
The known attacks exploit discovered vulnerabilities, such as code injection, buffer
overflow, phishing attack, denial of service attacks (DoS), etc. Even though the patterns of known
attacks can be defined as rules for intrusion detection software, it still can take over 4 months to
discover a sophisticated attack among a large quantity of false alarms.

Figure 2 Attack timeline
As shown in Figure 2, the sophisticated attack and unknown attack can cause time-delay
effect in manufacturing system: malicious defective products could reach consumer market before
the IDS reveals the attack action. The defective products could be purchased, caused safety risk,
and require market recalls.
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1.4

The Objective and Hypothesis
The objective of this research is to prevent physical damage to equipment and defective

parts from cyber-physical attacks in CMS while reducing false alarms. To achieve the
objective, new methodologies are developed and applied, in addition to conventional network and
host based intrusion detection system. The new methodology takes advantage of the high accuracy
of physical data machine learning, and high efficiency alert correlation method in intrusion
detection.
The hypothesis of this research is that manufacturing process physical data analysis and
cyber-physical correlation analysis in Cyber-Manufacturing Systems can prevent physical
damage to equipment and defective parts from cyber-physical attacks while reducing false
alarms.
The cyber-physical intrusion in CMS is a new and unique problem. It enters from the cyber
network, but influences and damages physical equipment, machines, or even products. Currently,
there are not any detection methods for the cyber-physical intrusion. It is a new type of attack that
is not well understood and cannot effectively be detected according to prior research.
The Cyber-Manufacturing System is a unique environment as compared to a computer
network environment. The physical components are integrated with computational resources via
the Internet. In such a system, both physical data (such as acoustic emission and energy
consumption) and cyber data (such as network activity and computer host activity) can be extracted
from CMS for the study of cyber-physical intrusion detection. The physical data can help detect
intrusion quickly, and the correlation between cyber and physical data can help reduce false alarm
rate.
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The conventional network and host based intrusion detection will be integrated for
correlation and root cause analysis. Naturally, the limitations will be inherited from the current
network based IDS, such as large number of alarms and the high false alarm rate. The alarm
number reduction and false alarm reduction are critical for accomplishing this work.
The measurement of the objective is the accuracy of the detection, the alert reduction rate
and response time. The accuracy is defined as the total of the False-Negative Rate (FNR) and the
True Positive Rate (TPR). Response time measures the time interval between when the attacker
begins the intrusion and the time intrusion detection identifies the adversary. The alert reduction
rate shows that how many alerts can be correlated to reduce the detection time.
1.5

Dissertation Overview
In this section, the contribution and organization of this dissertation is summrized.

1.5.1

Contribution
This dissertation contributes to the manufacturing security domain with the following

points: (i) applied machine learning in manufacturing process for defect detection, (ii) defined
similarity-based cyber-physical alert correlation method, (iii) defined physical alert correlation
format, (iv) established the first CMS security testbed, (v) collected data on the testbed with cyberphysical attack experiments for research community.
The application of machine learning in manufacturing processes provides detection for
specific problems: 3D printing infill voids attack, and CNC milling process feed and spindle speed
attack. The 3D printing infill void attack was defined by Sturm (Sturm et al. 2014) without any
detection and prevention methods. The CNC milling process attack was defined by Vincent
(Vincent et al. 2015) without any detection method during the manufacturing process. This
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dissertation shows methodologies in data selection, collection, feature extraction and classification
to detect those attacks during manufacturing processes. They are examples to show how to use
physical data to detect malicious changes in manufacturing processes.
The similarity-based cyber-physical alert correlation method has been developed for this
work. There was no alert correlation method defined previously between the cyber and physical
domains. The possible reasons are: (i) there was no physical security alert to be correlated in the
past; (ii) cyber-physical attacks were not well noted, only emerging in recent years; (iii) physical
alerts were not standardized for study and analysis; (iv) physical detection does not have high false
alarm rate and large number of alerts that requires alert correlation. This correlation method is
defined for root cause analysis and false alarm reduction in both cyber and physical domains.
Moreover, a Physical Intrusion Detection Alert (PIDA) format is defined for information exchange
during alert correlation process.
The Cyber-Manufacturing System Security Testbed (CSST) is established for conducting
scientific experiments and validating theories for this dissertation. It is the first security-oriented
CMS testbed for intrusion detection research. It can provide an environment for researchers to
explore and create new cyber-physical attack scenarios, and validate detection/prevention methods.
The data collected from testbed have been shared with researchers, and could potentially be
utilized as benchmark datasets for intrusion detection study.
1.5.2

Dissertation Organization
The remainder of this dissertation is organized as follows. Chapter 2 reviews related works

on CMS, cyber-physical attacks, intrusion detection and alert correlation. Chapter 3 analyzes
cyber-physical attacks in depth, with examples, attack methods, and risk analysis in manufacturing.
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Chapter 4 discusses alert in both cyber and physical domains. Chapter 5 describes our methodology
of similarity-based cyber-physical alert correlation methods. Chapter 6 introduces the experiment
environment, attack design, and four case studies that validate cyber-physical attack detection and
alert correlation. Chapter 7 provides an implementation framework for application of this work on
candidate systems. Chapter 8 summarizes the dissertation and outlines the limitations and future
work.
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Chapter 2

2

Literature Review

In this chapter, publicly known cyber-physical attacks in critical infrastructure domain and
manufacturing sector are reviewed; the security status in Cyber-Manufacturing System and related
work in two topics: intrusion detection and alert correlation. The domains are limited to computer
security, industrial and manufacturing engineering, and cyber-physical system. The intrusion
detection and alert correlation are typical computer security domain research topics. However,
because of the nature of cyber-physical detection, methodologies that apply to manufacturing
quality control, process monitoring, side channel detection can also apply to detecting cyberphysical attacks.
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2.1

Cyber-Manufacturing System
Cyber-Manufacturing System is a vision for future manufacturing systems. It integrates

physical components with network and computational components seamlessly. An architecture of
CMS consists of five layers: the Application/User Layer, the Application Interface Layer, the
Global Core Service Layer, the Integrated Connection Layer, and the Physical Provider Layer (Z.
Song and Moon 2016b). The first layer—Application/User Layer—includes users and consumers.
The second layer—Application Interface Layer—includes support techniques as a buffer of
inventory and information processing. The third layer—Core Service Layer—is the global
information hub of machine resources, personnel, geographical locations, logistics, user
information, etc. The fourth layer—Integrated Connection Layer—is a local analysis and selfcontrol network center. The fifth layer—Physical Provider Layer—is the physical layer, which
includes all the manufacturing resources in factory floor.
While similar visions—cloud manufacturing, Industry 4.0, IoT manufacturing, and smart
manufacturing—differ in detail, one common character is the physical layer is connected, causing
physical components being targets of cyber-physical attack. Furthermore, some of the existing
equipment to be integrated are rarely updated (Pan et al. 2017b)—making CMS extremely
vulnerable to cyber-attacks. At the same time, emerging unknown (Bilge and Dumitras 2012)
cyber-physical exploits such as “STL” file altering attacks (Sturm et al. 2017a) endanger the CMS
cyber and physical domain stealthily.
2.2

Cyber-Physical Attacks
Cyber-physical attacks initiate as digital format and intrude via cyber network, causing

physical components such as machines, equipment, parts, assemblies, products to develop over18

wearing, breakage, scrap or any other changes that original design does not intend to do (Wu, Song,
and Moon 2019). Furthermore, cyber-physical attacks can generate additional long-term effects.
For example, a weakened 3D printing structure caused by malicious attacks can compromise
customers’ safety, with a series of events such as recalls and replacements.
Even though CMS has not fully been realized, cyber-physical attacks have been happening
in connected manufacturing systems. In this section, existing published cyber-physical attacks, and
security incidents in manufacturing system are reviewed. The information source of cyber-physical
attacks can be categorized into four types: security investigation reports, research papers, industry
reports and news.
2.2.1

Confirmed Cyber-Physical Attacks

In this section, two publicly confirmed cyber-physical attacks: Stuxnet (Langner 2011) and
German steel mill attack (R. M. Lee, Assante, and Conway 2014) are presented. These two
incidents are well documented and published. Cyber-physical attacks in the perspective of attack
vector, attack impact, attack target and attack consequence (Wu and Moon 2017b) are analyzed.
2.2.1.1 Iran Stuxnet Attack
The Iran Stuxnet attack is documented by multiple sources (Langner 2011; Kelley 2013;
Karnouskos 2011; Yadegari and Mueller 2012; Lindsay 2013).
In 2010, secret Iranian centrifuges were targeted by Stuxnet—a malicious computer worm.
The worm compromised the programmable logic controllers (PLC) with unknown flaws —
undiscovered computer software vulnerability—to make the centrifuges spin faster (Karnouskos
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2011). Even though it happened in a critical infrastructure, the victim hardware such as Windows
operating system and Siemens controller are commonly used in manufacturing systems.
Even though Stuxnet is viewed as a turning point in the history of cybersecurity, and the
controller hijacking technique on the 315 and 417 controllers are complicatedly designed, the
attack vectors are not uncommon: computer worm distributed by Universal Serial Bus (USB)
sticks, payload code uses code injection and man-in-the-middle attack (Langner 2011). From
Stuxnet example, and following cases, the attack vector and direct attack impact of a cyberphysical attack are similar to existing cyber-attack exploits.
Stuxnet targeted at a particular type of programmable logic controllers (PLCs), collecting
information on industrial systems and causing the fast-spinning centrifuges to tear themselves
apart. On the infected machines, the centrifuges unintentionally sped up or slowed down and
finally were destroyed. Different form a convention cyber-attack on industrial system, the attack
target and consequence are in physical domain: destroy of equipment.
2.2.1.2 German Steel Mill Attack
In 2014, multiple hackers using phishing email with malicious attachment gained access to
the industrial control system in a German steel mill. The attack compromised the blast furnace
control system, making it unable to shut down by their employees, and ultimately caused
significant damage (R. M. Lee, Assante, and Conway 2014). It is one of the first confirmed cyberphysical attacks in the manufacturing system.
2.2.2

Cyber-Physical Attacks in Research

Several research address attacks on altering CAD/CAM file in manufacturing systems.
Sturm (Sturm et al. 2014) examines the cyber-physical vulnerabilities in additive manufacturing
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system—a key enabling technology for CMS. Malicious infill void placement by altering an “STL”
file is demonstrated in the work. Several tensile test specimens with and without voids were tested.
The experiment shown that the specimen fractured at the void location, with average reduction in
yield load of 14%, and strain at failure reduction from 10.4% to 5.8%. Sturm (Sturm et al. 2017a)
later conducted a case study to evaluate the ability of human subjecting to detect and diagnose a
cyber-physical attack on the STL file of a test specimen. Recommendations—improved software
checks, hashing or secure signing, improved process monitoring, and operator training—are
presented.
Two experiments of cyber-physical attack were conducted among engineering students to
test the response and awareness from human upon cyber-physical attacks. Wells (Wells et al. 2014)
conducted a cyber-physical attack experiment with sophomore-level engineering students; virus
infected the computer to alter the tool path file for 3-axis milling machine. The students are hardly
aware of the change and cannot diagnose the problem as a cyber-physical attack. Turner (Turner
et al. 2015) conducted a similar experiment: this time, the virus infected computer terminal
rewrites the students’ G-code for 3D printing to alter the part’s geometry. The results show none
of the groups were aware that the computer system was under attack.
Zeltmann (Zeltmann et al. 2016b) investigated two cyber-physical attack methods on 3D
printing: embed defects and alter printing orientation. This research presents a different defect
location compare to Sturm 2014; moreover, the alter printing orientation is explored in this
research. The result shows that the ultrasonic detection method can hardly detect both attack
methods, while the attack methods cause reduction in strength and failure strain.
Belikovetsky (Belikovetsky, Yampolskiy, et al. 2017) demonstrated a complete chain of
attack from cyber-attack aimed at compromising a manufacturing environment, ending with the
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destruction of the target system. The final result shows that structural change reduced the fatigue
life of a 3D printed drone propeller, causing the part broke down during the flight.
Yampolskiy (Yampolskiy et al. 2016) conducted security analysis in the ability of
compromised 3D Printing equipment by cyber-physical attacks. The attack weaponize the
equipment in order to cause kinetic, nuclear/biological/chemical or cyber damages. The targets
analyzed including 3D object physical properties, contamination, electronic circuits, equipment
lifetime, damage, explosion, and environment fire, contamination.
Pan (Pan et al. 2017b) identifies and classifies possible cyber-physical attacks against IoTbased manufacturing processes. The attack vectors include social engineering, malware, cross-site
scripting and insufficient authentication. It also identifies the vulnerability in different
manufacturing processes such as milling, turning, drilling, 3D printing, soldering, heat treatment,
and surface coat.
2.2.3

Cyber-Physical Attacks in News

The news documents the occurrence of cyber-physical attacks incidents, but rarely
provides detail of the attack method, consequence and post attack investigation results. News that
documents the potential of the cyber-physical attacks in manufacturing system nowadays are
presented. Two types of attack: ransomware and data breach are included.
2.2.3.1 Ransomware
Though the ransomware was not designed to target the manufacturing specifically, the
consequence of downtime in production illustrates how critically cyber-physical attacks can
damage manufacturing systems that are connected by the Internet.
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In 2017, the WannaCry ransomware affected the car manufacturer Dacia (owned by French
Renault) in Romania, and caused Renault to temporarily stop production at several sites to prevent
the spread of the attack (Kaspersky Lab 2017).
In 2018, Boeing production plant in Charleston, South Carolina, US is hit by WannaCry
ransomware with few machines influenced (Gates 2018). Same year, the world's largest
manufacturer of semiconductors and processors Taiwan Semiconductor Manufacturing Company
(TSMC) was forced to shut down for a production day, because of the WannaCry ransomware
(Mohit Kumar 2018).
2.2.3.2 Data breach
The data breach in manufacturing not only can cause secret and intellectual property theft,
but also control data alteration.
In 2018, a total of seven auto companies were impacted by the data leak, including auto
manufacturer Chrysler, Ford, GM, Tesla, Toyota and Volkswagen. The data included 10 years of
assembly-line schematics and control settings for robotics used to build the cars, along with
internal ID and VPN-request forms. The permissions to the server were set to allow anyone to
write, which means the data could be accessed, downloaded, and changed by anyone (Spring 2018).
It potentially could cause a successful Cyber-physical attack in manufacturer shop floor. However,
since the incident occurred in July 2018, there was no follow up security investigation published.
The cyber-physical attack types in manufacturing are not limited to the cases in above news.
In fact, limited security incidents are published, with a trend of under-reporting security incidents
in manufacturing sector (IBM-Security 2017).

23

2.2.4

Industry Insights on Cyber-Physical Attacks

The security industry report provides the security trend overview yearly. The institutes and
companies provide those reports including International Business Machines (IBM) XForce, Kaspersky, Verizon, Symantec, Deloitte.
2.2.4.1 IBM X-Force
The IBM X-Force publish yearly Threat Intelligence Index security report about all
industries. The manufacturing sector always ranks in top five attacked industry in all recent five
years (Bradley et al. 2015; IBM-Security 2016; Alvarez et al. 2017; IBM-Security 2018, 2019).
Specially in 2017, a separate report Security Trends in the Manufacturing Industry is published
focus on manufacturing security (IBM-Security 2017) reveals that the manufacturing industry had
the most number of confirmed security incidents among all industry sectors in 2016—with almost
40 percent higher than the average across all industries. In their 2019 report, the cyber-physical
attack is the future risk of manufacturing system: “future trigger events or new attack tactics may
lead to damage to physical infrastructure—and potentially human lives… manufacturing sector
must rethink the security of its operational zones and its preparedness to respond to potential
attacks of this nature” (IBM-Security 2019).
Moreover, over the years, there is an underreporting trend (IBM-Security 2017; Alvarez et
al. 2017) in manufacturing section shown from IBM X-Force yearly report.
2.2.4.2 Kaspersky
Kaspersky Lab publishes yearly report The State of Industrial Cybersecurity focus on
industrial cybersecurity since 2017. The survey based report shows that the cyber-physical
attacks—sabotage or other intentional physical damage by external actors—is one of the major
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concerns for industrial control system across the world (Kaspersky Lab 2017; Schwab and Poujol
2018). In 2017, the new rumors of cyber-physical attacks, including Triton and Industroyer,
increased the concern.
2.2.4.3 Deloitte
Deloitte published a study Cyber Risk in Advanced Manufacturing (Waslo et al. 2017) in
collaboration with Manufacturers Alliance for Productivity and Innovation (MAPI) and Forbes
Insights. In the study, production downtime, equipment damage or failure, loss of life, fines,
litigation expenses, and loss of revenue from brand damage that can persist for months or even
years are highlighted are highlighted as consequence of potential cyber-physical attacks via the
integration of Internet of Things (IoT) devices in manufacturing system.
2.3

Intrusion Detection System
An intrusion detection system (IDS) is designed to alarm malicious activities and security

violations in a system. It comprises two core functions: auditing data regarding suspects and
analyzing the data (Mitchell and Chen 2014). It is broadly used in computer security domain to
monitor networks and hosts for cyber-attack. In this work, the intrusion detection works in the (i)
computer security domain, (ii) manufacturing process domain, and (iii) industrial control domain
are reviewed.
Among the three topics, the (i) computer security domain will focus on its original
algorithms, limitations and improve methodologies. Although the development of intrusion
detection in computer security domain is continuous, it cannot fit into the background of CyberManufacturing System.
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The between topic (ii) and (iii), the focus will be on the (ii) manufacturing process domain.
The cyber-physical manufacturing and industrial control in intrusion detection are two separate
domains (Giraldo et al. 2017; A. Elhabashy 2018) despite the overlapping. Even though the two
domains could be correlated in the future, the methodology of this work utilizes more on cyberphysical manufacturing process domain.
2.3.1

Computer Security Domain
In computer security, there are two types of IDS according to audit data: (i) host-based

intrusion detection systems and (ii) network-based intrusion detection systems. According to the
data analysis method, there are two types of IDS detection methods: (iii) knowledge-based and (iv)
behavior-based. Over the years, although new data analysis techniques are applicable to the
intrusion detection problem, these four categories of detection methods do not change.
A host-based intrusion detection system (HIDS) is an intrusion detection system that
monitors and analyzes the internals activities of a computing system to determine if it is
compromised. For example, the “etc/shadow” file in the Linux operating system keeps account
passwords. A change of the “etc/shadow” file can trigger the HIDS alarm for potential malicious
account information changes.
A network-based intrusion detection system (NIDS) audits network activities to determine
if a node is compromised (Liao et al. 2013). For example, if any IP address contributes a large
amount of traffic within a short time, the NIDS can be triggered for potential denial of service
(DoS) attack.
The knowledge-based intrusion detection techniques work like a blacklist. The technique
applies knowledge about known attacks and system vulnerabilities. The intrusion detection system
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contains information about these vulnerabilities and triggers an alarm when attack attempts are
detected.
By contrast, behavior-based (anomaly-based) intrusion detection approaches look for
runtime features that are out of the ordinary (Mitchell and Chen 2014). This approach assumes that
an intrusion can be detected by observing a deviation from the normal or expected behavior of the
system or the users (Herve Debar 2017).
The limitation of the general intrusion detection system is its slow response time. In some
cases, an average intrusion takes more than two months to detect and even longer to remediate. As
the complexity of network grows in CMS, the case can take much longer (Jon Minnick 2016). The
response time is longer than a product manufacturing lifecycle. This puts the safety and business
of users and manufacturers at risk.
For an IDS system, there are three aspects that can be improved: (i) machine learning
algorithms, (ii) feature selection and extraction methods, and (iii) training data/detection rules.
However, this work does not intend to improve the intrusion detection system in the computer
security domain. The IDS system for cyber-physical alert detection with current techniques are
adapted and integrated along with their limitations, such as false alarms.
2.3.2

Manufacturing Process Domain
The physical data collected from manufacturing process has been extensively used to detect

malicious change during the process. This method is referred as side-channel detection, or physical
based detection in this domain.
Vincent (Vincent et al. 2015) proposed a method of Trojan detection and side-channel
analyses for cyber-physical manufacturing systems. The structural health monitoring detection
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system is used to detect changes to a manufactured part’s intrinsic behavior. However, Vincent’s
detection occurs only after the part is manufactured. Also, it cannot tell if the manufactured part’s
intrinsic behavior is caused by system flaw or intrusion attacks.
Wu (M. Wu et al. 2016) presented a method of detecting embedded void via “STL”
alteration attack during the 3D printing process. The method uses a camera taking top view images
during 3D printing process layer by layer. The method can detect any malicious design with
machine learning image classification methods. The detection method reached accuracy of 96.1%
(Wu et al. 2017). Wu then proposed a detection method for G-code alteration with dimensional
change in the CNC milling process (Wu, Song, and Moon 2019). The method utilized acoustic
signal during CNC milling process and machine learning, reaching an average detection accuracy
of 91.1%.
Chhetri (Chhetri, Canedo, and Faruque 2016) proposed a detection system for cyberphysical attacks in 3D printing process, called KCAD. The system used acoustic analog emissions
for detecting potential unknown kinetic cyber-attacks. The system reaches an accuracy of 77.45%
in detecting the kinetic cyber-physical attack. This work used statistically estimating function to
simulate the analog emissions with corresponding G-code to detect kinetic cyber-physical attack.
Belikovetsky (Belikovetsky, Solewicz, et al. 2017a) presents work for detecting the cyberphysical attacks in a drone propeller, previously presented in (Belikovetsky, Yampolskiy, et al.
2017). Similar to KCAD (Chhetri, Canedo, and Faruque 2016), Belikovetsky used acoustic signal
generated by onboard stepper motors during 3D printing process. The method evaluated the
deviation between acoustic signals.
Monroy (Monroy et al. 2018) proposed a defect injection attack localization (DIAL)
algorithm that uses machines’ energy consumption and voltage measurements to identify
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compromised machines in the system. The work used multiple 3D printers to simulate a largescale IoT-enabled manufacturing system. The method can efficiently observe and locate the
compromised machine, without providing any detection accuracy.
Overall, the above methods use physical performance and indicators to detect cyberphysical attacks. However, while they can detect physical change, they cannot find the root cause
residing in the cyber domain. Moreover, most of the existing research considers the attack or
detection from component level: they are investigating one type of machine or a single type of
manufacturing process. However, CMS is designed at the system level. This research aims for
developing an intrusion detection system from the system level point of view.
2.3.3

Industrial Control Domain
One example of intrusion detection system in industrial control domain is

(Hadžiosmanović et al. 2014). It presented a semantic, network-based intrusion detection system
monitoring the communication of PLCs in two real-world water plants. The method detects cyberphysical attack by monitoring the state variables of the system, including: constants, attribute data,
and continuous data (Giraldo et al. 2018).
There is also a large amount of work in the control theory community, which are mostly
high-level and highly mathematical. Most of the work looks at models of the system satisfying a
particular equation (Giraldo et al. 2018). This work takes a different route compared to the control
theory community: start with low-level manufacturing processes with data intensive methods.
Compared to control theory, this work follows the computer security domain method that focuses
specifically on intrusion detection problem. However, the control theory domain work provides a
good method to generalize the detection method to a high-level perspective.
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2.4

Alert Correlation Theory
Different from the review of intrusion detection, the alert correlation research has only

been developing in the computer and network security discipline since the early 2000s. The
research can be categorized into two categories: (i) alert correlation methodology and (ii) alert
correlation process. The correlation methodologies (Qin 2005; Kabiri and Ghorbani 2007; K. Lee
et al. 2008; Smith et al. 2008; Ahmadinejad and Jalili 2009; Roschke, Cheng, and Meinel 2011)
provide techniques to correlate alerts, while the correlation processes or frameworks (Elshoush
and Osman 2012; Cuppens and Miège 2002; Valeur et al. 2004; Shittu et al. 2015) supply general
principles from a high level in correlation processes.
Three types of alert correlation methods have been developed: (i) similarity-based method,
(ii) sequential-based method, and (iii) case-based method (Salah, Maciá-Fernández, and DíazVerdejo 2013).
2.4.1

Similarity-Based Method
The similarity-based method correlates different alerts by defining and using their alert

similarities. The main assumption of this method is that similar alerts have the same root causes
or similar effects on the system being monitored. The similarity is evaluated by comparing predefined features.
The temporal similarity-based method uses time as the pre-defined feature for alert
correlation. It is assumed that the alerts by the same attacks are generated within a short time
window. Alerts generated within a time window are correlated or aggregated. Other types of
similarity-based methods use different attributes in evaluating similarities—such as IP addresses,
ports, kinds of service, and users. A similarity measure is typically calculated by computing certain
metrics, such as Euclidean distance function. The resulting scores, when compared with threshold
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values, determine whether these alerts are to be correlated or not (Salah, Maciá-Fernández, and
Díaz-Verdejo 2013).
The similarity-based method has advantages in alert correlation research. It is less
complicated, so can be implemented in diverse systems. Moreover, it has proven the effectiveness
in reducing the total number of alerts (Salah, Maciá-Fernández, and Díaz-Verdejo 2013) for alert
correlation and aggregation processes. In general, this method cannot discover causality
relationship between alerts. However, for CMS environments, the correlation can reveal the
causality relationship between correlated alerts from different components of CMS because of the
connection within the physical production flows.
2.4.2

Sequential-Based Method
The sequential-based method correlates different alerts by using causality relationships.

The causality relationship exists between the attack pre-conditions and the attack consequences.
The attack pre-conditions are the necessary requirements for a successful exploit, while the attack
consequences are the influence of a specific attack payload that occurred. The results from the
sequential-based method may embody many false alarms. This is especially prevalent when the
logical predicates are not well configured, or the quality of the sensor alerts is not adequate.
For CMS, the cyber-attack pre-condition and physical attack consequence do not
necessarily have strong logical predicates. For example, a privilege elevation attack, such as
shellshock attack, can cause various types of cyber and physical consequences—production
parameter changes, design alteration, or even downtime. It is almost impossible to define the
causality relationship between cyber and physical alerts exhaustively.
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2.4.3

Case-Based Method
The case-based method correlates different alerts by comparing specific system behaviors

with the pre-defined scenarios in a knowledge-based system. The case-based method has been
implemented to correlate alerts based on known attack cases. The knowledge base is being updated
by inferencing mechanisms, or expert interventions with successfully correlated cases and newly
brought-up cases. The case-based correlation method can efficiently correlate pre-defined attack
scenarios, but heavily depends on its knowledge base. It is difficult to enumerate every attack
scenario in advance and create a useful knowledge base even within a reasonable time frame.
For CMS, the attack case scenarios can help to understand the attack adversary and define
the monitoring strategy. However, a case-based method is not adequate for continuously emerging
cyber-physical attacks. Also, it is not efficient for the need of real-time alarm correlation.
Furthermore, it is not practical to develop different knowledge bases for various CMS enterprises
with different network and manufacturing environments.
The alert correlation process provides a high-level principle view on correlation processes.
Over the years, several alert correlation frameworks have been developed to correlate IDS datasets.
An overview of six alert correlation processes developed over the years is shown in Table 2.
Table 2 Alert correlation process review
Paper

Alert Correlation Process

(Valeur et al. 2004)

Normalization, Preprocessing, Alert Fusion, Alert Verification, Thread
Reconstruction, Attack Session Reconstruction, Focus Recognition, MultiStep Correlation, Impact Analysis, Prioritization.

(Siraj 2006)

Normalization/Formatting, Reduction Severity/Prioritization, Attack
Scenario Contribution, Attack Prediction.

(Maggi and Zanero 2007)

Normalization, Prioritization, Aggregation, Correlation and Verification.
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(Elshoush and Osman
2012)

Normalization, Preprocessing, Prioritization, Alert, Verification, Alert
Fusion.

(Maggi and Zanero 2007)

Alert Normalization, Alert Clustering, Alert Correlation and Intention
Recognition.

(Bhuyan, Bhattacharyya,
and Kalita 2017)

Alert Normalization, Preprocessing, Correlation Techniques, PostProcessing, and Validation.

Unlike other cyber-alerts-only correlation methods—such as alert correlation (Cuppens
and Miège 2002; Valeur et al. 2004; Qin 2005; Valeur 2006), log correlation (Abad et al. 2003),
alert aggregation (H Debar and Wespi 2001), alert management (Bhuyan, Bhattacharyya, and
Kalita 2017),and alert mining (Julisch and Dacier 2004)—the cyber and physical alerts from CMS
possess different causal relationships. Currently available methods are not adequate for correlating
cyber and physical alerts. Attributes such as time, IP address and port numbers are not shared
between cyber and physical processes. Attributes from manufacturing processes that can enhance
the correlation efficiency have not been investigated.
2.5

Summary
From the literature review, the cyber-physical attacks in CMS shows growing toxic

potential, but lack systemic understanding. In Chapter 3, two taxonomies are presented to study
cyber-physical attacks from intrusion and detection perspective. In chapter 4 and 5, attack
detection and correlation methods are analyzed and developed in depth, to detect cyber-physical
attacks in CMS.
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Chapter 3

3

Cyber-Physical Attacks

In this chapter, cyber-physical attack is analyzed further in depth. Taxonomy of cyberphysical attack in cyber-physical manufacturing system is presented to give a comprehensive
understanding of the attack targets, methods and consequences. 37 cyber-physical attack scenarios
are presented based on six common targets in CMS: human, product, equipment, intellectual
property, environment, and operation. This section provides a better understanding of cyberphysical attacks, and potential validation methods for detection and prevention research.
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3.1

Cyber-Physical Attack Decomposition
To understand cyber-physical attack, the attacks are decomposed into four dimensions:

cyber-attack vector, attack cyber-impact, attack physical target and attack physical consequence.
3.1.1

Cyber-Attack Vector
Cyber-attack vector in CMS mainly comes from a network and computer attacks in a digital

format. The taxonomy includes shellshock, buffer overflow, race condition, cross-site request
forgery, code injection, repackaging, virus, and worms.
Shellshock: It is a security bug in Unix Bash shell, first discovered on 24 September 2014.
This vulnerability can exploit various systems and be launched either remotely or from a local
machine. The Internet-facing services in CMS, such as service facing customers, can use Bash to
process certain requests. This can allow an attacker to gain the root/super or user/administrator
access and run malicious commands that result in unauthorized access to a computer system.
Buffer Overflow: This refers to a condition when a program tries to write data beyond the
limit of pre-allocated fixed length buffers. It happens when a piece of code or data do not check
for appropriate length of input and the value is not the size the program expects(Simmons et al.
2014). This vulnerability can be exploited by a malicious user who gains the root/super or
user/administrator access and executes arbitrary commands.
Race Condition: A race condition occurs when multiple processes access and manipulate
the same data concurrently. It allows an attacker to gain the root/super or user/administrator
privileges while a program or process is in those privilege modes.
Cross-Site Request Forgery (CSRF): Also known as session riding, this is a type of
attack on website where unauthorized commands are transmitted from a user that the website trusts.
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It can happen on web applications facing customers in CMS. A CSRF attack involves a victim
user (customer), a trusted site (CMS web), and a malicious site (attack site). When the customer
holds an active session with a CMS web application while visiting a malicious site, the malicious
site can inject an HTTP requests to the CMS web application user session, causing change in
account information.
Code Injection: Code injection is caused by attackers' inputting code into a vulnerable
computer program and change the process of execution. The places in CMS for code injection may
include SQL (Structured Query Language), OS commands, etc. For example, most small and
industrial strength database applications can be accessed using SQL statements for structural
modification and content manipulation (Zhu, Bonnie, Anthony Joseph 2011). Malicious users can
use SQL injection and manipulate other customer’s information.
Repackaging: This is a type of attacks on Android OS applications. Attackers download
popular applications from a store, unpack and modify the application with malicious requests of
privileges, then post the application in certain third-party app stores. In CMS, the designs with
CAD models can be offered online. Similar to repackaging an application, attackers can repackage
a design by reverse engineering or just modifying the CAD file; then uploading back to online
platforms. Such attacks can cause defective parts, products, or even machine malfunctions.
Virus: This self-replicating program can spread through some types of infected file
(Hansman and Hunt 2005).
Worms: This self-replicating program can propagate without using infected files. Worms
usually propagate through network services on computers or through emails.
Among all those cyber-attack vectors, 74 percent of manufacturers are targeted by
malicious input data and code injection to attempt to control or disrupt a system, which is notably
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higher than the cross-industry average of 42 percent. Among those code injection attacks in
manufacturing, SQL injection made up 45 percent of these attacks ranks the most frequent cyberattack vectors among all code injection attacks (IBM-Security 2017).
3.1.2

Attack Cyber-Impact
The cyber impact shows the impact on digital platforms, such as web application, program,

operating system, digital file, etc. The taxonomy includes privilege compromise, user compromise,
file compromise, denial of service, and malware installation.
Privilege Compromise: By using attack vectors such as buffer overflow, shellshock, race
condition, the attacker can gain higher privileges such as superuser.
User Compromise: An attacker gains unauthorized use of other user account or privileges
on a host, web application, or database. An attack such as CSRF can achieve this goal on web
applications.
File Compromise: In CMS, CAD/CAM files play a major role. Attacker makes malicious
change by using repackaging, code injection, thus can change the critical structure and physical
characteristic of the design.
Denial of Service (DoS): An attacker can conduct a denial-of-service attack (DoS attack)
that makes a connected machine such as a database or computation resource inaccessible to its
intended clients.
Malware Installation: An attack can be launched via user-installed malware, whether
user installation or drive-by installation. Installed malware can allow an adversary to gain full
control of the compromised systems, potentially leading to the exposure of sensitive information
or remote control of the host.
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3.1.3

Attack Physical Target
The target of a cyber-physical attack is in physical domain. For a cyber-physical

manufacturing system, the target could be sensor, actuator, machine, part/product or even human.
Sensor: Sensors allow monitoring to the manufacturing system and provide data for
manufacturing status perdition and simulation.
Actuator: An actuator is a fundamental component of a machine that moves or controls a
mechanism or system.
Machines: Machine is the key component of physical provider layer in CMS. It can also
be an assembly of actuators, sensors and control unit such as programmable logic controller (PLC).
Manufactured Parts: Manufactured parts or assemblies are the finished products from a
production line.
Human: Human can be a target victim in CMS as well. Operators, assembly workers
working next to robots are endangered when hackers can send malicious control to actuators.
3.1.4

Attack Physical Consequence
The consequence of a cyber-physical attack is in physical domain, such as tear down a

centrifuge (Langner 2011), control a blast furnace (R. M. Lee, Assante, and Conway 2014), or a
defective 3D printed drone (Belikovetsky, Yampolskiy, et al. 2017). In general, six types of attack
consequence are summarized.
Defective Product: Defective products or even malicious products are physical
consequences. The scrap cost, recall will be drawn with defective products or part being
manufactured. Following consequences can damage company image or risk human lives.
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Machine Manipulation: Attacks can cause problems on machines such power over
consumption, unpredicted breakage, compromised precision, slow-down, etc.
Malfunction and Breakage: The breakage or malfunction can be a consequence of
machine manipulation.
Loss of System Availability: The critical availability of physical components such as 3D
printers, CNC machines, logistics can be compromised.
Environmental Disaster: Environmental disasters such as leakage and explosion are
critical physical consequences.
Risk of Death and Serious Injury: Human as most fragile component of CMS is at risk
of their health and life when working in environment with hazardous chemical, radiation and
robots.
3.2

Scenarios of Cyber-Physical Attack in CMS
Based in prior analysis, six common targets in CMS is emphasized: human, product,

equipment, intellectual property, environment, and operation. 37 cyber-physical attack scenarios
are designed for detection validation for this study, as well as attack prevention and mitigation
study. This section is generalized in the format of an intrusion taxonomy.
3.2.1

Human
In the human category, two types of people are the major target in CMS: customer and

worker. Although, those two targets are not further decomposed into sub-targets, the customers
can be both end-consumers or people involved in an entire supply chain. Also, the customers’
safety can be endangered by a product, while workers’ safety can be compromised by the working
environment.
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As shown in Figure 3, the human as an affected entity is decomposed into four major
categories: customer safety risk from product quality or security compromise, and worker safety
risk from environment safety or production safety compromise.
Product quality risk on customer safety. The product quality can be compromised via a
cyber-physical attack. Furthermore, the physical consequence can cause human safety risks, such
as defective products, weakened structures (Sturm et al. 2014) and reduced product lifetime.
Product security risk on customer safety. The product security that is compromised via
software or hardware can cause human safety risks. The vulnerability through a backdoor may
allow attackers to access the product remotely via the Internet and result in safety compromises.
For example, a vulnerable infotainment system can allow a hacker to control a Jeep Cherokee’s
ignition switch, brakes and steering system (WIRED 2015), leading to several accidents. The
product can become dangerous even without the remote control: attackers may alter the product
software or hardware during production, causing the product to malfunction in the future.

Figure 3 Human category decomposition
Environment risk on worker safety. Environmental risk in work space can endanger
workers’ safety. An attacker may manipulate manufacturing process or emission treatment to
increase pollution in a production environment.
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Production risk on worker safety. The production accident based on malfunctioning
manufacturing processes can occur. For example, the UI modification attack (Quarta et al. 2017)
on an industrial robotic arm may lead operators on a critical safety hazard.
3.2.2

Product
The product can be compromised in CMS with consequences in unacceptable quality.

Three major targets are design processes, manufacturing processes, and quality inspection
processes.
As shown in Figure 4, compromises in the product quality are classified into eight
categories: product design structure, dimension, design feature, production raw material,
equipment, specification, software, inspection equipment and specification.
Structure property compromise on design integrity. The attacker can manipulate the
design process or the design document to change the structure of a part. The physical performance
of a part—such as stiffness, natural frequency—can be affected according to the structural changes
and additional quality issues.

Figure 4 Product category decomposition
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Dimension compromise in design integrity. The dimensional change can be embedded
in CAD/CAM file. Attackers may scale a part incorrectly in one or more dimensions or make
alterations in the file. It can cause the part unfit in the assembly design (Pan et al. 2017b).
Design feature specification manipulation in design. The design feature such as drilling
hole, fillet can be removed or added maliciously by modifying design file. Such attacks can
increase manufacturing cost and cause assembly problems.
Raw material manipulation in manufacturing process. The raw material or part from
upper stream supplier can be affected by the attack. The material changes in the manufacturing
processes—such as change of colors, strength, surface roughness—can cause the finished part with
a different physical property to the original design. For example, change the 3D printing filament
from ABS to PLA plastic. The source part manipulation—such as hardware Trojan on circuit
board—can result in malicious defective parts.
Equipment manipulation in manufacturing process. Connected equipment can be
manipulated by attackers during manufacturing processing. One of the consequences of equipment
manipulation is product alteration—resulting in malicious products, defective products, etc.
Specification

manipulation in manufacturing process.

The specification in

manufacturing processes can be the target to make product quality alterations. Examples are
changes in heat treatment temperature, changes in feed speed of milling, and changes in 3D printer
heating nozzle temperature. As a result, the product may be generated in poor quality.
Product software compromise in manufacturing process. The software or operating
system is a common part of a product—such as automobiles, computers, smartphones, etc. The
software can be compromised from a backdoor for further malicious activities by attackers.
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Inspection equipment manipulation. The equipment for product inspection process can
be manipulated. An attacker may make inspection process to accept manufactured products as
conforming, despite their unacceptable quality (A. E. Elhabashy et al. 2018).
Inspection specification manipulation. Inspection process specification can be
manipulated by altering control limits, data, etc. Similarly, parts or products of poor quality may
be ignored during the process. Moreover, manipulation with stricter specification can classify
otherwise acceptable parts as defective; and cause more downtimes in the investigation for quality
improvement.
3.2.3

Equipment
The equipment itself is a target that can bring damage to different physical components in

manufacturing systems. The sensors, machines, and controllers are further discussed in equipment
manipulation dimension.
As shown in Figure 5, the equipment manipulation can be decomposed into seven
categories: sensor manipulation with data integrity and sensor availability, actuator manipulation
with its maintenance, specification and availability, controller manipulation with control logic and
availability.
Sensor data integrity manipulation. The data integrity is important especially for the
controlled manufacturing processes, such as heat treatment, injection molding, etc. The loss of
integrity in data causes malfunctions in the control of manufacturing processes and can induce
production accidents.
Sensor availability manipulation. The denial of service (DoS) attack on sensors can make
the manufacturing process or even whole system lose availability.
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Figure 5 Equipment category decomposition
Actuator maintenance manipulation. The schedule or process of actuator maintenance
can be attacked, resulting in malicious machine wearing or damage by attackers.
Actuator specification manipulation. The malicious change in actuator specification can
directly cause physical consequence, such as motor damage, drilling bit damage, etc.
Actuator availability manipulation. Loss of actuator availability can result from the
denial of service attack (DoS) on a connected actuator.
Controller logic manipulation. Controllers such as programmable logic controller (PLC)
is commonly used in manufacturing systems. They control assembly lines, robotic arms, etc. But
the controller logic can also be manipulated. For example, changes the spindle speed on a CNC
milling machine can increase the excessive wearing on the end mill bill and also motor itself.
Intensive manipulation may cause incidents such as in the Stuxnet worm incident (Langner 2011).
Controller availability manipulation. Similarly, with a denial of service attack (DoS),
CMS operator may lose control of the controller and corresponding actuators. For example, the
blast furnace cannot be shut down by its control system in the steel mill incident from Germany in
2014 (R. M. Lee, Assante, and Conway 2014).
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3.2.4

Intellectual property
Intellectual property theft is a common problem in the current manufacturing system and

so will be in CMS. The direct consequence of intellectual property theft is the loss of trade secrets.
However, the long-term influence can be physical—counterfeit goods, modified designs, etc.
Moreover, new cyber-physical attack methods such as side-channel attack (C. Song et al. 2016)
add new methods for intellectual property thefts.

Figure 6 Intellectual property category decomposition
As shown in Figure 6, intellectual property thefts are decomposed into seven categories:
intellectual property theft by unauthorized access or compromise network communication;
production data theft or eavesdropping; leakage from insider, supplier or outsourcing manufacturer.
Database unauthorized access in network environment. Attackers can use methods such
as code injection, shellshock, or social engineering to make unauthorized access to database or
computers that contain intellectual properties and trade secrets.
Communication eavesdropping in network environment. In the age of CMS, network
communication among customers and service providers are ubiquitous. A weak link in
communication can create a channel for intellectual property thefts.
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Production data theft. The data from production can be used to reverse developing and
engineering. For example, the acoustic emission data (C. Song et al. 2016) can be used to
reconstruct the object being manufactured. Obtaining production data is an indirect way of
intellectual property theft.
Production data eavesdropping. Similarly, the production data can also be picked up and
eavesdropped by compromised devices for reverse engineering. For example, a smartphone (C.
Song et al. 2016) in a connected environment can monitor 3D printing processes.
Insider confidentiality compromise. Ill-intended insiders may be able to steal intellectual
properties. The employee can sell those data or start up a competing company. The insider threat
is a significant factor in intellectual property theft, accounting for 15% of breaches (Verizon 2017).
Supplier confidentiality compromise. Suppliers may be a weak link in the supply chain
that leaks intellectual property. A supplier from a country with weak intellectual property law or
little intellectual property protection culture, is more exposed to intellectual property thefts.
Outsourcing manufacturer confidentiality compromise. Similarly, outsourcing
companies can be a weak link in the supply chain—vulnerable to intellectual property thefts.
3.2.5

Environment damage
Two targets for environmental damage are manufacturing processes and products.
As shown in Figure 7, the environmental damage can be decomposed into six categories:

attack on manufacturing process via environmental spill, energy over-consumption or emission
manipulation; product chemical property change, energy over-consumption or emission sabotage.
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Figure 7 Environment category decomposition
Environmental spill in the manufacturing process. Cyber-physical attacks can cause
environmental spills in manufacturing systems. In some of the manufacturing processes, such
attacks can cause oil and chemical spills, radiological and biological discharges, and accidents
causing releases of pollutants.
Energy over-consumption in the manufacturing process. Attacks that manipulating
power consumption in CMS can influence environment indirectly—for example, increase in the
process temperature, decrease in storages' environment climate control temperature, etc.
Emission manipulation in the manufacturing process. Manipulating the emission
treatment process can cause environmental damages in the manufacturing processes. For example,
in 3D printing process, the emission rates were observed to depend strongly on extruder
temperature (Mendes et al. 2017). As a result, the emission may increase simply by attacking
extruder temperature.
Product chemical property change. Changes in chemical property of a product, such as
acid and alkaline, can influence the product’s damage to environment during its lifecycle.
Product energy over-consumption. Similarly, the product power consumption during
customers' usage can be manipulated by changing product specifications, software, controllers, etc.
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Product emission sabotage. Product emission during customers' usage can also
manipulated by altering software or controller to damage the environment. For example,
manipulation of the automobile emission via a software can increase the emission without being
noticed during pollution inspection (Contag et al. 2017).
3.2.6

Operation
The operational change and delay have significant consequences for manufacturing

systems. For example, unplanned downtime can cost as much as $20,000 potential profit loss per
minute (Quarta et al. 2017). Manufacturing processes and supply chains are two major targets for
operational schedule delay target.

Figure 8 Operation category decomposition
As shown in Figure 8, attacks on operations can be decomposed into four categories: attack
on manufacturing process with equipment availability and production schedule; attack on supply
chain with job allocation policy and supplier availability.
Equipment availability compromise. Such a downtime in an equipment can cause
operational changes within the manufacturer. By carrying out denial of service attacks on machines,
assembly lines, the attacker can delay the operational schedule.
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Operation schedule change. Attackers can change the scheduling in manufacturing
processes. Slowing down or speeding up the process both can cause chaotic operations. For
example, slightly slowing down the feed speed of CNC milling machine, printing speed of 3D
printer, or even conveyor speed, may significantly decrease the utilization of the machine in the
long run, and substantially delay the operational schedules.
Allocation policy manipulation. The job allocation policy is predefined based on factors
such as cost, geographical distance, sustainability, etc. A compromised policy can make incorrect
decisions and delay manufacturing schedules.
Supplier availability manipulation. Operations rely heavily on suppliers. Attacks on a
supplier’s service availability or real-time data availability can influence the operations. If the data
have been manipulated by attackers, the job allocation system may make incorrect decisions and
delay manufacturing schedule.
Overall, the attack scenarios is presented with six potential affected entities. They are
further decomposed into 15 targets and 32 sub-targets. Finally, 37 potential attack methods are
identified.
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Figure 9 Cyber-physical attacks scenarios in CMS
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Chapter 4
4

Alerts in Cyber and Physical Domain

In this chapter, the cyber and physical intrusion detection systems and their alerts are
introduced. The cyber domain utilizes network and host-based intrusion detection software. The
physical domain alert are generated by machine learning data analytics in the manufacturing
process. The performance of each systems is analyzed.
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4.1

Intrusion Detection Alerts in Cyber Domain
Cyber intrusion detection alerts can be generated by packages like Snort (Roesch 1999b),

OSSEC (Karthikeyan and Indra 2010) when suspicious activities are detected. Intrusion detection
alert in cyber domain includes both network-based and host-based intrusion detection system
(NIDS & HIDS).
In this section, an intrusion detection alert format to review the information that can be
utilized for alert correlation is introduced; how to generate cyber IDS alerts by using NIDS
software snort and HIDS software OSSEC is explained; example of alerts generated in our
experiment environment are shown.
4.1.1

Standard Format
The standard format for an intrusion detection alert is primarily for alert normalization:

translate features of each sensor alert into a generic format for feature extraction and alert
correlation. For cyber domain, there is well-established Intrusion Detection Message Exchange
Format (IDMEF).
The Intrusion Detection Message Exchange Format (IDMEF) was proposed by Internet
Engineering Task Force (IETF 2018). The purpose of the IDMEF is to define data formats and
exchange procedures for sharing information of interest to intrusion detection and response
systems and to the management systems that may need to interact with them (H. Debar, Curry, and
Feinstein 2007).
An IDMEF alert message is composed of nine different components (Bhuyan,
Bhattacharyya, and Kalita 2017):
Create Time: The time when the alert was generated.
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Detect Time: The time when the event(s) leading up to the alert was (were) detected.
Analyzer Time: Current time on the analyzer.
Analyzer: Identification information for the analyzer that generated the alert.
Source: The source that triggered the alert.
Target: The main target of the alert.
Classification: Information that describes the alert.
Assessment: Impact, action and response against the generated alerts with evaluation.
Additional data: Additional information that does not fit into the data model.
By preprocessing, the attributes can be extracted for alert correlation. As shown below, is
an example of IDMEF alert from ping-of-death attack:
4.1.2

Snort
In a computer network, network activity log data can be information, such as login attempts,

network connections, or every data packet that appeared on the wire (Kemmerer and Vigna 2002).
It can be monitored by Network based Intrusion Detection System (NIDS). For example, Software
Snort is a packet sniffer that can monitor network traffic in real time. It checks each packet closely
to detect a dangerous payload or suspicious anomalies.
Snort is an open source, lightweight, cross-platform software, originally developed by
Martin Roesch in C language in 1998. It uses predefined rules for checking abnormal data in packet
traffic (Khamphakdee, Benjamas, and Saiyod 2014). Snort is available for most operating systems
and most major platforms, including Windows, Linux, MacOS, BSD and Solaris. It can generate
alerts according to network activities in real time.
The software packages and detection rules can be downloaded from the Snort homepage
<www.snort.org>. The rule can also be defined by computer security professionals. For example,
Figure 10 shows a basic snort rule. This rule will generate an alert when traffic from any port of
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IP address 10.0.1.5 send to any destination IP address and destination port number is 53. It also
will show message “DNS request” (Khamphakdee, Benjamas, and Saiyod 2014).

Figure 10 Snort Rule example

In Table 3 is a full list of alerts defined by Snort 2.9.9.0. The alert list consists of the short
name of alert, description and priority. Currently, there are four levels of priority, 1 stands for high,
2 stands for medium, 3 stands for low, and 4 stands for very low.
Table 3 Snort alert list
#
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19

Name
attempted-user
unsuccessful-user
successful-user
attempted-admin
successful-admin
shellcode-detect
Trojan-activity
web-application-attack
inappropriate-content
policy-violation
file-format
malware-cnc
client-side-exploit
bad-unknown
attempted-recon
successful-recon-limited
successful-recon-largescale
attempted-dos
successful-dos

Description
Attempted User Privilege Gain
Unsuccessful User Privilege Gain
Successful User Privilege Gain
Attempted Administrator Privilege Gain
Successful Administrator Privilege Gain
Executable code was detected
A Network Trojan was detected
Web Application Attack
Inappropriate Content was Detected
Potential Corporate Privacy Violation
Known malicious file or file-based exploit
Known malware command and control traffic
Known client side exploit attempt
Potentially Bad Traffic
Attempted Information Leak
Information Leak
Large Scale Information Leak
Attempted Denial of Service
Denial of Service
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Priority
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
2
2
2
2
2
2

20 rpc-portmap-decode
21 suspicious-filename-detect
22 suspicious-login
23 system-call-detect
unusual-client-port24 connection
25 denial-of-service
26 non-standard-protocol
27 web-application-activity
28 misc-attack
29
30
31
32
33
34
35
36
37
38

default-login-attempt
sdf
not-suspicious
unknown
string-detect
network-scan
protocol-command-decode
misc-activity
icmp-event
tcp-connection

Decode of an RPC Query
A suspicious filename was detected
An attempted login using a suspicious
username was detected
A system call was detected

2
2

A client was using an unusual port
Detection of a Denial of Service Attack
Detection of a non-standard protocol or event
access to a potentially vulnerable web
application
Misc Attack
Attempt to login by a default username and
password
Sensitive Data
Not Suspicious Traffic
Unknown Traffic
A suspicious string was detected
Detection of a Network Scan
Generic Protocol Command Decode
Misc activity
Generic ICMP event
A TCP connection was detected

2
2
2

2
2

2
2
2
2
3
3
3
3
3
3
3
4

Studying the alert instead of network activity data is a process of feature extraction and
dimensional reduction for network activity data.

07/10-17:01:30.096292

[**] [1:399:6] ICMP Destination Unreachable

Host Unreachable [**] [Classification: Misc activity] [Priority: 3] {ICMP} 10.0.2.2
-> 10.0.2.15
Figure 11 Snort Alert Example
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Shown in Figure 11 is an example of snort alert. The key information of an alert is: alert
priority level, alert time, and description.
4.1.3

OSSEC
A network host is a computer or other device connected to a computer network. A network

host may offer information resources, services, and applications to users, or other nodes, on the
network. It can be monitored by a host based intrusion detection system (HIDS). For example,
Software OSSEC can do log analysis, file integrity checking, Windows registry monitoring,
centralized policy enforcement, rootkit detection, real-time alerting and active response (Timofte
2008). In section 2.1.2, the implementation of OSSEC is introduced, along with introduction of
other similar HIDS.
OSSEC is an open source, multi-platform, scalable host-based intrusion detection system
(HIDS). It can run on most operating systems, such as Windows, Linux, MacOS, OpenBSD,
FreeBSD and Solaris (Timofte 2008). It analyzes host log, file, windows registry and gives realtime alert response.
The OSSEC can be installed as a stand-alone tool to monitor one host, or can be deployed
in a multi-host scenario. In CMS, one installation acts as the IDS monitoring server and the others
as agents in different layers of CMS.
Similar to Snort, OSSEC gives alerts with a number representing its priority. Different
from Snort, the OSSEC uses ascending order instead of descending. Moreover, OSSEC has 15
different levels of severity, as shown in Table 4: alert level from OSSEC 2.8.1 rules classification.
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Table 4 OSSEC alert examples
Alert
Level
0

1
2
3
4

Action

Description

Ignored

No action was taken. Used to avoid false positives. These
rules are scanned before all the others. They include events
with no security relevance.
System notification or status messages. They have no
security relevance.
They include successful login attempts, firewall allow
events, etc.
Errors related to bad configurations or unused
devices/applications. They have no security relevance and
are usually caused by default installations or software
testing.
They include missed passwords, denied actions, etc. By itself
they have no security relevance.
They indicate a worm or a virus that have no effect to the
system (like code red for apache servers, etc). They also
include frequently IDS events and frequently errors.
They include words like “bad”, “error”, etc. These events are
most of the time unclassified and may have some security
relevance.
Include first time seen events. First time an IDS event is
fired or the first time an user logged in. If you just started
using OSSEC HIDS these messages will probably be
frequently. After a while they should go away, It also
includes security relevant actions (like the starting of a
sniffer or something like that).
Include attempts to login as an unknown user or from an
invalid source. May have security relevance (specially if
repeated). They also include errors regarding the “admin”
(root) account.
They include multiple bad passwords, multiple failed logins,
etc. They may indicate an attack or may just be that a user
just forgot his credentials.
They include messages regarding the modification of
binaries or the presence of rootkits (by rootcheck). If you just
modified your system configuration you should be fine
regarding the “syscheck” messages. They may indicate a
successful attack. Also included IDS events that will be
ignored (high number of repetitions).

None
System low priority
notification
Successful/Authorize
d events
System low priority
error

5

User generated error

6

Low relevance attack

7

“Bad word” matching

8

First time seen

9

Error from invalid
source

10

Multiple user
generated errors

11

Integrity checking
warning
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12

High importancy
event

13

Unusual error (high
importance)
High importance
security event.
Severe attack

14
15

They include error or warning messages from the system,
kernel, etc. They may indicate an attack against a specific
application.
Most of the times It matches a common attack pattern.
Most of the times done with correlation and it indicates an
attack.
No chances of false positives. Immediate attention is
necessary.

As shown in Figure 12, an OSSEC alert shows that an important system file size changed,
which is an integrity alert. Potentially it could be changed by an intruder for getting user or
superuser privilege.
** Alert 1499713141.34392: mail - ossec,syscheck,
2017 Jul 10 11:59:01 ubuntu->syscheck
Rule: 550 (level 7) -> 'Integrity checksum changed.'
Integrity checksum changed for: '/etc/php5/apache2/php.ini'
Size changed from '68428' to '68429'
Old md5sum was: 'a0ed8c3fc8bcf0d41efaeb5bc53eb98e'
New md5sum is : '4ed8aa5fcd256def07178fae0a5f8b00'
Old sha1sum was: 'ca9fb4ae0334a6735370ca7f56947665c6a8d8a8'
New sha1sum is : 'b27c5bb340415fc967d3ae5440be84e8e869cd3c'
Figure 12 OSSEC alert example
Similar to a network data process, the OSSEC transfers the host data into alerts data. By
monitoring the OSSEC alert’s time, level and description, adminstrator can make decisions in
intrusion detection.
4.1.4

Alert Generation
To observe the alert generation during an attack, an experiment is presented to simulate the

cyber-physical attack. The experiment is designed based on the CMS testbed (Wu et al. 2018) with
both cyber and network environments.
The experiment cyber environment comprises a data host equipped with Ubuntu 14.04
operating system (with magic quote function turned off to be vulnerable to SQL injection attack),
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a user data based on MySQL 5.7 and Apache HTTP Server 2.4, and a website application for
customers front-end.
The Snort is equipped with standard rule along with additional SQL injection rules as
follows.

Snort SQL Injection Local Rules
alert tcp any any -> any 80 (msg: “Error Based SQL Injection”; content: “%27” ; sid:100000011; )
alert tcp any any -> any 80 (msg: “Error Based SQL Injection”; content: “22” ; sid:100000012; )

The three factors in the experiment are: normal customer activity, SQL injection attack,
and false alarm noise by NMAP software (Orebaugh and Pinkard 2011) network scan:
Normal customer activity. Students simulated customers used computer visiting customer
front-end website, and created events such as login, uploading orders, deleting orders, editing
orders and logging out.
SQL injection attack. Students simulated hacker used commands such as “UID_xxxx'; - ” or “' or 1=1; --” directly accessing into customer account or administrator account without
knowing the password. Such an act could trigger alerts from Snort software.
NMAP network scan. Students simulated hackers used NMAP intense scan on customer
website and database host to create false alarms.
In replication one as shown in Figure 13 (a), the customers randomly visit the front-end
website during the whole process and caused minor false alarms. The SQL injection in the middle
of the experiment and caused over 600 alarms. Those alarms can be correlated via time similarity
directly. The Nmap scan at the end of the experiment and caused three alarm-peaks at around 200
counts, with a total number of 600 alarms. Those alarms can be correlated as second meta alert
with high priority.
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In replication two as shown in Figure 13 (b), the customers are regularly visiting and
causes similar minor false alarms. In this replication, the SQL injection and Nmap scan happen at
the same time. To correlate and create meaningful meta-alerts, IP address and time can correlate
alerts caused by the same attack. The two replications use randomized attack pattern to prove the
effectiveness of similarity-based correlation methods under different circumstances.

(a) Replication 1 alert number plot

(b) Replication 2 alert number plot
Figure 13 Snort and OSSEC experiment alert number plot
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4.2

Physical Alerts
For physical domain, a Physical Intrusion Detection Alert (PIDA) format is proposed for

the purpose of information exchange for alert correlation in a cyber-physical manufacturing system.
4.2.1

Physical Intrusion Detection Alert (IPDA)
The physical alert is new and not standardized yet for cyber-physical intrusion detection

system. They are generated by analyzing audit data from pre-production, in-production and postproduction stages. In the production process, the physical alert will be continuously generated until
the abnormal production pattern is paused, finished or return to normal. In a 15-minutes malicious
CNC milling process, two to three hundred alerts could be generated with real-time data analysis.
As a result, a physical intrusion detection alert (PIDA) format is proposed as shown in
Table 5 to provide vital information for alert correlation. Different from IDMEF, or other IDS
format, PIDA embodies information from the physical domain. The key information provided by
the physical alert format including:
Create Time: The time when the physical event caused the alert is generated.
Analyzer Time: The time when the alert is generated.
Sensor ID: The physical sensor/inspection station collected alert data.
Analyzer ID: The name of analyzer generated alert.
User ID: The user identification that triggers the alert.
Order ID: The product identification that triggers the alert.
Equipment ID: The identification of the equipment where the alert happens.
Supplier ID: The identification of the CMS service provider.
Manufacturing Process: The general manufacturing process the equipment belongs to.
Additional Information: The information can be added by the operator or administrator.
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Table 5 PIDA alert
<PIDA-Message_873642>
<Create_Time_2018-06-13 11:16:10.817137>
<Analyze_Time_2018-06-13 12:01:01>
<Ultrasonic_Sensor_1_1>
<KNN_classifier_k_1_feature_12>
<UID_976378452>
<Order_20180708_CNC16_T1>
<CNC_Milling_1>
<SupID_72654213>
<Metal_Subtractive_Mill>
<Cause_tardy_job_and_equipment_damage>

4.2.2

#Alert message title and ID
#Create Time
#Analyzer Time
#Sensor ID
#Analyzer ID
#User ID
#Order ID
#Equipment ID
#Supplier ID
#Manufacturing Process
#Additional Information

Machine Learning Based Physical Intrusion Detection
Machine learning has been intensively applied both in physical security data and

manufacturing system, but not in manufacturing security so far. Physical security data needed for
machine learning can come from voice recognition, fingerprint authentication, gait authentication,
keystroke and other biometrics (Jain, Ross, and Prabhakar 2004). Machine learning
implementations in manufacturing includes real-time vision system for surface defect detection
(Jia et al. 2004), weld defect defection (Shen, Gao, and Li 2010), surface defect detection (X. W.
Zhang et al. 2011), preventative maintenance, supply chains optimization, etc.
The integration of cyber security and physical data machine learning is an approach to
detect cyber-physical attacks. It can effectively enhance the accuracy and shorten the respond time.
The cyber security approaches have been intensively researched in the past and can be
implemented with IT security professionals. At the same time, the machine learning approach
utilizing physical data can filter the false alerts from cybersecurity aided by domain experts from
manufacturing.
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4.2.2.1 Supervised Learning: Classification
Classification is a supervised machine learning method with the purpose of categorizing
data sets. In machine learning, classification is implemented with various algorithms, also known
as classifier, such as Support Vector Machine (SVM), C4.5 decision tree, artificial neural network
(ANN), k-Nearest Neighbors, etc. Data sets for classification are pre-processed and analyzed to
features. The process to define feature is a key process to enhance accuracy in machine learning
results, called feature extraction which requires domain knowledge with data mining experience.
In this research, image and acoustic classifications have been used to detect malicious
attacks in CMS processes. Random forest, k-nearest neighbors (kNN) machine learning algorithms
have been implemented. k-Nearest Neighbors (kNN) classifier is used to perform discriminant
analysis when reliable parametric estimates of probability densities are unknown or difficult to
determine (Peterson 2009). A random forest multi-way classifier consists of a number of trees,
with each tree grown using some form of randomization. The leaf nodes of each tree are labeled
by estimates of the posterior distribution over the image classes. Each internal node contains a test
that best splits the space of data to be classified (Bosch, Zisserman, and Munoz 2007). In this
research, three decision trees are used and each of them has five leaf nodes to classify (Wu et al.
2017). Compared to C4.5 decision tree algorithm, the random forest classifier achieves higher
accuracy with relatively shorter time to execute.
4.2.2.2 Unsupervised Learning: Anomaly Detection
Anomaly detection can identify abnormal behavior on a host or network (Kim, Park, and
Lee 2013), image (Chandola, Banerjee, and Kumar 2009b), supervisory control and data
acquisition (SCADA) (Garcia, Rolle, and Castelo 2011), or for equipment preventive maintenance
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(Rabatel, Bringay, and Poncelet 2011). It refers to the problem of finding patterns in data that do
not conform to expected behavior (Chandola, Banerjee, and Kumar 2009a). The principle is to
recognize patterns of accepted behavior, which is learned or specified by the algorithm. Activities
that fall outside the predefined or accepted model of behavior will alert administrators. The
advantage of anomaly detection is that it can detect novel attacks comparing to supervised
approaches. However, the disadvantage of network anomaly detection is the difficulty in defining
rules for normal network behavior.
Since it is impossible to predict every possible attack that a hacker may try against CMS
system, the anomaly detection method is implemented and combined with the random forest
method to increase the accuracy.
4.2.2.3 Data in CMS Environment
To implement machine learning in CMS security, data/signal processing and feature
selection and extraction are key steps. Data sources can be used including vision, acoustic, energy,
temperature, weight, etc. Some of the data can be directly drawn from controlling system whereas
others need additional monitoring systems.
CMS processes can consist of traditional and advanced manufacturing processes. They
include additive manufacturing, subtractive manufacturing, molding, forming, joining, casting,
coating, high-speed assembly and others. In this research, 3D printing and CNC milling processes
were used as two examples.
To decide what data to extract from the manufacturing process for security purposes, the
following factors should be analyzed: i) what is the process and what is the attack aim, ii) what is
the symptom and consequence, and iii) what data can be collected from the machine for detection.
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3D printing is a key enabling technology for CMS. It is getting extensively popular in
recent years, and some new machines are developed with wireless network capability, which also
increases the attack surface for a successful attack. The attack aims for 3D printing could be:
change the design dimensions, change the infill with malicious void, change nozzle travel speed,
or change heating temperature. The symptom could be quite implicit, such as a hidden void, surface
gap or high energy consumption, and finally, leads to scrap parts. For 3D printing, vision, acoustic
and energy consumption could be potential features.
Computer Numerical Control (CNC) milling process is a representative process for
subtractive manufacturing process. The attack can aim for CNC milling process to alter design,
spindle speed, or feed speed. The design change can create scrap parts. The increase in spindle
speed can accelerate tool wear. Also, the increase in feed speed can break cutting tools. For CNC
milling, acoustic, temperature and time can be potential features.
Table 6 CMS process attacks analysis and data extraction
Process

Attack aim

Symptom

Consequence

Detection Data

Design
Hidden void
3D
printing

Vision

Infill

Scrap parts
Surface gap

Energy consumption

Nozzle travels speed

Overheating
High energy consumption

Acoustic

Heating temperature
Change in vibration

Scrap parts

Change in chip shape

Overwear

Cutting bit temperature

Tool breakage

Tool breakage

Overheating

Design
CNC
milling

Acoustic

Spindle speed

Temperature

Feed speed

Time
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4.2.2.4 Feature Extraction
For machine learning in manufacturing, feature extraction is a critical process. It starts from
an initial set of measured data and builds derived values (features) intended to be informative and
non-redundant, facilitating the subsequent learning and generalization steps, and in some cases
leading to better human interpretations. A feature is a good data representation of a symptom,
phenomenon or measurement. For example, high value of acoustic emission during drilling
process can mean wrong spindle speed or wrong part material. The feature extraction process
requires domain knowledge and data processing experience.
4.2.3

Additive Manufacturing Process: a 3D Printing Example
3D printing, or additive manufacturing, is a key technology for advanced manufacturing

systems (Wu et al. 2016). However, 3D printing systems have unique vulnerabilities presented by
the ability to affect internal layers without affecting the exterior layers (Sturm et al. 2014). By
changing design or dimensions in the “.STL” file, malicious defective parts could be manufactured
without any prior alert.
4.2.3.1 Attack Mode
Man-in-the-middle attacks can easily accomplish the process of replacing an original
“.STL” file with a malicious design “.STL” file. As shown in Figure 14, during the user's
uploading original “.STL” file to manufacturing server to put an order, an attacker can alter the
communication between user and server, and replace with malicious “.STL” file.
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Figure 14 Man-in-the-middle attack for a cyber-based 3D printing process
If a hacker designed a malicious infill void defect that cannot be observed from the surface
of the final product, the part will be manufactured without noticing any abnormalities. During the
pre-production check process, operators cannot detect the difference between the original design
and malicious design because the malicious design can be implicit. The malicious file will then be
sent to 3D printers and the finished defective parts will be sent to the customers. As shown by
Sturm (Sturm et al. 2014), the void in a 3D printing part will result in reduction of yield, with other
corresponding physical characteristic changes such as weight, stiffness and natural frequency.
Five different infill defect patterns were designed as shown in Figure 15: Seam, Irregular
Polygon, Circle, Rectangle, and Triangle to simulate attacks. The examples illustrated in Figure
15 are parts with 10% honeycomb infill.
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Design
Simulation
Image
Camera
Image
Irregular
Rectangle
Triangle
polygon
Circle Defect
Defect
Defect
defect
Figure 15 Malicious defect designs, simulation images and camera images
Seam Defect

4.2.3.2 Data Collection: Image Simulation and Experiment
Images were captured from the 3D printing software MakerBot Desktop 3.9.1 preview
function. The size of images is 512 x 512 pixels. The selection of image size was done in
considering feature extraction process.
In total, 3887 simulation images were generated for simulation. 532 images of non-defect
parts were captured, labeled as group A. The non-defect group A images were captured every 2 to
4 layers during the printing process, with infill density varied from 8%-12% to increase the
diversity of the training images. 3355 images of defective parts were captured and labeled as group
B. The defective group B images were captured every 2 to 4 layers during the printing process,
with combinations of 5 different defects. The infill density is 10% for group B.
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Another method used in images collection is to capture real images during printing process
with mini cameras attached on 3D printer structures. To test and verify the image classification
method in real environment, a camera-based vision detection system has been designed and
installed on MakerBot Replicator TM2. MakerBot ReplicatorTM2 has the building envelope of 11.2
x 6.0 x 6.1" and can print at 100 µm per layer. Installation of the camera on a MakerBot Replicator
2 is shown in Figure 16. In this work, two ways to install cameras on MakerBot Replicator 2 were
presented. One is mounting the camera right next to the extruder and move along with it, called
'moving camera.' The other is mounting the camera on the frame of the 3D printer, called 'static
camera.' The ‘static camera’ can capture clear image and reach higher accuracy. The ‘moving
camera’ should have same accuracy and can adapt to more conditions, without the blurring caused
by motion.
The camera is an Arducam Mini Module Camera Shield with OV2640 2 Megapixels Lens,
compatible with Arduino UNO Mega2560 Board. The camera unit dimensions are 3 x 2 x 1 inches,
connected to the Arduino UNO via extended jumper wires. With programming in Arducam
software, it can produce images any size scaling down from SXGA to 40×30 in jpeg format. As a
result, the feature extraction process for previous 512x512 size images needed to be altered.
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Figure 16 MakerBot Replicator 2 printer with moving camera and static camera
4.2.3.3 Feature Extraction
Feature extraction process is implemented via R 3.3.1 and RStudio Desktop 0.99.903.
By plotting simulated image row No. 250 (marked in red in Figure 17) grayscale value,
repetitive peaks can be observed in normal area on the left, one medium peak followed by one
high peak, in pairs. In defective area on the right, the greyscale plot shows constant volatility. To
specify peaks, the threshold of grayscale is set at 120.
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Figure 17 Grayscale Plot Row No. 250, section separation

For feature extraction, each image is equally divided into eight sections as shown in Figure
17 Each section contains 64 rows, 32768 pixels. The following features are extracted for defect
classification.
•

Mean of grayscale in each section.

•

Standard derivation of grayscale in each section.

•

Number of pixels grayscale larger than 120.

As a result, every image has 24 features, from eight sections, each section provides three
features (Wu et al. 2016).
Three machine learning algorithms are used in detecting malicious defect: k-Nearest
Neighbors (kNN), random forest and anomaly detection.
4.2.3.4 Real-time Detection
A preliminary system was designed as Figure 18. to send real-time alert to administrator
indicating malicious defect. The vision system on 3D printer is connected to Internet via Raspberry
Pi B+. The camera is updated with Raspberry Pi OV 5647 Camera to be compatible with Raspberry
Pi B+, and also improve the image quality.
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Figure 18 Preliminary wireless real-time alert system for 3D printing process
Raspberry Pi B+ is used as the mini-computer system to connect to the network and operate
the Raspberry Pi OV5647 Camera to capture images of the printed object at a set time interval.
Once the images are captured and saved to the Pi, BitTorrent Sync is used to synchronize the
images from the device to the cloud service. The computer with classifier testing real-time
collected images. If detected any malicious defects, the program will send an alert to the user via
text message and email. As shown in Figure 18, the email says, “Alert from 3D printer,
Administrator: Found defect in process”.
After testing, the whole process can be accomplished within one minute, including the time
for syncing and downloading images (largely depend on server and Internet speed) and feature
extraction and classify time (within few seconds).
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4.2.3.5 Result Analysis
The goal of this experiment is using machine learning and physical data from cameras to
detect malicious defects. The accuracy of machine learning results is one of the measurements for
effectiveness of the system. The machine learning accuracy is defined by the equation (1). Where
TruePositive means images in class A that are predicted as class A, and TrueNegative stands for
images in class B predicted as class B.
Accuracy =

TruePositive+TrueNegative
Total

(1)

Moreover, the compatibility of the system is also tested by running with 5 different infill
shapes of 3D printing process: Honeycomb, Diamond, Linear, Star, Catfill. Finally, the system
effectively under real environment comparing to simulation is analyzed.
Table 7 3D printing process accuracy results
Machine Learning Method
Accuracy

Image from
Simulation

Honeycomb
Diamond
Linear
Star
Catfill

Image from
Moving Camera
Image from Static
Camera

Honeycomb

Random Forest (%)

kNN (%)

88.4
100.0
94.6
97.8
91.5
68.4

81.3
85.0
92.5
100
100
68.75

Anomaly Detection
(%)
100.0
100.0
100.0
99.8
100.0
72.5

95.5

87.5

96.1

As shown in Table 7:
1) Anomaly detection is most accurate method among three chosen methods in detecting
malicious defects. Accuracy is 96.1% which is acceptable for the experimental result
and can be improved by refinement in hardware and software.
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2) Based on simulation images experiment, the different types of infill have a minor
influence on system accuracy, but not critical.
3) Camera images have lower accuracy compared to simulated images. Among camera
images, moving camera's final accuracy 72.5% is not acceptable because of the blur
created by motion. Static camera images have a better accuracy of 96.1%, thus proves
the system effectiveness in a real environment.
4.2.4

Subtractive Manufacturing Process: a CNC Milling Example
CNC machining is a typical subtractive processing. During the decades, CNC has been

core manufacturing units in manufacturing systems. The flexibility and automation of
manufacturing systems have been significantly enhanced by implementation of CNC machining.
Since CNC processing could be totally manipulated by programming, it shows its vulnerability
towards cyber-physical attacks.
4.2.4.1 Attack Mode
By implementing man-in-the-middle attack, attackers can replace original G-code designs
with malicious G-code. Two attack scenarios have been developed as a result of malicious codes.
Scenario 1: Attack on Design
The first attacking scenario is to alternate the positioning parameters during processes and
therefore change the profiling routine of tools. As a result, the geometric design will change. The
change in tool path could cause assembly mistakes, structural weaken and possibly breakage. As
shown in Figure 19, edge 2-3, 4-5, 5-6 and 6-7 offset inward the contour.
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Figure 19 Comparison of Original and Attacked Milling Profiles

Scenario 2: Attack on Operation
The second attack mode proposed in this research is the change in machining operation
parameters. In this section, a change in spindle speed in milling operation is captured for further
research. In real case, fast rotation speed can cause over wear of tool; a tool with too slow rotation
will risk in being broken by shear force in the feeding direction. In the scenario, spindle speed is
maliciously altered from 1200 rpm to 2000rpm.
4.2.4.2 Data Collection: Acoustic Signal Simulation and Experiment
Acoustic signal is selected as the index to detect any malicious change in CNC milling
process. Similarly, both simulation and experiment methods are adopted for testing.
Simulated signal is a time-serial amplitude numbers, created by a summation of sinefunctions with fundamental frequency, harmonic frequencies and a Gaussian noise. The advantage
of adopting simulated signal in this scenario is to enhance variety of signals for test and analysis
with more parameters setting, and generate enough data for further analysis. The parameter used
for acoustic signal generation are listed in Table 8, and the simulated signals were generated in R.
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Table 8 Simulation Signal Parameters
Parameter
Fundamental Frequency
Harmonic Frequency
Normalized Amplitude
White Noise
Acquisition Frequency

Value
40Hz
80Hz, 120Hz, 160Hz, 320Hz
0.3 for milling exterior boundaries;
1 for milling interior boundaries
0.1*N(0,1)
100 Hz

The experiments were conducted on a CNC machine Bridgeport Milling Ez-trak. The
milling tool is a 2-flute, 3/16 end mill with rotation speed of 1200 rotation per minute. The material
of work piece was aluminum. Moving speed of the tool was 10 inch per minute. Feed rate was
50/1000 of 1 inch for the first six milling cycles, 20/1000 of 1 inch for the last cycle.
According to (Delio, Tlusty, and Smith 1992; Duro et al. 2016), microphone provides the
best balance in satisfying the many requirements of a sensor for recording acoustic signal in milling
operations. Three microphones from smartphones: iPhone 5s microphone, iPhone 6s plus
microphone and iPhone 6s with ear pod microphone were implemented as the acoustic sensors to
recording signals.
The sample part is designed as Figure 20.

Figure 20 Sample part
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4.2.4.3 Feature Extraction
The monitored signals were digitalized by MATLAB software. All the sound signal data
were pre-processed by sectioning the whole period into sound periods of each individual cycle. In
order to increase the number of the training data set, the real sound signal data were also sampled
by 10 observations each. R was used for machine learning programming. The packages used for
sound wave editing and analysis are “tuneR” and “seewave”. The packages used for machining
learning detection and analysis are “randomForest”, “h2o” and “pROC”.

(a) Real Changed Operation Signal (b) Simulated Changed Operation Signal
Figure 21 Plot of Sound Wave in Attacked Scenario 2

According to the simulated and recorded signal, three key features is selected.
•

Mean of amplitude in each period of time.

•

Standard derivation of amplitude in each period of time.

•

Number of points amplitude larger than threshold.

In experiment, period of time is set as 80 seconds, threshold for simulation is set as 1000,
threshold for experiment signal is set as 2.5.
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Similar to section 4.1, three machine learning algorithms are used in detecting malicious
defect: kNN, random forest and anomaly detection. The real time synchronizing system can be
implemented as section 4.1.4.
4.2.4.4 Result Analysis
Accuracy is the key measurement for detecting effectiveness as defined in section 4.1.5.
The results of detecting malicious defects in CNC milling process via acoustic signal shown as
Table 9.
Table 9 Machine learning accuracy for CNC milling process

Scenario 1

Machining Learning Method
kNN Random
Anomaly
(%) Forest (%) Detection (%)
50
93.1
93.8

Scenario 2

50

100

100

Scenario 1

70

82.2

79.6

Scenario 2

77.8

100

100

Accuracy

Simulated Signal

Real Signal

As shown in Table 9, anomaly detection and random forest method hold high accuracy for
both scenario 1 and 2 in simulated signal, and scenario 2 in real signal. In real signal, the random
forest shows highest average accuracy of 91.1%; Scenario 1 shows a slightly lower prediction
accuracy comparing to scenario 2; Real signal has lower accuracy in scenario 1 than simulated
signal, the reason could be the background noise from recording environment, and also the
complexity of scenario 1 attack mode.
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4.2.5

Alert Generation
The physical environment comprises manufacturing processes and data auditing and

analyzing system. The manufacturing processes consist of a 3D printer, a CNC milling machine,
two robotic arms, a conveyor, and a heating chamber, an Automated Guided Vehicle (AGV). The
physical data is collected by sensors and analyzed as the source of physical alert. At least two types
of sensor are used on each machine/process for the security and alert accuracy.
Table 10 Physical data auditing list
Equipment
3D Printer
CNC Milling
Mover Robotic
Arm
Welder Robotic
Arm

Sensor #1
Power Meter
Accelerometer

Sensor #2
Camera
Acoustic

Avoidance Sensor

Accelerometer

Camera

Accelerometer

Conveyor

Acoustic Sensor

Current Sensor

Heating Chamber
AGV

Temperature
Sensor
Accelerometer

Current Sensor
Ultrasonic sensor

As shown in Table 10, power meter and camera are used for data collecting for 3D printing
process. For CNC milling machine, two accelerators and an acoustic sensor are used for data
collection. For moving robotic arm, an avoidance sensor and a current sensor are used for data
collection. For welder robotic arm, a camera and a current sensor are used for data collection. For
conveyor, an acoustic sensor and a current sensor are used for data collection. For the heating
chamber, a temperature and a current sensor are used for data collection. For AGV, an accelerator
and an ultrasonic sensor are used for data collection.
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The physical flow of victim manufacturing process starts with CNC milling, followed by
conveying, heat treatment and transporting. It is manipulated via (1) changing spindle speed and
the feed speed of CNC to create poor finish and (2) change heat treatment heating speed with to
cause overload. The Figure 22 shows the time-series data of the CNC microphone, and
accelerometer X axis, heat treatment current sensor, and temperature sensor (temperature data
trend inversed).
The physical consequence in the data can be detected by machine learning and alerted
quickly (Wu, Song, and Moon 2019; Wu et al. 2017). Each type of data is processed by separate
analyzers and given an alert if any malicious defect discovered. Those four alerts can be correlated
via time and sensor similarity and create further two physical meta-alerts.
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Figure 22 Physical domain alert correlation
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Chapter 5

5

Cyber-Physical Alert Correlation Methodology

In this chapter, the cyber-physical alert correlation method discovers and establishes the
mutual causal relationships between cyber and physical alerts from same or different sources. Once
the relationship is established, it creates a high-level alert. This high-level cyber-physical metaalert is a set of correlated alerts at a high level of abstraction and provide a succinct view of the
intrusions (Valeur et al. 2004). It can help to trace to the origin of the attack (Bhuyan,
Bhattacharyya, and Kalita 2017) and improve the accuracy of cyber-physical attack detection
(Abad et al. 2003). A similarity-based correlation method for CMS cyber-physical alert correlation
has been developed with a new physical alert format for reporting physical alerts.
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As shown in Figure 23, the cyber-physical alert correlation method has three core
components: (i) correlating similar cyber alerts to cyber meta-alerts, (ii) correlating similar
physical alerts to physical meta-alerts, and (iii) correlating similar cyber and physical meta-alerts
to cyber-physical meta-alerts. Table 11 shows the notations used in this section.

Figure 23 Cyber-physical alert correlation method
Table 11 Notations used in this section
Parameters
a
b
c
d
IPsim𝑎
𝐶
𝑇𝑐𝑟𝑒𝑎𝑡𝑒
𝑇𝑤𝑖𝑛𝑑𝑜𝑤
𝐶
𝑇𝑡𝑒𝑟𝑚
𝑚
𝑇𝑐𝑟𝑒𝑎𝑡𝑒

Definition
Last byte of the IP address of a four-byte IP address.
Second to last byte of a four-byte IP address.
Third to last byte of a four-byte IP address.
First byte of the IP address of a four-byte IP address.
IP similarity score for the last byte of an IP address.
Create time of an intrusion detection alert.
Pre-defined correlation time window.
Termination time of a correlation period.
Create time of a meta-alert.
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𝑎
𝑇𝑐𝑟𝑒𝑎𝑡𝑒
𝑚
𝑇𝑡𝑒𝑟𝑚
𝑆𝑒𝑛𝑠𝑜𝑟𝑠𝑖𝑚
𝑆𝐼𝐷
𝑆𝐼𝐷𝑠𝑖𝑚
𝑘
𝑆𝐼𝐷𝑚𝑎𝑥
𝐸𝐼𝐷𝑠𝑖𝑚
𝑑𝑆𝐼𝐷
𝑡ℎ𝑟𝑒𝑠ℎ𝑜𝑙𝑑
d𝑆𝐼𝐷
𝑀𝑃𝑠𝑖𝑚
MPID
𝑇𝑗𝑜𝑏
𝑇𝑒𝑛𝑑
UID
SIP
DIP
K
𝑛𝑐𝑚
𝑛𝑝𝑚
𝑛𝑝
𝑛𝑐
p

Create time of newly listed intrusion detection alert α.
Termination time of a meta-alert with more than 2 alerts.
Sensor similarity value.
Sensor ID.
Sensor ID similarity.
The maximum sensor ID of type K sensor.
Equipment ID similarity.
Euclidean distance of sensor ID.
𝑑𝑆𝐼𝐷 threshold to determine alert from same type of sensor.
Manufacturing process similarity.
Manufacturing process ID.
Manufacturing job length time.
Manufacturing job end time.
User identification/ user ID.
Source IP address.
Destination IP address.
Number of the cyber-physical meta-alert.
Number of cyber meta alert.
Number of physical meta alert.
Number of single physical alert.
Number of single cyber alert.
Total reduction rate.

To realize each function, the temporal- and attribute-based similarity analyses are defined
separately. Furthermore, a physical intrusion detection alert (PIDA) format is defined for reporting
and correlating physical alerts.
5.1

Cyber alert correlation
The cyber alerts derive from the intrusion detection system in CMS cyber domain. The

source of alerts can be one or multiple host-based intrusion detection systems (HIDS) and networkbased intrusion detection systems (NIDS). For example, a NIDS software Snort (Roesch 1999a)
and a HIDS software OSSEC (Karthikeyan and Indra 2010) are implemented as the cyber alert
source in our experiments. As shown in Table 12, alerts are generated by Snort and OSSEC once
a SQL injection attack (Clarke and Alvarez 2012) is detected by the software.
As shown in Figure 23, the cyber-alert correlation utilizes both attribute-based and
temporal-based similarity analyses. Specifically, the attributes are source IP addresses and
destination IP addresses. The temporal analysis utilizes the creation time of cyber alerts.
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Table 12 Snort and OSSEC alert
Snort Alert
[**] [1:100000011:0] Error Based SQL Injection [**]
[Priority: 0]
07/06-09:33:00.631608 192.168.56.1:52938 -> 192.168.56.102:80
TCP TTL:64 TOS:0x2 ID:0 IpLen:20 DgmLen:715 DF
***AP*** Seq: 0x7EC4E75E Ack: 0xCD74DE37 Win: 0x1015 TcpLen: 32
TCP Options (3) => NOP NOP TS: 668492138 1130267
OSSEC Alert
** Alert 1530883982.4621: - ids,
2018 Jul 06 09:33:02 ubuntu->/var/log/snort/alert
Rule: 20101 (level 6) -> 'IDS event.'
[**] [1:100000011:0] Error Based SQL Injection [**]

5.1.1

Source IP Similarity
The IP address is one of the most common features used in the similarity-based correlation

method in alert management research. If two alerts contain the same Source IP, then they are more
likely to be under same attack source to be correlated (M Kumar, Siddique, and Noor 2009). For
example, Valdes and Skinner (Valdes and Skinner 2001) compared higher bits of IP addresses for
estimating its similarity. There are limitations that source IP addresses may be spoofed, and using
IP alone may not provide a sufficient measure to classify the threat posed by an alert (Smith et al.
2008). But utilizing features such as time windows in Section 3.1.3 can also reduce the effect of
IP reassignment (Ahmadinejad and Jalili 2009).
To effectively evaluate the IP address similarity, the IP is compared in four bytes via the
IP address similarity matrix shown in Table 13. Assume that existing alert has the IP of
“192.168.56.1”, and the new alerts with various IP addresses are calculated as follows:
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Table 13 IP address similarity matrix
New alert IP
192 . 168 . 56 . 1
192 . 168 . 56 . a
192 . 168 . b . a
192 . c . b . a
d . c . b .a

Similarity
1
1 − IPsim𝑎
1 − IPsim𝑎 − IPsim𝑏
1 − IPsim𝑎 − IPsim𝑏 − IPsim𝑐
1 − IPsim𝑎 − IPsim𝑏 − IPsim𝑐 − IPsim𝑑

Where the IPsim𝑥 the sum of score should equal to 1:

∑𝑑𝑥=𝑎 𝐼𝑃𝑠𝑖𝑚𝑥 = 1

(1)

The different values of IPsim𝑥 score can be defined by specialists for different situations
to meet different needs. For example, the score can be evenly distributed: IPsim𝑥 = 0.25 to
compare both higher and lower bits of IP address. The IP address with similar higher bits could be
from same subnetwork. This score generates similar results to those reported in (Ahmadinejad and
Jalili 2009). Another way is comparing IP address in all four bytes to find the exact match. If the
two alert source IP are identical, the similarity will be 1. Otherwise, the similarity will be 0.
5.1.2

Destination IP Similarity and Host Segmentation
The destination IP similarity can be analyzed by the same method presented in Section

5.1.1. The difference between the source IP and destination IP means that the source IP comes for
the user or potential attacker, while the destination IP stands for data host in CMS.
In CMS, the data host can be segmented based on various factors: manufacturing processes,
geographic locations, customer type, etc. In this work, the manufacturing process were used as an
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example. As a result, the alerts from different destination IP stands for different physical meanings.
The benefit of such practice includes:
1)
2)
3)
4)
5.1.3

Correlate cyber alerts to physical alerts via manufacturing process/destination IP.
Improve performance in each segmented network and reduce congestion.
Improve security when one of the segmentation is compromised while others are isolated.
Improve security when one type of customer can only access to limited data resource.
Time Similarity
The time stamp from cyber alert provides valuable information time similarity analysis. It

can correlate the alerts caused by the same attacks that triggered the IDS sensor within the same
short period of time.
The time stamp may contain different information in different cyber alerts. In the Snort
alert, the time stamp shows the create time of the alert. In the standardized Intrusion Detection
Message Exchange Format (IDMEF) (H. Debar, Curry, and Feinstein 2007), the alert will contain
𝐶
three timestamps: create time, detect time, analyzer time. The create time 𝑇𝑐𝑟𝑒𝑎𝑡𝑒
is the feature to

analyze alert similarity.
Time window, or 𝑇𝑤𝑖𝑛𝑑𝑜𝑤 is a pre-defined value. The length of the correlation time
window affects the potential of creating correlations. The length could vary from seconds to
several hours depending on the alert characteristics, and the value will emerge from the practice
of managing a specific network (Jakobson and Weissman 1995). Only alerts occurring within a
time-window are to be correlated.
The method to scientifically set up an optimum correlation window is an open
problem. Theoretically, a large window time can include more alerts that can provide more helpful
information for security analysts on the meta-alert. However, a large window time can also include
false alarms and noise that can affect the correlation efficiency (Qin 2005). One of the methods
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defines the 𝑇𝑤𝑖𝑛𝑑𝑜𝑤 using pre-specified attack scenario time. The assumption is that different
multi-stage attack strategies usually have their own attack behavior patterns and happen in a certain
time span (Jie, Li, and Li 2008). As a result, the attacks occurred within scenario time span should
be correlated as meta-alert.
The alerts to be correlated are from IDS existing alerts set, called candidate alerts. Every
𝐶
𝐶
alert has a correlation lifespan between create time 𝑇𝑐𝑟𝑒𝑎𝑡𝑒
and termination time 𝑇𝑡𝑒𝑟𝑚
, defined as:
𝐶
𝐶
𝑇𝑡𝑒𝑟𝑚
= 𝑇𝑐𝑟𝑒𝑎𝑡𝑒
+ 𝑇𝑤𝑖𝑛𝑑𝑜𝑤 (2)

When a new cyber alert α is generated during or follows the candidate alarm, the candidate
alert and the new alert can be correlated based on the temporal analysis.
𝐶
𝛼
𝐶
𝑇𝑐𝑟𝑒𝑎𝑡𝑒
< 𝑇𝑐𝑟𝑒𝑎𝑡𝑒
≤ 𝑇𝑡𝑒𝑟𝑚
(3)

The meta-alert is a combination of two or more alarms, and the correlation lifespan of a
meta-alert is defined as:
𝑚
𝐶
𝑎
𝑇𝑐𝑟𝑒𝑎𝑡𝑒
= min(𝑇𝑐𝑟𝑒𝑎𝑡𝑒
, 𝑇𝑐𝑟𝑒𝑎𝑡𝑒
) (4)
𝑚
𝑎
𝑇𝑡𝑒𝑟𝑚
= 𝑇𝑐𝑟𝑒𝑎𝑡𝑒
+ 𝑇𝑤𝑖𝑛𝑑𝑜𝑤 (5)

For cyber alerts, any new alerts generated within the time window of the candidate metaalert, can be correlated to a new meta-alert. The temporal alert correlation can reduce the number
of alerts generated by the same attacks and convert them into high-level alerts (Salah, MaciáFernández, and Díaz-Verdejo 2013).
5.2

Physical alert correlation
As shown in Figure 23, the physical alert correlation method also utilizes attribute-based

and temporal-based similarity analysis. However, different from cyber alert, the attributes are
sensor similarity, manufacturing process similarity and user ID similarity.
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5.2.1

Sensor Similarity
The sensor similarity aims to correlate the similar symptom caused by the same attack. A

meta alert correlated by sensor similarity could be caused by: (1) alerts from similar types of sensor
on different machines; (2) alerts from different types of the sensor on the same machine.
The sensor similarity can be calculated by computing certain metrics, such as Euclidean
distance functions. The result will be compared to a threshold value and determine whether to be
correlated (Salah, Maciá-Fernández, and Díaz-Verdejo 2013). To compare the sensor similarity:
(1) the alerts from similar type of sensor can be calculated via sensor ID, (2) the alert from different
types of sensor on same machine can be calculated via machine ID.
As shown in equation 6, the sensor similarity value calculates via both sensor and machine
ID similarity, then use the larger value as the sensor similarity.
𝑆𝑒𝑛𝑠𝑜𝑟𝑠𝑖𝑚 = max(𝑆𝐼𝐷𝑠𝑖𝑚 , 𝐸𝐼𝐷𝑠𝑖𝑚 ) (6)
The sensor ID similarity 𝑆𝐼𝐷𝑠𝑖𝑚 is calculated by comparing 𝑑𝑆𝐼𝐷 between the existing
𝑖
𝑡ℎ𝑟𝑒𝑠ℎ𝑜𝑙𝑑
alerts set’s sensor IDs 𝑆𝐼𝐷𝑠𝑒𝑡 and the new alert sensor ID 𝑆𝐼𝐷𝑛𝑒𝑤
. Comparing to the d𝑆𝐼𝐷
,

any 𝑑𝑆𝐼𝐷 within threshold achieves similarity of 1, otherwise the similarity is 0.
2

𝑖
𝑑𝑆𝐼𝐷 = √(𝑆𝐼𝐷𝑠𝑒𝑡 − 𝑆𝐼𝐷𝑛𝑒𝑤
)2

(7)

The 𝑑𝑆𝐼𝐷 threshold need to be defined according to the structure of the sensor ID. For
example, if acoustic sensor numbered from 1001 to 1010, temperature sensor numbered from 2001
𝑡ℎ𝑟𝑒𝑠ℎ𝑜𝑙𝑑
to 2020, accelerometer numbered from 3001 to 3030, then the d𝑆𝐼𝐷
should be 30. Alerts

coming from sensor ID difference within threshold 30, such as 3007 and 3020, 𝑆𝐼𝐷𝑠𝑖𝑚 should be
1; Alerts coming from sensor ID difference beyond threshold, such as 1002 and 3002, 𝑆𝐼𝐷𝑠𝑖𝑚
should be 0.
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𝑘
𝑡ℎ𝑟𝑒𝑠ℎ𝑜𝑙𝑑
𝑘
d𝑆𝐼𝐷
= max𝑘=1..𝑥 (𝑆𝐼𝐷𝑚𝑎𝑥
− 𝑆𝐼𝐷𝑚𝑖𝑛
) (8)

The equipment ID similarity 𝐸𝐼𝐷𝑠𝑖𝑚 should be 1 if two alerts have the same 𝐸𝐼𝐷 ,
otherwise the similarity will be 0.
{

𝑖
𝐸𝐼𝐷𝑠𝑒𝑡 = 𝐸𝐼𝐷𝑛𝑒𝑤
, 𝐸𝐼𝐷𝑠𝑖𝑚 = 1

(9)
𝑜𝑡ℎ𝑒𝑟𝑤𝑖𝑠𝑒

5.2.2

, 𝐸𝐼𝐷𝑠𝑖𝑚 = 0

Manufacturing Process Similarity
The manufacturing type similarity aims to correlate the alerts from same manufacturing

processes. It indicates that a manufacturing process is compromised by a type-specific attack. For
example, when the 3D printing data hose is injected with malicious infill designs, the different
local supplier can have similar alert from 3D printers via camera real-time image classification.
The manufacturing process similarity 𝑀𝑃𝑠𝑖𝑚 is 1 when two alerts have same MPID,
otherwise the 𝑀𝑃𝑠𝑖𝑚 is 0.
{

𝑖
𝑀𝑃𝐼𝐷𝑠𝑒𝑡 = 𝑀𝑃𝐼𝐷𝑛𝑒𝑤
, 𝑀𝑃𝑠𝑖𝑚 = 1

(10)
𝑜𝑡ℎ𝑒𝑟𝑤𝑖𝑠𝑒

5.2.3

, 𝑀𝑃𝑠𝑖𝑚 = 0

Time Similarity
The time similarity aims to correlate the physical alerts from different sensors on same

machine, trigger by same attack in a short time period. For example, in Figure 24, a CNC milling
feed speed and spindle speed attack, the acoustic sensor and accelerometer shows alerts within 6
seconds.
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(a) Heat treatment process current plot
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(b) Heat treatment temperature plot
Figure 24 Physical alert time similarity comparison
Similar to section 3.1.3, the time similarity correlation needs to define the time window, or
𝑇𝑤𝑖𝑛𝑑𝑜𝑤 . Different from the cyber alert, the physical alert can refer to the manufacturing job length
time 𝑇𝑗𝑜𝑏 , and the job end time 𝑇𝑒𝑛𝑑 , as a result,
𝑐
𝑇𝑡𝑒𝑟𝑚
= 𝑇𝑒𝑛𝑑 (11)

Moreover, the window time is dynamically allocated according to the job length,
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𝑇𝑤𝑖𝑛𝑑𝑜𝑤 = 𝑇𝑗𝑜𝑏 (12)
In another word, physical alerts generated within the same manufacturing job on a physical
machine should be correlated.
5.2.4

User Identification (UID)
The user identification aims to correlate the physical alerts caused by the same user. It can

hardly prevent any sophisticated attacks that hiding the alerts to user accounts but can detect the
alerts that caused by repackaging attack or other attacks that victim user unaware of.
The method of calculating attribute-based user ID similarity can be calculated via the
Euclidean distance function, as follows:
{

𝑖
𝑈𝐼𝐷𝑠𝑒𝑡 = 𝑈𝐼𝐷𝑛𝑒𝑤
, 𝑈𝐼𝐷𝑠𝑖𝑚 = 1

(10)
𝑜𝑡ℎ𝑒𝑟𝑤𝑖𝑠𝑒

, 𝑈𝐼𝐷𝑠𝑖𝑚 = 0

Where the threshold can be set to near zero to find an exact match of user ID.
5.3

Cyber-physical alert correlation
Different from the cyber or physical alert correlation methods, which are a combination of

temporal and attribute-based analysis, the cyber-physical alert correlation only based on the
attribute-based analysis. It is because the weak correlation between the cyber alert create time and
physical alert create time: an intrusion can happen on cyber domain days or even weeks before
and physical consequence happen. As a result, following attributes are defined for cyber-physical
meta-alert correlation.
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5.3.1

Destination IP with the Manufacturing Process
As defined in section 3.1.2 and 3.2.2, the CMS host network is segmented based on the

manufacturing process. The destination IP of each host is designated to customers on different
manufacturing service. For example, the Table 14 is a destination IP and manufacturing process
similarity matrix, which shows the only correlation between IPs and manufacturing processes.
Table 14 Host IP and Manufacturing Process correlation matrix

5.3.2

Subtractive_Manufacturing_PLA

Subtractive_Manufacturing_ABS

Subtractive_Manufacturing_Aluminum

Heat_Treatment

184.34.21.200
100.109.244.1
101.60.193.233

Subtractive_Manufacturing_Wood

113.238.46.13
39.3.197.234
36.133.70.114
93.211.37.77

Additive_Manufacturing_ABS

Host IP Address

Similarity

Additive_Manufacturing_PLA

Manufacturing Process

1
0
0
0
0
0
0

0
1
0
0
0
0
0

0
0
1
0
0
0
0

0
0
0
1
0
0
0

0
0
0
0
1
0
0

0
0
0
0
0
1
0

0
0
0
0
0
0
1

Source IP with User ID
The source IP address, or SIP from cyber-alerts provides the IP address of the customer or

attacker who triggers the alarm in the cyber domain. The user identity, or UID from physical
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domain alarm provides the same customer information during production. By correlating SIP and
UID, the physical alarm can effectively trace back to the source of the root cause.
Different from the DIP, each user could have more than one IP addresses. It could be caused
by multiple user login, log in from different locations or devices, dynamically allocated IP
addresses, or even log in from a malicious user.

As shown in Table 15, a user with

UID_56474358546 has multiple IP addresses can be correlated to one user ID. Any alerts in the
physical domain caused by this UID should be correlated to any alerts caused by those five
highlighted IP addresses

Table 15 UIP and UID correlation matrix

UID_45332564

UID_12324456

197.115.19.110
188.218.195.29

UID_43453654

64.99.107.206
208.81.201.180
159.149.228.81
113.200.27.26

UID_564743585

User IP address

101.39.143.223
50.35.81.191
165.129.82.29
74.170.160.209
210.98.94.55

UID_678543786

Similarity
50.126.114.76

UID_789548786

User ID

1
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0

0
1
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0

0
0
1
1
1
1
1
0
0
0
0
0

0
0
0
0
0
0
0
1
1
0
0
0

0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
1
0
0

0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
1
1
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Chapter 6

6

Experiment Design and Case Studies

In this chapter, four case studies were created, presented and analyzed for the proof of
concept and validation of the cyber-physical intrusion detection and correlation methodology.
Multiple cyber-attack vectors/methods, along with various physical attack payload/consequence
are analyzed and integrated for the following four case studies:
•

A weakened 3D printing object

•

A manipulated CNC milling process

•

A multiple robotic arm speed attack

•

A supply chain attack

A cyber-physical intrusion detection oriented Cyber-Manufacturing System Security
Testbed (CSST) is established for experiment for various reasons. One of the most important is
that the cyber-physical attack is new since the emergence of Stuxnet; at the same time, CMS or
other manufacturing visions, such as Industry 4.0 or Cloud Manufacturing, are not established.
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6.1

Test Environment
The Cyber-Manufacturing System Security Testbed (CSST) is the environment to test and

validate the intrusion detection and alert correlation case studies. It is a testbed developed for the
needs of intrusion detection and prevention research, the development requirement including:
i.

Simulate the CMS physical process with a simple minimum setup to reduce the set-up
cost and attack damage cost.

ii.

Simulate the CMS network environment with the most common and basic network
setup, with potential to expand or replace with more advanced technologies.

iii.

Collect cyber and physical data for intrusion detection analysis, with the potential to
collect more types of data with additional sensors.

iv.

Simulate cyber-physical attacks within a manufacturing system, and along a simple
supply chain.
The environment is developed with the reference to CMS hierarchical five-layer

architecture (Z. Song and Moon 2016c). To mitigate the risk that experiment cyber-physical
attacks cloud damaging expensive equipment, a simple minimum layout is set up: use one machine
to represent each type of manufacturing process; when choosing a machine, the ability and
flexibility to collect data are the first priority when the fabrication size, speed, precision are the
second priority.
Supply chain as a core part CMS is loosely managed in most cases, making penetrations
through supply chain attack possible. As a result, a simple supply chain is also created in the test
bed for research on the cyber-physical attacks through the supply chain.
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6.1.1

System Architecture and Design
The CMS testbed consists of six major components: (i) discrete event computer simulation,

(ii) cyber environment for customer web service (iii) physical manufacturing process and
equipment, (iv) control system, (v) network communication system, and (vi) monitoring system.
As shown in Figure 25, the computer simulation can provide randomized customer and
attacker arrival schedule. The researcher can play the role of customer or attacker based on
randomized job schedule, place an order or penetrate into the customer database. The order can be
fabricated within only one testbed or between testbed supplier and demander. The physical flow
in Figure 25 shows a part first fabricated in testbed supplier then transferred to testbed demander
and assembled with another part fabricated by demander testbed.
The physical testbed audit system collects cyber data such as network activities and host
log, along with physical data such as image, acoustic, acceleration, temperature, power
consumption, part dimensions to the isolated database for intrusion detection analysis.
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Figure 25 CMS IDS testbed diagram
In general, these five components have following functionalities: (i) mimic CMS
production flow; (ii) generate and collect cyber and physical data for analysis; (iii) implement and
validate cyber-physical intrusion detection and correlation method such as Define, Audit,
Correlate, Disclose, and Improve - DACDI (Wu and Moon 2017a), and develop countermeasures
for preventing, mitigating cyber-physical attacks. As shown in Figure 26, the testbed is setup in a
separate environment to simulate CMS production flow.
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(a) Testbed supplier setup

(b)Testbed demander setup
Figure 26 Testbed setup
6.1.2

Physical Manufacturing Processes
The physical system consists of two 3D printers, a CNC milling machine, four robotic arms,

a conveyor, and heating chamber, an Automated Guided Vehicle (AGV), 3D scanner and RFID
reader/writer as shown in Figure 27. The equipment (a-g) is set up as a supplier testbed. The
equipment (h-j) is set up as a demander testbed.
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(f) Heating
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(h) 3D Scanner and Turn Table

(i) Robotic Arm for
Assemble
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(a) 3D Printer
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Figure 27 Testbed physical environment
6.1.2.1 Additive Manufacturing
As shown in Figure 27 (a), the testbed integrates an MP Select Mini 3D printer V2 to
represent the additive manufacturing process. The machine is capable of constructing design under
the dimensions of 120 x 120 x 120 mm with ABS or PLA material. The machine can print “STL”
files via a connected Windows 10 desktop machine with Cura 3D printing software.
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6.1.2.2 CNC milling machine
As shown in Figure 27 (b), the testbed integrates a three-axis CNC milling machine to
represent the subtractive manufacturing process. The machine can read “Gcode” file from same
desktop machine with Grbl Controller 3.0 software.
6.1.2.3 Robotic arm for carrying/moving
As shown in Figure 27 (c), the testbed integrates an Arduino Braccio six degree of freedom
robotic arm for carrying sample objects from storage area to conveyor. The robotic arm executes
pre-defined code in Arduino UNO R3 micro-controller. The Arduino UNO is connected to a
Raspberry Pi as a control machine.
6.1.2.4 Conveyor
As shown in Figure 27 (e), the testbed integrates a custom built conveyor for conveying
sample object through welding process and heat treatment process. The conveyor is powered by a
step motor controlled by the same Raspberry Pi.
6.1.2.5 Robotic arm for welding
As shown in Figure 27 (d), the testbed integrates a custom built robotic arm for simulating
the welding process. The robotic arm has six degrees of freedom with the hand attached to a
marking pen. The pen simulates the welding pattern instead of the real welder. Similarly, the
welding robotic arm executes pre-defined code in Arduino UNO R3 micro-controller connected
to Raspberry Pi as the control machine.
6.1.2.6 Heat treatment
As shown in Figure 27 (f), the testbed integrates a heating chamber for simulating the heat
treatment process. The heating chamber consists of a tunnel that encloses the heating environment,
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an ultrasonic sensor detects sample object arrival, and 3 heating elements controlled by Raspberry
Pi.
6.1.2.7 Transporter AGV
As shown in Figure 27 (g), the testbed integrates a AGV as a final transporting device. It
carries sample object coming out of conveyor to the packaging area. The AGV is self-controlled
by an Arduino UNO connected wired/wirelessly to local control machine.
6.1.2.8 3D Scanner and turntable
As shown in Figure 27 (h), The 3D scanner and turntable setup is a function that attempts
for checking the part dimensions. The part is placed on turntable and rotate slowly for 360 degrees,
at the same time the Kinect 360 scanner records the process and creates an STL file that can be
used for comparing original design file.
6.1.2.9 Robotic arm for assemble
As shown in Figure 27 (i), the robotic arm for assembling shares the same model type as
the robotic arm for welding, expect in total six servo motors are integrated into the arm for multiple
axis movements. The robotic arm can only accomplish simple assemble job but enough for
demonstrative purpose.
6.1.2.10 RFID reader/writer
As shown in Figure 27 (j), the RDIF read/write function utilizes Mifare RC522 sensor
module and NTAG 215 NFC sticker. The NFC sticker is thin and compact in size for attaching on
part with 540 bytes of memory. Information such as part ID, customer ID can be stored and
attached on parts.
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6.1.3

Control System
There are two local computers each testbed: a Windows 10 based desktop machine

connected to Ethernet, and a Linux based raspberry Pi 3 microcomputer. The supplier testbed uses
OpenPLC (Alves et al. 2014) software with Raspberry Pi to control the conveyor. All connections
are wired but with wireless potential.
6.1.3.1 Control machine for CNC and 3D printer
The Windows 10 based desktop machine controls the 3D printer and CNC milling machine.
The 3D printer control requires Cura open source 3D printer slicing software. In Cura, 3D printing
settings such as nozzle temperature, printing speed, layer height can be modified. The CNC milling
machine control requires Grbl Controller software sending “Gcode” to the machine. In Grbl
Controller, milling setting such as feed speed, spindle speed can be modified.
6.1.3.2 OpenPLC for conveyor
The integration of raspberry Pi 3 and OpenPLC software is an open-source alternative of
Programmable Logic Controller (PLC). PLC is common in industrial control. The OpenPLC
directly controls the step motor that powers conveyor, or the Arduino UNO micro-controllers in
the robotic arms.
6.1.4

Communication
This testbed utilizes an Ethernet-based communication control system. The local control

machines such as the Windows 10 based desktop machine or Linux based raspberry pi are
connected to the Internet for the purpose of connectivity to the CMS database via TCP/IP
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communication protocol. Within the testbed, Modbus is used between Raspberry Pi and its
connected actuators.
The reason of adopting TCP/IP and MODBUS communication protocol in the testbed is:
(i) the popularity of them in nowadays manufacturing systems; (ii) the abundant resource of
available network monitoring system and (iii) the communication protocol standardization of
future manufacturing visions are not yet accomplished (Bitkom, Vdma, and Zvei 2016).
Regardless of which type of protocol is chosen here, the proposed methodology of intrusion
detection on cyber-physical attacks function the same.
6.1.4.1 TCP/IP
The connection between customer and website frontend, database, and local control
machine are Ethernet over TCP-IP protocol. TCP/IP refers to the Transmission Control Protocol
and Internet Protocol. The TCP/IP is one of the protocols nearly all firms use today (Boyle and
Panko 2013).
6.1.4.2 MODBUS
MODBUS is a free and open source protocol that developed by Modicon for PLCs. It is
popular among the industrial control. As the OpenPLC with raspberry Pi 3 has the capability of
Ethernet over TCP/IP, it was implemented support for the MODBUS TCP/IP protocol (Alves et
al. 2014). The Modbus TCP/IP is the Modbus protocol with a TCP interface that runs on Ethernet
(Goldenberg and Wool 2013).
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6.1.4.3 I2C
The connection between the Raspberry Pi and the robotic arm controller Arduino UNOs
are over I2C protocol. It is a multi-master protocol that virtually any number of slaves and
any number of masters can be connected and communicate between each other on two signal lines
(Leens 2009).
6.1.5

Monitoring System
The audit data is the most important part of an intrusion detection system. In the DACDI

(Wu and Moon 2017a) framework, both cyber and physical data needed to be collected. Between
those two, the physical data analysis is the novel part for intrusion detection of cyber-physical
attacks.
Cyber data is capable of: (1) detecting amateur and known attacks, and (2) use as evidence
to correlate with physical anomaly occurrence. Physical data is capable of detecting cyber-physical
data quickly with high accuracy (Wu, Song, and Moon 2019; Wu et al. 2017; Song et al. 2017),
and can also prevent machine malfunction and human mistakes as a byproduct.
6.1.5.1 Cyber data auditing
Cyber audit data includes the data from network activity and host. Snort network-based
intrusion detection system (NIDS) software is used to tap network activity log data, such as login
attempts, network connections, or every data packet that appeared on the wire (Kemmerer and
Vigna 2002). As a packet sniffer, it can monitor network traffic in real time on local control
machines and database host of the testbed. The standard rules are used to checking abnormal data
in packet traffic (Khamphakdee, Benjamas, and Saiyod 2014).
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OSSEC (Timofte 2008) host-based intrusion detection system (HIDS) software is used to
monitor host activities on local control machines and database host. It analyzes host log, file,
windows registry; and provides real-time alert responses.
6.1.5.2 Physical data auditing
The physical data is collected from the manufacturing processes and equipment on the
testbed. At least two types of sensor are used on each machine/process for the security and alert
accuracy, as shown in Table 16.

Table 16 Physical data auditing list
Equipment

Sensor #1

Sensor #2

3D Printer

Power Meter

Camera

CNC Milling

Accelerometer

Acoustic

Mover Robotic Arm

Avoidance
Sensor

Accelerometer

Welder Robotic Arm

Camera

Accelerometer

Conveyor

Acoustic Sensor

Current Sensor

Heating Chamber

Temperature
Sensor

Current Sensor

AGV

Accelerometer

Ultrasonic sensor

In following paragraphs, sample data collected form tested bed with analysis method such
as feature extraction for machine learning are presented.
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6.1.5.2.1 Power consumption data from power meter
The power consumption data is recorded by a Kill-A-Watt P4400 power meter. The
malicious and legitimate data is created by print a malicious infill defect (Wu et al. 2016) that can
weaken the part structurally (Sturm et al. 2017b).
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Figure 28 Power consumption data analysis
To analysis the power consumption data of 3D printing process as shown in Figure 28, the
window time of feature extraction is set for every 100 seconds. During the window time period,
the mean value, standard deviation, maximum, medium, minimum, skewness, kurtosis, number of
power data points over 80, 82 and 85 kWh are calculated as features. In total, there are ten features
are used. In Figure 28, the unit for y-axis is kWh, and the unit for x-axis is minute.
6.1.5.2.2 Image data from the camera
The image for 3D printing process sample part infill and welding process quality is taken
by two similar Logitech C310 and C525 cameras. The greyscale value is used for data analysis.

107

18000

(a) Welding mark

(b)Infill detect

16000
14000
100
12000
90
10000
80
8000

4000
60
2000
50
0
40

1
23
45
67
89
111
133
155
177
199
221
243
265
287
309
331
353
375
397
419
441
463
485
507

6000
70

Legit
Malicious
Legitimate
Malicious

(c) Number of pixels over the grayscale threshold
Figure 29 Image data analysis
The images collected from the welding mark and 3D printing infill are shown in Figure 29
(a) and (b). Each image as a dataset can be divided vertically into eight equal areas. In each area,
the greyscale mean value, standard deviation, and the number of pixels over the grayscale threshold
are obtained. As shown in Figure 29 (c), the number of pixels over the grayscale threshold between
malicious and legitimate images defecate immensely.
6.1.5.2.3 Acceleration data
The accelerometer installed on CNC milling machine and AGV for monitoring the
dynamic activity. They are MMA7361 accelerometer sensor with a sampling rate of 115200 bauds,
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controlled by Arduino UNO microcontroller. Figure 30 shows the acceleration data at the first
120 seconds with legitimate and malicious settings via manipulating the feed speed.
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Figure 30 Acceleration data analysis
For acceleration data analysis, the window time for feature extraction is set to 1.5 seconds
when the sensor collects around 108 acoustic signals per second. During every 1.5 seconds, the
acceleration mean, standard deviation, maximum, medium, minimum, number of zero crossings
(after centering), peak-to-peak value, skewness, kurtosis, and root mean square value (RMS) are
calculated as features for detection. In Figure 30, the unit for y-axis is g (G-forces), the unit for xaxis is seconds.
6.1.5.2.4 Acoustic data
The acoustic sensor is installed on CNC milling machine and around the stepper motor of
the conveyor. They are FC-04 sound sensor module with sampling rate of 9600 bauds, controlled
by Arduino UNO microcontroller. Figure 31 shows the first 2 minutes of CNC milling process
with legitimate and malicious settings via manipulating the spindle speed.

109

200
195
190
185
180
175
170
165

0

10

20

30

40

50

60

Legitimate

70

80

90

100 110 120

Malicious

Figure 31 Acoustic data analysis
To analyze the acoustic data, the window time for feature extraction is set to 1 second when
the sensor collects 20 acoustic signals per second. During every second, the acoustic signal mean,
standard deviation, maximum, medium, minimum, number of acoustic data amplitude over 180,
185 and 200 are calculated as features for detection. In Figure 31, the unit for y-axis is dB, the unit
for x-axis is seconds.
6.1.5.2.5 Current data
The current sensor is installed in multiple places in testbed including heating elements in
the heating chamber, robotic arm, conveyor stepper motor. They are Gikfun ACS712 current
sensor controlled by Arduino UNO microcontroller. Figure 32 shows the current data from the
conveyor.
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Figure 32 Current sensor analysis
To analyze the current data, the window time for different machine or process varies.
During each window time, the current mean, standard deviation, maximum, medium, minimum,
number of acoustic data amplitude over the threshold are calculated as features for detection. In
Figure 32, the unit for y-axis is Amp, the unit for x-axis is seconds.
6.1.5.2.6 Temperature data
The temperature sensor is installed on the heating chamber on the conveyor in the testbed.
It is a SainSmart MAX6675 temperature sensor controlled by Arduino UNO microcontroller. It
collects data at a rate of 1 Hz. Figure 33 shows the temperature data from the heating treatment
process.
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Figure 33 Temperature data analysis
To attack on heating treatment process, the intrude manipulate the heating element power
voltage from 5 volts to 9 volts. The potential physical consequence is the overload of the power
system and also change the physical character of treated part. As shown in Figure 33, the malicious
heating process has a greater increasing trend. In Figure 33, the unit for y-axis is Celsius, the unit
for x-axis is seconds.
To analyze the temperature data, the window time is set for 7 seconds. During each window
time, the temperature means, standard deviation, maximum, medium, minimum, number of
acoustic data amplitude over 25 °C, 28 °C and 30 °C are calculated as features for detection.
6.1.5.2.7 Ultrasonic data
The ultrasonic sensor is installed the on AGV route for monitoring. They are HC-SR04
ultrasonic sensor controlled by Arduino UNO microcontroller. It collects data at a rate of 5 Hz.
Figure 34 shows the ultrasonic data from the AGV route area.
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(a) Ultrasonic sensor at loading zone
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(b) Ultrasonic sensor at unloading zone
Figure 34 Ultrasonic sensor analysis
To attach the AGV, the intruder changes the control code of the AGV, making it leave
assigned route. As shown in Figure 34, both sensors read maximum distance value when AGV
leave route. The potential consequence of this attack can be damage to vehicle, production
environment or even human safety. In Figure 34, the unit for y-axis is mm, the unit for x-axis is
seconds.
To analyze the ultrasonic data, the data from two ultrasonic sensors are added up and set
the window time for 1 second. During every window time, the ultrasonic mean, standard deviation,
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maximum, medium, minimum, number of acoustic data amplitude over the threshold are
calculated for detection.
6.1.5.2.8 Avoidance sensor data
The avoidance sensor is installed on the robotic arm for moving sample parts. It is Gikfun
ACS712 avoidance sensor controlled by Arduino UNO microcontroller. Figure 35 shows the
avoidance sensor data.
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Figure 35 Avoidance sensor data analysis
The avoidance data is binary. 0 stands for none detected while 1 stands for object detected.
The avoidance sensor is installed in an area where not expecting robotic arm to intrude. It could
be areas with equipment or human. When the robotic arm under attack, its working logic is changed,
and the potential consequence could be damage to equipment or even human safety. For avoidance
sensor data, anytime the sensor gives back value of 1 can be classified as alert.
6.1.5.2.9 3D scanner data
The 3D scanner is located before the assemble process in demander testbed. It is an Xbox
360 Microsoft Kinect Sensor controlled by Skanect 3D Scanning Software. The software will
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capture object and export to a “STL” file. The “STL” file will be post-processed in Cloud compare
software to check the dimension difference to the original design.
6.2

Cyber-Physical Attack Scenario Design
The attack scenarios are designed to simulating the cyber-physical attacks in the CMS

environment. The cyber-physical attack is defined as “the attacks initiate inside or outside CMS
environment as digital format and intrude via cyber, causing physical components such as
machines, equipment, parts, assemblies, products have over wearing, breakage, scrap or any other
change that original design does not intend to be” (Wu, Song, and Moon 2019).
As analyzed in Chapter 3, the existing confirmed and published cyber-physical attacks are
limited: Stuxnet (Langner 2011) and German steel attack (R. M. Lee, Assante, and Conway 2014).
The reasons behind is phenomena including: the unawareness of cyber-physical attack, the trend
of under reporting (IBM-Security 2017), and business reputation, confidentiality, etc.
As a result, the cyber-physical attacks are decomposed into two components based on its
definition: cyber-attack method and physical consequence.
6.2.1

Cyber-Attack Method
The cyber-attack methods are various and growing every day. In general, they can be

categorized into two types: known attack and unknown attack. This work select SQL injection
(SQLi) as an example of sophisticated known attack, and 3D printing repackaging attack as an
example of unknown attack.
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6.2.1.1 SQL Injection (SQLi)
According to a 2016 security report from IBM, 74 percent of their manufacturing clients is
targeted by malicious input data and code injection to attempt to control or disrupt a system, which
is notably higher than the cross-industry average of 42 percent. Among those code injection attacks
in manufacturing, SQL injection made up 45 percent of these attacks ranks the most frequent
cyber-attack vectors among all code injection attacks (IBM-Security 2017).
With SQL injection attack, the intruder can spoof identity, download existing data or
upload malicious data to any SQL database with the injection vulnerability. In the CMS testbed,
the intruder can spoof into the MySQL 5.7 customer database without known the customer’s
password when the “magic quote” countermeasure turned off.
For example, the CMS customer with username “UID001” and password “1234” can login
to the system and upload designs or requirements for fabrication. However, an intruder can use the
code “UID001’;-- ” without any password to log into the account as well. The intruder will have
full access to download, edit, upload, and remove the customers’ order.
One example of cyber-physical attack via SQL injection is change CAD/CAM file or
manufacturing specification. A hacker can access into a user’s account, download a “G-code” file
for CNC milling process, and change specifications such as spindle speed, feed speed, or even tool
path. The change can be harmful to the tool life, equipment safety and design structure.
6.2.1.2 Repackaging
The repackaging attack originated from smartphone applications. An attacker can
download an online banking application (Jung et al. 2013), decompile the application, add
malicious functions and upload back to 3rd party application store to obtain any user’s information.
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In a CMS, a designer can upload their finished design into online marketplace for
customers to choose from. The customer pays to get the design file. The file can be an “STL” file
for 3D printing, G-code for CNC machining, or any other types of CAD file. The customer can
either upload the file to CMS database directly or revise it further and generate a self-designed file.
When customers select their designs and products from a 3rd party store, the repackaging attack
can happen by a malicious user. Attackers may modify a popular design from the online market;
reverse-engineering the design; add some malicious defects, parameters, dimensions; and then
upload the modified design to online marketplace. The repackaging attack occurs in the CMS's
customer layer.
The customers can be easily fooled to purchase and download the design from the online
market because it is difficult for them to notice the difference between the modified design and
original design. Once the modified design is uploaded to CMS database, it will go through a typical
process—certification check, model check, order confirmation, and distribute to the specific
physical provider for manufacturing. However, results are defective parts, machine malfunction,
etc.
6.2.2

Physical Payload
In this section, four types of physical payload are introduced and will be integrated in later

case studies.
6.2.2.1 3D printing quality manipulation
The potential attack payload of a repackaging attack can be design alteration, such as
embedding malicious infill void defect via change the “STL” file as shown in Figure 36. It is
difficult to observe visually by customers or inspectors. Moreover, Sturm (Sturm et al. 2014)
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proved that the structural stiffness of a 3D printing test piece with infill void could reduce by at
least 14%. As shown in 10, the malicious seam-shape infill defect can be embedded in the
connector part, and cause early breakage in use.
To simulate this attack in CMS testbed, a malicious “STL” file can be sent to the database.
3D printer will proceed to manufacture the part with malicious void while sensors collect physical
data in the process.

Figure 36 Repackaging on “STL” file with malicious infill void

To detect the intrusion, defining the system’s process is the first step. The audit data for
3D printing process can be the image, energy and acoustic data monitored during the production
process; and structural health data monitored in post-production stage. Using the pre-defined
architecture and correlation, the physical alert will be traced all the way back to the customer’s
design file. An alert will be sent to the customer, and the corresponding design and designer will
be added to the blacklist.
Other 3D printing settings, such as 3D printer’s heating bed and nozzle temperature, can
also be attacked on the local control machine. It can cause problems such as low quality, gaps
between infill and an outer wall, the high defective rate at inspection.
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6.2.2.2 CNC milling equipment manipulation
To conduct a cyber-physical attack on CNC milling, an attacker can download the original
design from the customer, modify it with malicious parameter or structure, then upload to the data
server. For example, the spindle speed and feed speed change in a G-code file can be modified by
the attacker. The user could only focus on the appearance of the design and satisfied with the
malicious file. When a corrupted file is sent to the physical provider and being manufactured, the
change of the spindle speed and feed speed can cause the breakage of drilling bit.
6.2.2.3 Robotic arm attack
To conduct a cyber-physical attack on robotic arm, an attack can alter the user perceived
robot state to cause operator injuries (Quarta et al. 2017). The attacker can manipulate the status
information, so the operator is not aware of the true status of the robot.
The operator interface must provide timely information at least on the motor state (on/off)
and operational mode. Moreover, standards mandate that safety-critical conditions

require

deliberate user confirmation. Unfortunately, some of these conditions are communicated and
require user interaction via software, not through electrical components.
To apply a robot state interface attack safely without cause any damage, two operational
modes were defined: normal mode and maintenance mode. When an intruder manipulates the
robotic arm control system, the robotic arm will operate under maintenance mode, which will
change the operating speed.
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6.2.2.4 Supply chain attack
In CMS environment, geographically distributed manufacturing equipment are controlled
by the global business center. The global business center will make job allocations depending on
the customer order priority and physical provider availability.
The attacker will gain super user privilege via race condition and change the customer
orders and physical provider data. A wrong part could be sent to the assembly manufacture. This
attack simulates the supply chain attacks and tests the aftermath countermeasure to mitigate such
an attack.
6.3

Experimental Design
In this section, the repeatability of the relation between cyber alerts and the cyber-attack

vector is discussed. Second, the duties for different roles in the experiment are designed. The roles
will be played by engineering students independent from the intrusion detection student team. The
randomness and credibility of the experiment is guaranteed by this practice.
6.3.1

Factorial Design
The network environment is based on an Ubuntu 14.04 operating system, with the magic

quote function turned off so as to be vulnerable to SQL injection attack. A web application-based
customer login front end is hosted and connected to user data based on MySQL 5.7 and Apache
HTTP Server 2.4.
To simulate a CMS network environment, a two-level three-factor experiment were
designed to test the NIDS software Snort and HIDS software OSSEC. The attack scenarios use
SQL injection to get into the CNC machining database, change the feed speed and spindle speed
of a G-code, and trigger alerts from both the acoustic sensor and accelerometer.
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Snort is an open source, lightweight, cross-platform software, originally developed by
Martin Roesch in C language in 1998. It uses predefined rules for checking abnormal data in packet
traffic (Roesch 1999a). In our experiment, Snort is equipped with standard rule along with
additional SQL injection rules, as follows.
Snort SQL Injection Local Rules
alert tcp any any -> any 80 (msg: “Error Based SQL Injection”; content: “%27” ; sid:100000011; )
alert tcp any any -> any 80 (msg: “Error Based SQL Injection”; content: “22” ; sid:100000012; )

OSSEC is an open source, multi-platform, scalable host-based intrusion detection system
(HIDS). It analyzes the host log, file, windows registry, and provides real-time alert responses.
The OSSEC is equipped with standard rules.
The three factors in the experiment are: normal customer activity, SQL injection attack,
and noise by NMAP software (Orebaugh and Pinkard 2011).
6.3.1.1 Factor one: Cyber-physical attacks
Let students simulate hacker use commands such as “UID_xxxx'; -- ” or “' or 1=1; --” to
directly access a customer account or administrator account without knowing the password. Such
an act will trigger alerts from Snort software.
6.3.1.2 Factor 2: Network scan noise
Let students use Nmap, a free open source network scanning utility (Orebaugh and Pinkard
2011), to intensely scan a customer website and database host to create false alarms.
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6.3.1.3 Factor 3: Customer activity
Let students simulate customers use computer visit customer front-end website, and create
events such as login, uploading orders, deleting orders, editing orders and log out.
6.3.2

Role and Duty Design
As a result, there will be at least two roles in the experiment for students to act as. The

attack guideline will be provided to student to follow, but the key factors, such as attack time,
event order, the attack payload will be decided by the student.
6.3.2.1 Hacker
The hacker will be responsible for attacking the CMS test bed and also adding interference
for the intrusion detection system. The hacker needs to be trained with basic knowledge or cyberattack knowledge as well as manufacturing knowledge, such as CAD/CAM software skills.
Table 17 Attack guideline example
Actions

Order

Begin Time

End Time

User: MTW

1

9:00

9:03

User: BYD

3

9:09

9:15

User: YPL

5

9:22

9:24

Attack: SQLi

4

9:21

9:23

Interference: Scan

2

9:05

9:10

6.3.2.1.1 Duty
The duty of a hacker includes the use of SQLi attack vector to intrude into the CMS
database, and downloading and editing the customer’s CAD/CAM file, such as “STL” file or
“Gcode.” The editing of the CAD/CAM file should contain malicious influence to the part or
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manufacturing process. The malicious influence should be reasonable and logical so that the
machine, such as a 3D printer, can still fabricate the part.
The hacker also needs to use another machine to scan the CMS hosts to give the
interference to the intrusion detection system. If there are multiple hosts, multiple scans are
preferred.
6.3.2.1.2 Randomness
There are many factors that need to be decided by the role player himself/herself; for
example, the timing of attacking, the physical payload of the attack, the times of attack, the design
of the attack, etc.
6.3.2.2 Customer
The customer role is comparatively easy. The customer can be trained with the introduction
of a/the CMS customer interface. The customer is used to create normal traffic for the web frontend
and to create a/the target for cyber-physical attack.
6.3.2.2.1 Duty
The duty for the customer is to select the CAD/CAM file for manufacturing, login into the
CMS testbed web frontend, and upload the design to the customer database for placing an order.
6.3.2.2.2 Randomness
The factors such as customer arrival timing, order type, and order design can be randomly
decided by the customer role.
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6.3.2.3 Security administrator
The security administrator will be independent from the customer and hacker roles. The
administrator will process the audit data from both the cyber and physical environments and give
alarms when cyber-physical alerts are identified.
6.4

Case Study 1: 3D Printing Infill Structure Attack
The case study 1 is on the additive manufacturing process, or the 3D printing process. Over

recent years, there are a growing number of researches (Zeltmann et al. 2016a; Chhetri, Canedo,
and Faruque 2016; C. Song et al. 2016; Wu et al. 2016; Yampolskiy et al. 2016; Belikovetsky,
Yampolskiy, et al. 2017) involving the 3D printing processes. In this case study, SQL injection
and infill seam defect (Vincent et al. 2015) were used to test and validate the proposed
methodology.
6.4.1

Cyber-Physical Attack Design
The cyber-physical attack on 3D printing uses attack vector SQLi and unknown attack

repackaging. Three orders in total will be placed to the CMS testbed: a legitimate order, a
repackaged order, and a malicious order by SQLi. The physical attack payload is the infill design
alteration. More specifically, malicious infill defects are caused by changing the “STL” file. It is
difficult to observe by inspectors or customers as the change cannot be observed from the exterior.
However, the structural stiffness of a 3D printing test piece with infill void may be reduced by 14%
(Sturm et al. 2014). As shown below, there are five different designs of malicious defect infill
shape.
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2-1 NonDefect

2-2 Seam
Defect

2-3 Irregular
polygon
defect

2-4 Circle
Defect

2-5
Rectangle
Defect

2-6 Triangle
Defect

Figure 37 Five Types of Infill Defect Patterns Camera & Simulation View

To simulate this attack in CMS testbed, a malicious “STL” file is sent to the database. 3D
printer proceeds to manufacture the part with malicious void while sensors collect physical data in
the process. To make the attack realistic and randomized, the design selected for intrusion detection
training set and the design for repackaging and SQLi attack is different. As shown in Figure 37,
the design 2-2 seam defect is selected for the training set.
6.4.2

Attack Guideline
An attack guideline is provided to a person who operates as an attacker with the training

of cyber-security knowledge. The attacker can switch between different roles during the
experiment to create normal as well as malicious network activities. Each role is played on a
different virtual machine. For example, Table 18 shows that five actions are executed from five
different computers.
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Table 18 3D printing attack guideline for student attacker
Actions

Tasks

Guideline

User #1

1. Log into user MTW account.

1. Execute user #1-3 action in
random order and random
time.

2. Upload one of the legitimate “STL” file.
3. Sign off MTW account
User #2

1. Log into user BYD account.
2. Upload one of the legitimate “STL” file.
3. Sign off BYD account.

User #3

1. Log into user YPL account.

2. Make note of order, begin
and end time for evaluation.

2. Upload one of the repackaged “STL” file.
3. Sign off YPL account.
SQLi

1. SQLi database from login interface: Enter
“jws'; -- ” (include space) as user name,
leave password blank.
2. Randomly choose a legitimate user.
3. Download its legitimate “STL” file.
4. Edit with a random malicious design
previously defined.
5. Upload the malicious “STL”, delete the
previous order.
6. Submit order.

7. Logoff user account.
Interference 1. Use Nmap intense scan attack on customer
host.

1. Execute SQLi anytime
between the completion of
first legitimate user and the
end of the experiment.
2. Make note of username,
begin and end time for
evaluation.

1. Execute Nmap scan
interference anytime during
the experiment.
2. Make note of username,
begin and end time for
evaluation.

6.4.3

Attack Detection Result Analysis
In the experiment, two cyber alert sources and 15 physical alert sources monitored CMS

testbed activity in real time. The cyber alert sources are the analysis results of network traffic and
host log file changes. The network-based intrusion detection software (SNORT) is using a rulebased algorithm to detect cyber-attack vectors whereas the host-based intrusion detection software
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(OSSEC) monitors the change in the critical file directory and alerts if there is any suspicious
change.
The physical alert sources are the analysis results of physical data from multiple sensors
installed on the CMS testbeds. In the supplier testbed, there are (1) conveyor microphone, (2)
conveyor current sensor, (3) heating chamber current, (4) heating temperature, (5) CNC
microphone, (6) CNC three-axis accelerometer, (7) avoidance sensor, (8) mover robotic arm threeaxis accelerometer, (9) welder robotic arm three-axis accelerometer, (10) 3D printing power meter,
and (11) 3D printer camera. In the demander testbed, there are (12) robotic arm #1 three-axis
accelerometer, (13) 3D scanner, and (14) robotic arm #2 three-axis accelerometer. In each of threeaxis accelerometers, there are three channels of data: x-axis, y-axis and z-axis. As a result, there
are 24 channels of data in total. Each channel of data is fed to the supervised machine learning
algorithm, same as the rule-based detection method. Any suspicious activities are alerted.
6.4.3.1 Cyber alerts
The cyber alerts collected from both CNC and 3D printing hosts are visualized in Figure
38. Clearly, the CNC milling host suffers heavier traffic with discrete cyber alert peaks, with a
total of 137 Snort alerts and 173 OSSEC alerts. Using alert correlation with the attribute of IP
address and time, meta-alerts are created. This activity reduces the investigation workload and
prioritize the alerts. As shown in Table 2, total 5 meta-alerts are aggregated from 62 single Snort
cyber alerts.
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(a) CNC Host Snort Alert Number Per Second

(b) CNC Host Snort Alert Number Per Second

(c) 3D Printing Host Snort Alert Number Per Second
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(d) 3d Printing Host Ossec Alert Number Per Second
Figure 38 CNC Attack Cyber Alert Distribution
Below are cyber meta-alerts correlated from 3D printing data host Snort software. The
meta-alerts were listed that correlated more than at least 2 alerts, listing them in a hierarchy based
on correlated attributes and correlated alerts. As shown in Table 19, five meta-alerts are aggregated
from 62 single Snort cyber alerts.
Those five meta-alerts are high-level Snort alerts. They are strong evidence of an intrusion,
but not necessarily a successful cyber-physical attack. As a result, further correlation with physical
alerts is necessary.
Even though five meta-alerts is a small amount of work to investigate the alerts one by one,
in a real network environment, the number of alerts can exponentially increase because of the
network traffic complexity and noise.
Table 19 3D printing database Snort Cyber-Meta alerts
Start
Time

15:01:23

End
Time

15:01:28

Correlated Correlated
Alerts
Attributes

32

3

Source/Destination IP

192.168.56.107 >192.168.56.102
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Alert Content
Executable code was
detected; Attempted
Information Leak; Misc
activity.

15:02:48

15:02:48

17

3

192.168.56.103:49388>192.168.56.102:80

Error Based SQL Injection

14:59:58

14:59:58

6

3

192.168.56.105:41678>192.168.56.102:80

Error Based SQL Injection

15:01:06

15:01:06

4

3

192.168.56.102:10009>192.168.56.107:45814

Attempted Denial of
Service

As shown in Table 20 below, the host-based intrusion detection software OSSEC’s metaalerts are a reflection of alerts from the Snort. It is because the alert log directory of Snort
“ubuntu->/var/log/snort/alert” is under the monitoring of OSSEC. Moreover, the OSSEC provides
additional alerts from directory of authentication log “ubuntu->/var/log/auth.log” potentially
because of a ‘SSH insecure connection attempt (scan)’.
Table 20 3D printing database OSSEC Cyber-Meta alerts
Start
Time

End
Time

Correlated Correlated
Alerts
Attributes

15:01:24 15:01:28

32

2

15:02:49 15:02:49

17

2

15:00:00 15:00:02

9

2

15:01:06 15:01:06

6

1

File Directory

Alert Content

ubuntu->/var/log/s
nort/alert

ICMP PING undefined
code; SHELLCODE x86
inc ebx NOOP; SCAN
nmap XMAS

ubuntu->/var/log/s
nort/alert
ubuntu->/var/log/s
nort/alert
ubuntu->/var/log/a
uth.log;
ubuntu->/var/log/s
nort/alert

Error Based SQL Injection
Error Based SQL Injection
'SSH insecure connection
attempt (scan).'; Did not
receive identification string
from 192.168.56.107;
COMMUNITY SIP TCP/IP
message flooding directed
to SIP proxy

The correlated alerts represented the attack activities planned in the attack scenarios well.
The rest of the alerts, which are uncorrelated, are a mixture of false alarms caused by normal
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customer traffic, or true positives from network scans that didn’t correlate because the gap time
exceeded the window time reduced its priority. For Snort, between experiments 14:58 and 15:08
a total of 176 alerts were generated. The correlation reduced the alerts to 4 meta-alerts consisting
of 59 single alerts. For OSSEC, the experiment also generated a total of 176 alerts, which reduced
to 4 meta-alerts consisting of 64 single alerts.
6.4.3.2 Physical alerts

(a) Training set legitimate design

(b) Training set malicious design

(c) Training set malicious design #1

(b) Training set malicious design #2

Figure 39 Training and testing product sample
The camera is the main source of the physical alerts in this experiment. As shown in below
Figure 39 , the training set design for intrusion detection machine learning algorithm is different
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from the experiment testing set. Even though the original pictures are taken in an imperfect
condition—shadows and dark edges from 3D printing heating plate are shown in the picture—
reasonable feature extraction technique can reduce the false alarms and reach a detection rate to
nearly 100%.
As shown in Table 21, the 3D printing process generated 61 alerts. Each experiment was
carried out for 1 hour, with a total of 3 hours for three customer orders. The order from customer_1
started at 15:48 aggregated 23 alerts into a meta-alert while the order from customer_3 started on
Day 2 at 13:40 aggregated 38 alerts into a meta-alert.
Table 21 3D Printing Physical Alert List
Start
Time

End
Time

13:40 15:10

15:48 16:52

Number
of Alerts

38

23

# of
Correlated
Attributes

4

4

Correlated
Attributes

Alert Content

Time similarity;
Sensor_sim_equi;
Manu_Process;
UID.

<PIDA-Message_NA>
<Create_Time_2018-10-12 13:40:00>
<Analyze_Time_NA>
<3D_Camera_1_1>
<KNN_classifier_k_1_feature_12>
<UID_Customer 3>
<Order_20181010_3D_T2>
<3D_PLA_1>
<SupID_NA>
<Additive_ Plastic >
<Potential_infill_defect>

Time similarity;
Sensor_sim_equi;
Manu_Process;
UID.

<PIDA-Message_NA>
<Create_Time_2018-10-10 15:48:00 >
<Analyze_Time_NA>
<3D_Camera_1_1>
<KNN_classifier_k_1_feature_12>
<UID_Customer 1>
<Order_20180708_3D_T1>
<3D_PLA_1>
<SupID_NA>
<Additive_Plastic>
<Potential_infill_defect >
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By now, cyber and physical alerts have been successfully extracted from cyber and
physical domains. The next step is to correlate those alerts to cyber-physical meta-alerts via predefined attributes.
6.4.3.3 Cyber-Physical Meta-Alerts
The available pre-defined similarity attributes to correlate cyber and physical alerts include
(1) destination IP with the manufacturing process and (2) source IP with user ID. The network
environment setup and correlation of IP address, manufacturing process and customer ID is listed
in Table 22. Each independent entity is assigned an IP address. The CNC and 3D printing customer
database have the addresses 192.168.56.101 and 192.168.56.102. They belong to the destination
IP type in cyber alerts because customers or hackers visit the hosts via Internet. The customers and
unknown traffic are assigned with IP addresses from 192.168.56.103 to 192.168.56.107.
It is worth noting that customer 1 has two IP addresses. It is because the SQLi attacker
maliciously logged into customer 1’s account from 192.168.56.105. Even though the true identities
(SQLi attacker and Nmap Scan) are labeled in brackets in Table 22, they were unknown for
security administrators in the experiment during data analysis.
Table 22 Network environment and cyber-physical correlation for case study 1
IP address

Type

Manufacturing
Process

Customer ID

192.168.56.101

Destination IP

CNC milling

-

192.168.56.102

Destination IP

3D printing

-

192.168.56.103

Source IP

-

Customer 1

192.168.56.104

Source IP

-

Customer 2

192.168.56.105

Source IP

-

Customer 1 (SQLi)

192.168.56.106

Source IP

-

Customer 3

192.168.56.107

Source IP

-

Unknown (Nmap Scan)
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With the network environment clearly defined in Table 22, the correlations of “destination
IP - manufacturing process” and “source IP - customer ID” are yielded as well, as shown in Figure

UID_Customer_2

UID_Customer_3

1
0
192.168.56.101
0
1
192.168.56.102
(a) Destination and Manufacturing Process
Correlation

UID_Customer_1

Additive_Manufacturing_PLA

Similarity

Subtractive_Manufacturing_Wood

40 below.

192.168.56.103

1

0

0

192.168.56.104

0

1

0

192.168.56.105

1

0

0

Similarity

192.168.56.106
0
0
1
(b) Source IP and Customer ID
Correlation

Figure 40 Correlation Matrix based on case study 1 network environment
The cyber meta-alerts aggregated from the cyber domain and physical meta-alerts
aggregated from the physical domain can be further correlated based on the correlation matrix.
The correlation process can be visualized according to Figure 41 below.
The cyber and physical alerts are generated by IDS and machine learning algorithms along
the main timeline as the production proceeds in the CMS environment.
The cyber and physical alerts are first correlated into cyber meta-alerts and physical metaalerts. The single low-level alerts are generated in the hundreds, if not thousands, which are timeconsuming to process with many false alarms. This step can reduce false alarms randomly
generated from network traffic and the physical production environment.
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The cyber meta-alerts and physical meta-alerts are further correlated to the cyber-physical
meta-alert. As shown in Figure 41 below, the cyber physical correlation process generated: (i) a
cyber-physical meta-alert with highest priority, (ii) a physical meta-alert with medium priority,
and (iii) a cyber meta-alert with low priority.
The cyber-physical meta-alert has a clear source and consequence from the information
combined from previous cyber and physical alerts: the order comes from customer_1 from IP
addresses 192.168.56.103 and 192.168.56.105. The IP addresses provide multiple cyber alerts,
with clear attempt of SQL injection attack. The order caused a 3D printer alert with potential infill
defect. The cyber domain attack alert lasted from 14:59:58 to 15:02:48. The physical domain attack
alerts began at 13:40:00 on day two and didn’t end until the job finished.

Figure 41 Correlation process diagram
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The physical meta-alert has a clear consequence from the 3D printing process—potential
infill defect. However, there is not any high-level cyber meta-alert that shows the intrusion. It is
possibly coming from a unknown exploit that will not trigger the cyber alert. It is also possible that
the physical production process met operation mistakes or defects. The physical domain attack
alerts began at 15:48:00 and ended when the job finished.
The cyber meta-alert has a clear attack source without any clear physical consequence. It
is possible to be a cyber-attack from outside without a physical domain intrusion. The cyber
domain attack alert lasted from 15:01:23 to 15:01:28.
6.4.3.4 Evaluation
To evaluate the attack detection results, the original experiment record is presented in table
below. The experiment operating students that played customers and hackers kept a record of
attack sequence and timing. The table was not used for previous analysis, but can be used to verify
the correctness of the prediction made from a cyber-physical meta alert.
In order to present the experiment attack record to the correlated meta-alerts, a comparison
between attack and alert is listed in Table 24 below. From the comparison, the meta-alerts can
effectively reflect the attack source, target and timing. For the repackaging attack, there are not
specific intrusion times because the malicious activity to repackage the design happened outside
the CMS environment, and the malicious pattern was unknown to NIDS (Snort) and HIDS
(OSSEC).

136

Table 23 Experiment operator record on regular activity and attack
Task summary

Task Type

Begin Time

End Time

· Normal customer with legitimate design.
· Customer ID: 1
· User ID: MTW

Regular
Customer
activity

2:59

3:00

·Normal customer with legitimate design.
· Customer ID: 2
· User ID: BYD

Regular
Customer
activity

3:02

3:03

· Customer under repackaging attack with
malicious design.
· Customer ID: 3
· User ID: YPL

Attack

3:04

3:07

· Act as a hacker, use SQLi attack randomly
attack legitimate customer.
· Attacker detection: Attack customer 1.

Attack

3:00

3:02

· Act as hacker, use Nmap intense scan attack on
3D printing and CNC milling data host.

Noise

3:01

3:06

The alert priority also provides a useful guideline for investigating the attack. Clearly, the
SQLi and repackaging attacks have a higher priority over the Nmap scan, which did not bring any
physical consequence. Between SQLi and repackaging attack, both are malicious to the CMS
environment, while the SQLi has a strong cyber evidence shown at the alert level. In a real
production environment, it also depends on the company’s security policy in deciding the alert
priority of the different type of alerts.
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Table 24 Attack VS Alert Comparison
Attack

Alert

SQL Injection

Cyber-physical meta-alert (Priority: high)

· Target: 3D host, 192.168.56.102.

· Cyber Domain: 14:59:58 to 15:02:48, SQLi, DoS;
from Snort on 192.168.56.102.
· Physical Domain: 13:40:00 (D2), additive

· Source: Hacker, 192.168.56.105.
· First attempt: 15:00, download design.
· Second attempt: 15:02, upload malicious
design.

manufacturing infill.
· Possible Source: Customer_1, 192.168.56.103 and
192.168.56.105.

Repackaging attack (unknown)

Physical meta-alert (Priority: medium)

· Target: 3D printer.
· Source: customer_3, 192.168.56.106.

· Physical Domain: 15:48:00, additive manufacturing
infill defect, 3D printer.
· Possible Source: customer_3, 192.168.56.106.

Nmap scan (Noise interference)

Cyber meta-alert (Priority: low)

· Target: 3D host, 192.168.56.102.

· Cyber Domain: 15:01:23 to 15:01:28, Executable

· Source: Hacker, 192.168.56.107.

code was detected; Attempted Information Leak;
Miscellaneous activity; from Snort on 192.168.56.102.
· Possible Source: unknown source, 192.168.56.107

· Attack attempt: 15:01

6.4.4

Summary
The case study 1 is a comprehensive example to show to entire process from cyber to

physical domain, from low level to high-level alert. It is a case study proved the following points:
•

The cyber and physical domain monitoring can detect various types of attacks.

•

The cyber-physical alert correlation method precisely detects the cyber-physical attacks
and correlate to root cyber alert.
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•

The correlation process reduced the number of alerts from 371 alerts (cyber alerts 310,
physical alerts 61) to 3 meta-alerts, with a reduction rate of 99.1%.

•

The detection accuracy is improved from 49.6% (correlated alarms 184, total cyber 371)
to 100%.

•

In the cyber domain, the known attack SQLi and unknown attack repackaging both can be
detected with the assistance of physical detection.

•

In the physical domain, the physical payload can be detected in real time with high accuracy,
no false alarm is reported.
In case study 1, 3D printing is selected as an example for cyber-physical attack detection.

The physical detection reaches an accuracy of 100% even though different training and testing
data sets and product design were used. In the next case study, CNC machining will be used as an
example to evaluate how the cyber-physical alert correlation will perform when the physical
detection rate is relatively low with a large amount of physical false alarms.
6.5

Case Study 2: a CNC Spindle Speed and Feed Speed Attack
In case study 2, a representative subtractive manufacturing process: CNC milling process

with wood material is attacked. Similarly, the cyber-physical attack on CNC milling can use attack
vector SQLi and unknown attack repackaging. Three orders in total will be placed to the CSST: a
legitimate order, a repackaged order, and a malicious order by SQLi. By exploiting the system
vulnerability, a hacker can inject malicious specifications, such as spindle speed, feed speed, or
even tool path into the CMS environment. The change can be harmful to the tool’s life, equipment
safety and design structure.
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Similary to case study 1, to detect such attacks, sensors such as acoustic sensor and
accelerometer can be used to monitor the manufacturing process change. For example, a higher
spindle speed could generate higher amplitude of acoustic data during the milling process.
Different from case study 1, the physical detection accuracy for both accelerometers is
relatively lower compared to the 3D printing image classification. The unavoidable consequence
is the false positive alarms: the actual product is legitimate but the monitoring system gives alarms.
The alert correlation and prioritization analysis for the physical domain will be emphasized.
6.5.1

Cyber-Physical Attack Design
In this section, a change in spindle speed in the milling operation is captured for further

research. In the real case, fast rotation speed can cause over wear of a tool—a tool with a too slow
rotation will risk being broken by shear force in the feeding direction. In the scenario, spindle
speed is maliciously altered from 1200 rpm to 2000rpm.
The CNC milling cyber-physical attack will be involved with both SQLi and repackaging.
Three orders in total will be placed to the CSST: a legitimate order, a repackaged order, and a
malicious order by SQLi.
The physical payload will involve the change of two critical milling parameters: spindle
speed and feed speed in the milling operation. The manipulation of CNC spindle and feed speed
can cause over wearing, tool breakage and a rough finish without an obvious change in the
dimensions.
In this experiment, the normal range of spindle speed and feed speed were defined in a
range shown in Table 25. The customer order design should be within the legitimate range, while
the attack will try to destroy the machine using the malicious range.
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Table 25 The CNC Milling Process Feed and Spindle Speed Range
Legitimate Range

Malicious Range

Feed Speed

65 ± 5 𝑖𝑛/𝑚𝑖𝑛

75 ± 5 𝑖𝑛/𝑚𝑖𝑛

Spindle Speed

1000 ± 100 𝑟𝑝𝑚

2000 ± 100 𝑟𝑝𝑚

Four sets of training data are collected within with the reference of range. However, the
attack parameters are randomly decided by the student hacker without notice of the security
administrator.
Table 26 The CNC Milling Training Dataset Parameter

6.5.2

Feed Speed

Spindle Speed

Training Set Legitimate 1

66.5

1000

Training Set Legitimate 2

61.5

900

Training Set Malicious 1

77.5

2050

Training Set Malicious 2

72.5

1950

Attack Guideline
Similarly, the attack guideline is provided to the student hacker. The student is isolated

from the CMS testbed operators and security administrators. The student attacker switch between
different roles during the experiment to create normal and malicious network activities according
to Table 27.
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Table 27 CNC milling process attack guideline
Actions
User #1

Tasks

Guideline
1. Log into user MTW account.

2. Upload one of the legitimate “Gcode” file.
3. Sign off MTW account
User #2

User #3

1. Log into user BYD account.
2. Upload one of the legitimate “Gcode” file.
3. Sign off BYD account.

1. Execute user #1-3 action
in random order and
random time.
2. Make note of order, begin
and end time for evaluation.

1. Log into user YPL account.
2. Upload one of the repackaged “Gcode” file.
3. Sign off YPL account.

SQLi

1. SQLi database from login interface:
Enter “jws'; -- ” (include space) as user
name, leave password blank.
2. Randomly choose a legitimate user.

1. Execute SQLi anytime
between the completion of
first legitimate user and the
end of the experiment.

2. Make note of username,
3. Download its legitimate “Gcode” file.
4. Edit with a random malicious feed speed begin and end time for
within 75 ± 5 𝑖𝑛/𝑚𝑖𝑛 and spindle speed within evaluation.
2000 ± 100 𝑟𝑝𝑚 range.
5. Upload the malicious “Gcode”, delete the
previous order.
6. Submit order.
7. Logoff user account.
Interference
1. Use Nmap intense scan attack on
customer host.

1. Execute Nmap scan
interference anytime during
the experiment.
2. Make note of username,
begin and end time for
evaluation.

6.5.3

Attack Detection Analysis
Compared to case study 1, case study 2 was carried out in the same testbed environment,

with the same monitoring systems, cyber-attack and detection methods. There are differences in
the physical target and payload; the physical attack targets the CNC milling machine with
142

malicious manufacturing specifications. The physical monitoring method use accelerometers and
acoustic sensor, which are different from previous image analysis. As a result, the highlight of this
section is how to use the correlated method in the physical domain to mitigate the false positive
alerts.
6.5.3.1 Cyber alerts
In case study 2, the cyber domain attack methods, monitoring system and analysis method
are same.
6.5.3.2 Physical alerts
To give a better overview, Table 28 shows all 24 channels of alert sources from the physical
sensor. Among those, the heat treatment current sensor and the CNC milling accelerometer sensor
give a total of 4011 alerts through the three orders’ production period.
Table 28 CNC process Physical Alert List
Sensor Name
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17

conv_micro
conv_current
heat_current
heat_temp
cnc_micro
cnc_acc_x
cnc_acc_y
cnc_acc_z
avoid_sens
mover_acc_x
mover_acc_y
mover_acc_z
weld_acc_x
weld_acc_y
weld_acc_z
3D_power
3D_img

Sensor ID

Number of Alerts

1001
2001
2002
3001
1002
4001
4002
4003
5001
4004
4005
4006
4007
4008
4009
6001
7001

0
0
526
0
0
1006
1260
1219
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
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18
19
20
21
22
23
24

tb2_arm1_acc_x
tb2_arm1_acc_y
tb2_arm1_acc_z
3D_scan
tb2_arm2_acc_x
tb2_arm2_acc_y
tb2_arm2_acc_z

4010
4011
4012
8001
4013
4014
4015

0
0
0
0
0
0
0

Among the 4011 alerts, the distribution of alerts according to three different orders is
shown in Table 29. Knowing two out of three orders is malicious; the heat-current gives clear
guidance in detecting the intrusion. Customer_3’s order only had 1 alert, possibly a false alarm.
However, for CNC accelerometer x, y and z axis data, each customer received hundreds of alerts.
Table 29 Physical alerts distribution based on customer’s order
Customer_1

Customer_2

Customer_3

heat_current

256

269

1

cnc_acc_x

389

342

275

cnc_acc_y

208

485

567

cnc_acc_z

461

422

336

Without further analysis of the data, the physical alert correlation methods were directly
implemented based on sensor similarity, manufacturing process similarity, time similarity and user
identification similarity.
As shown in Table 30, 4011 of the physical alerts are correlated into three physical metaalerts. The meta-alerts are listed in hierarchical order based on number of correlated attributes and
correlated alerts. The meta-alert with higher order in the hierarchy will be granted higher priority
for alert correlation and investigation. The accumulation of the alert numbers makes a simple
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“voting” system: the more alerts correlated from the entire system, the higher priority it will be
granted.
Table 30 CNC Milling Meta-Alert List
Start
Time

End
Time

Number
of Alerts

16:53 17:05

1518

Correlated
Attributes

Time;
Sensor ID;
User ID.

16:38 16:53

1314

Time;
Sensor ID;
User ID.

17:05 17:19

1179

Time;
Sensor ID;
User ID.

Alert Content

<PIDA-Message_NA>
<Create_Time_2018-10-12 16:53:00>
…
<CNC_Acc_1_x, CNC_Acc_1_y ,
CNC_Acc_1_z , Heat_Current_1>
<UID_Customer 2>
…
<PIDA-Message_NA>
<Create_Time_2018-10-12 16:38:00>
…
<CNC_Acc_1_x, CNC_Acc_1_y ,
CNC_Acc_1_z , Heat_Current_1>
<UID_Customer 1>
…
<PIDA-Message_NA>
<Create_Time_2018-10-12 17:05:00>
…
<CNC_Acc_1_x, CNC_Acc_1_y ,
CNC_Acc_1_z , Heat_Current_1>
<UID_Customer 3>
…

The “voting” system is a part of the alert correlation process. It utilizes the overall accuracy
of the physical data analysis to mitigate false alarms coming from one sensor. Case study 2 is an
extreme example: one accelerometer comprises three channels of data, one of the channels
provides large amount of false alarm. The additional current sensor mitigates and confirms the
malicious activity of customer_1 and customer_2’s orders, and lowers the priority of the metaalert from customer_3.
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6.5.3.3 Evaluation
Similarly, the experiment attack record and the correlated meta-alerts are listed in Table 31
below. Attack key points such as the attack source, target and timing are highlighted. Different
from the previous case study, there is an alarm generated with no corresponding attack activity,
which is a false alarm (false-positive).
Table 31 Attack VS Alert Comparison
Attack

Alert

SQL Injection

Cyber-physical meta-alert (Priority: high)

· Target: CNC host, 192.168.56.101.
· First attempt: 16:17, download design.

· Cyber Domain: 16:17 to 16:18, SQLi, DoS; from
Snort on 192.168.56.101.
· Physical Domain: 16:53, CNC milling acceleration.

· Second attempt: 16:18, upload malicious

· Possible Source: Customer_2, 192.168.56.104 and

design.

192.168.56.105.

Repackaging attack (Unknown)

Physical meta-alert (Priority: medium)

· Target: CNC milling.
· Source: customer_1, 192.168.56.103.

· Physical Domain: 16:38:00, CNC milling
acceleration, CNC milling process.
· Possible Source: customer_1, 192.168.56.103.

No attack activity (False alarm)

Physical meta-alert (Priority: medium)

· Any alerts generated are false positives.

· Physical Domain: 17:05:00, CNC milling

· Source: Hacker, 192.168.56.105.

acceleration, CNC milling process.
· Possible Source: customer_3, 192.168.56.106.
Nmap scan (Noise interference)

Cyber meta-alert (Priority: low)

· Target: CNC host, 192.168.56.101.

· Cyber Domain: 16:19, Executable code was detected;

· Source: Hacker, 192.168.56.107.

Attempted Information Leak; Miscellaneous activity;
from Snort on 192.168.56.101.
· Possible Source: unknown source, 192.168.56.107

· Attack attempt: 16:18
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With the alert correlation prioritization algorithm and multi-sensor voting effect, the false
alarm is listed as a lower priority, after all the true alarms with physical consequences. By
prioritizing the meta-alerts, the alert correlation can effectively mitigate the physical false alarms.
Even though this case study is intentionally carried out with false alarms, there are several
ways to improve the accuracy of physical detection in general. One way is improving the feature
extraction process via feature engineering. Secondly, different algorithms can have a significant
difference in accuracy. Thirdly, the training data is also critical for detection accuracy.
For physical detection in the manufacturing process, a feature is a good data representation
of a symptom, phenomenon or measurement. It requires domain knowledge and a data processing
technique. A good understanding of and experience with different types of manufacturing data can
improve the process. For example, the skewness and kurtosis feature can improve the accuracy of
power consumption detection accuracy. Moreover, data science techniques such as automated
feature engineering can also help creating and selecting features to improve the accuracy.
The machine learning algorithms affect the detection accuracy, false positive rate and speed
drastically. In this experiment, kNN algorithm were implemented with comparatively low
accuracy and high speed. From our previous work, algorithms such as random forest can greatly
enhance the detection accuracy. Different types of manufacturing data also respond differently to
various algorithms.
The training data is a critical factor for accuracy because it defines the representation of
legitimate and malicious classes of data. In theory, a larger training dataset includes more samples
can improve the accuracy. For manufacturing, because of the variation of the design, computer
simulation can also generate training data that better matches the actual data collected from the
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manufacturing process. Simulation system such as digital twin for Cyber-Manufacturing System,
can provide training data for manufacturing process prediction and detection.
6.5.4

Summary
In this case study, CNC milling process specification attack is used to investigate the alert

correlation result under the physical alert false alarms. To increase the chances of receiving false
alarms, (i) acceleration data is selected because of the lower detection accuracy, (ii) relatively less
sophisticated kNN machine learning algorithm is selected with limited detection accuracy, and (iii)
different CNC milling specifications (but within a reasonable range) is used during testing and
training. As a result, the experiment received around 33.8% of false alarms in CNC accelerometer
data set.
The alert correlation process results show that (i) the correlation and prioritization process
can decrease the false alarm priority for investigation, (ii) the percentage of false alarm reduced
from 33.8% in CNC accelerometer alerts to 25% in meta-alerts.
6.6

Case Study 3: a Multiple Robotic Arm Speed Attack
From the previous two case studies, the effectiveness of cyber-physical alert correlation

was proven and the correlation under the condition of false alarm in the physical domain was
discussed. However, the previous case studies only attacked a single machine. In this case study,
the alert correlation when multiple machines under the same cyber-physical attack will be
demonstrated.
For case study 3, robotic arms’ user-perceived robot state is attacked. In the CSST testbed,
there are two robotic arms on an assembly line controlled by one web-application user interface.
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Two robot state - normal mode and maintenance mode - are predefined. An attacker can use the
SQLi attack method intrude into the robot mode to change the whole assembly line operating speed.
6.6.1

Cyber-Physical Attack Design
In order to attack the robotic arms without safety risk and damage, the potentially

dangerous robot maintenance mode is set up as slower than the normal mode. In fact, changes such
as operating angle and pattern can also be changed, but could potentially damage the testbed, and
also very explicit from observation and sensor reading.
6.6.2

Attack Guideline
The normal robotic arm state operating speed is set at 10 degrees/second, while the

maintenance state is set at 5 degrees/second. The operator can set up the operating state via the
SQL based web-application control interface.
The attacker can log into the operator’s account via SQLi. Once login, the attacker can
freely modify the operating mode while the testbed is operating. However, the operator webapplication based interface will not show the change if the webpage is not refreshed manually.
Under this situation, the operation and safety could be damaged via the unknown maintenance
mode.
6.6.3

Attack Detection Analysis
Compare to case study 1 and 2, the case study 3 carried out in the same testbed environment,

and same monitoring systems. The difference of the attack detection in case study 3 is: there are
alerts coming from two different equipment within a system. As a result, this section will highlight
the correlation for alerts come from different equipment via one cyber-physical attack.
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As shown in Table 32 below, two meta alerts with 40 and 28 single alerts are presented.
They are fully correlated via all four similarity attributes: time, sensor ID, manufacturing process
and user ID. It means all those alerts happen on one machine within one production job from the
same customer.
Table 32 Robotic Arm Assembly Line Meta-Alert List
Start
Time

End
Time

16:20 16:22

16:38 16:40

Number
of Alerts

40

28

Correlated
Attributes

Alert Content

Time;
Sensor ID;
Manufacturing
Process；
User ID.

<PIDA-Message_NA>
<Create_Time_2018-10-12 16:20:00>
…
<Arm1_Acc_1_x>
<UID_Customer 2>
…
<Assembly_Process >
<Potential_Assemble_Mistake>

Time;
Sensor ID;
Manufacturing
Process；
User ID.

<PIDA-Message_NA>
<Create_Time_2018-10-12 16:38:00>
…
<Arm2_Acc_1_x>
<UID_Customer 2>
…
<Assembly_Process >
<Potential_Assemble_Mistake>

The two meta-alerts share a lot of similarity: they are both from same customer_2, they
happened in the same manufacturing process, and the sensor is installed on similar equipment. In
this case, even though the time similarity is not met, the two meta-alerts should be further
correlated into one meta-alert. The similarity based alert correlation process realizes this function
automatically.
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6.6.4

Summary
The benefit of such an act is: automatically correlate alerts (1) comes from similar

equipment or sensors, (2) happens within the same manufacturing process, or (3) comes from the
same user. These scenarios are most likely to happen during industrial security incident: the hacker
would bring influence on a large scale to increase the physical consequence.
The limitation of this function is it could correlate alerts happened during the same order
process within the same environment, but actually are independent. To mitigate this effect, the
security investigator should look into each correlated event to see if there is an actual connection.
6.7

Case Study 4: a Supply Chain Attack
In case study 4, the attack from the supply chain is investigated. A cyber-physical supply

chain attack is an attack that damages a manufacturing service provider by targeting raw materials,
parts or products from its supply network. In a CMS environment, geographically distributed
manufacturing equipment is managed by the global business center. The attacker can send a wrong
part or manufacture a malicious part that will be sent to the assembly manufacture which can cause
further physical consequence.
6.7.1

Cyber-Physical Attack Design
To simulate a supply chain, the CSST supplier testbed manufactures cubes and feeds to

demander testbed as shown in Figure 42. The cube will be inspected via 3D scanning for legitimacy.
The hacker uses SQLi or any alternative attack vector intrude into the supplier database and
changes the order type to make supplier testbed ships cube with a different specification to the
demander testbed.
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Figure 42 Demander testbed production flow
6.7.2

Attack Guideline
As shown in Figure 43 below, a hacker can send an alternative design product instead of

the legitimate design requested by the supplier. The two design are dimensionally similar however
largely different in design features. The part shipped from a supplier may in batch or in a package
that cannot be discovered until the production process.
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Figure 43 Alternative design (left) and original legitimate design request from supplier
6.7.3

Attack Detection Analysis
The 3D scanner is located before the assembly process in the Demander-Testbed. It is an

Xbox 360 Microsoft Kinect Sensor controlled by Skanect 3D Scanning software. The software
captures object images and exports to a “STL” file. The “STL” file is post-processed in the cloud,
comparing the dimension difference from the original design.
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Figure 44 3D scanning model compare

To inspect the overall dimension, as shown in Figure 44 above, the distance between the
scanning model and the original model follows a normal distribution with a mean value of 1.26
mm with a standard deviation of 1.38. It means the scanned part is on average 1.26 mm larger than
the original design, which is beyond the 0.05 mm tolerance. The part from the supplier is defective.
As shown in Table 33 below, the 3D scanning inspection gives a single physical alert.
Because the inspection is a single step procedure, rather than a process, there is only one alert.
However, the physical alert provides alert correlation content for root cause: customer_3 or
supplier CSST_1.
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Table 33 3D Printing Physical Alert List
Start
Time

End
Time

10:58 10:58

Number
of Alerts

1

Alert Content

<PIDA-Message_04-1>
<Create_Time_2018-8-14 10:58:00>
<Analyze_Time_NA>
<3D_Scanner_1_1>
<Tolerance_Inspection>
<UID_Customer 3>
<Order_20180814_3D_ASM>
<3D_PLA_1>
<SupID_CSST_1>
<Additive_ Plastic >
<Dimensional_Change>

The investigation will trace back to supplier CSST_1 using the alert correlations. However,
because of the data confidentiality and customer privacy, order and security relevance data will
not be shared across the supplier and demander. But the request of further investigation can be sent
over the CMS network.
6.7.4

Summary
This case study discusses the supply chain attack detection and correlation problem. CMS

as a future vision of manufacturing system will broaden the scope of the supply chain from a large
corporation to small business. The alert correlation method can provide a potential source of attack
through the supply chain when facing such an attack. However, because of the data confidentially
and privacy, the investigation will be requested to the supplier.
Inspection before and after the production for raw materials and parts are necessary for the
era of Cyber-Manufacturing. It is a combination of both improve the production quality control
and cyber-physical security.
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6.8

Conclusion
This section presented four case studies based on a Cyber-Manufacturing System Security

Testbed (CSST). The four case studies are all cyber-physical attacks but serve different purpose:
•

Case study 1 is a comprehensive example. Cyber-physical attacks with three different
types of cyber-attack vector: (i) unknown attack, (ii) known attack and (iii) attack
influence that causes false alarms were discussed. The case also included a full cyberphysical attack detection based on a highly accurate 3D printing infill detection vision
detection example. The result shows that the cyber-physical alert correlation method can
accurately correlate cyber and physical domain alerts and find the root cause.

•

Case study 2 discussed the situation when a physical detection system generates false
alarms and how the cyber-physical alert correlation methods mitigates such a problem.
The case used CNC milling process accelerometer data with a less sophisticated kNN
algorithm, which reduces accuracy and provides large amount of false alarms. The result
shows that the proposed method can reduce the false alarm priority and overall percentage.

•

Case study 3 discussed the situation of multiple machines under attack at the same time.
It is a common scenario for industrial security incidents as the large scope or attack
increases the influence and consequence. The correlation method can correlate the alerts
even though they are not from the same machine. Attributes such as user ID, sensor and
equipment ID are utilized.

•

Case study 4 discussed the situation when an attack comes from the supply chain, which
is a common scenario for current and future manufacturing systems. The inspection and
correlation method can alert of the problem and provide direction for further investigation.
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Potential issues such as data confidentiality, privacy and inspection across supply chain
are discussed.
In conclusion, the case studies attempt to prove that the cyber-physical attack detection and
correlation method can effectively reduce the alert numbers, reduce the false alarms, and trace to
root causes—despite intentional influences on the cyber domain and limitation of detection
accuracy in the physical domain. Issues such as supply chain attacks and large domain attacks are
discussed as well. The correlation method can provide valuable information for security
investigators to trace for the root cause through supply chain of CMS environment.
To generalize and implement the process of intrusion detection and correlation in CMS for
cyber-physical attacks, a five-step framework DACDI is presented in next chapter.
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Chapter 7

7

Implementation Framework

Security is a process, not a product. In this chapter, generalize the cyber-physical intrusion
detection and correlation method into an implementation framework. This five-step framework
aims for help security specialists applying intrusion detection and correlation methods to cyberphysical manufacturing system despite its scope, architecture or manufacturing process type.
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A five-stage framework—DACDI (Define, Audit, Correlate, Disclose, Improve)—is
proposed as follows. The DACDI framework is a collection of practices, techniques, procedures,
and analyses structured for detecting intrusion, reducing the influence of the intrusions, and
improving the Cyber-Manufacturing System security after intrusion incidents. This high-level
framework allows additional practices and tools to be included. Professionals in manufacturing
can follow this framework and adapt it to specific manufacturing environment for cyber-physical
intrusions purposes.

Figure 45 DACDI five-stage intrusion detection approach
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The DACDI is a continuous improvement system as illustrated in Figure 45, consisting of
five stages:
•
•
•
•
•

7.1

Define
Audit
Correlate
Disclose
Improve

Define
The first stage identifies seven As: Architecture, Attack surface, Attack vector, Attack

impact, Attack target, Attack consequence and Audit material. The objective of this step is to
define the kinds of cyber and physical data that need to be selected as audit data for the second
stage. The analysis of architecture, attack surface and attack vector can identify cyber data
selection from the cyber-security perspective. The analysis of attack impact, attack target and
attack consequence can identify physical data from the manufacturing process perspective. Both
types of data are summarized and further utilized in audit and disclose stages (2 and 4).
7.1.1

Define the Architecture
The architecture of a victim system needs to be defined in the first place by studying

implementing manufacturers. The manufacturers can follow any architecture that fits their
business model, manufacturing process and customer needs such as CMS hierarchical five-layer
architecture (Z. Song and Moon 2016b), cloud manufacturing concept architecture (Adamson et
al. 2015), or reference architecture model industry 4.0 (Bitkom, Vdma, and Zvei 2016).
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By defining a flow diagram, a detailed flow and dynamic relationship can be presented.
For example, Figure 1 shows a process flow in a standardized CMS architecture. This example
architecture of CMS consists of five layers: the Application/User Layer, the Application Interface
Layer, the Global Core Service Layer, the Integrated Connection Layer, and the Physical Provider
Layer. The first layer—Application/User Layer—includes users and consumers. The second
layer—Application Interface Layer—includes support techniques as a buffer of inventory and
information processing. The third layer—Core Service Layer—is the global information hub of
machine resources, personnel, geographically locations, logistics, user information, etc. The fourth
layer—Integrated Connection Layer—is a local analysis and self-control network center. The fifth
layer—Physical Provider Layer—is the physical layer which includes all the manufacturing
resources in factory floor.
However, different types of business and manufacturing may adopt a different architecture
or develop an appropriate architecture. Understanding of the adopted architecture can help defining
the attack surface.
7.1.2

Define the Attack Surface
The attack surface of a CMS environment is a list of different points where an attacker can

try to enter data or extract data from the environment. To inject the cyber-physical attack, the input
data is the only way that attackers can put malicious code, design, or commands to the physical
layer. By analyzing the input data, where to set up network or host sensors to monitor the intrusion
can be determined. According to Hutchins (Hutchins et al. 2015b), data inside a manufacturing
system includes, but is not limited to: design specs, CAD files, financial info, user data, inventory,
design feedback, production feedback, etc.
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Figure 1 illustrates an attack surface analysis for a CMS five-layer architecture. As shown,
the potential place an attacker can inject malicious data into CMS is the input data at the
application/user layer. However, the malicious data can flow through the CMS environment by
data exchanges.
In following four steps, a taxonomy of cross-domain attacks on CMS (Wu and Moon 2017b)
is adopted to define the attack vector, attack impact, attack target and attack consequence.
7.1.3

Define the Attack Vector
The attack vector is the method an attacker can exploit system vulnerabilities. For example,

code injection, shellshock, are frequently observed attack vectors in manufacturing (IBM-Security
2017). The purpose of defining the attack vector in intrusion detection is to find measurements in
network and host activities and logs to monitor the intrusion. For example, if the CMS customer
platform is a web application based uploading system with SQL databases, the following attack
vectors are possible: Shellshock, Buffer Overflow, Race Condition, Cross-Site Request Forgery
(CSRF), Code Injection, Repackaging, Virus, and Worms. A checklist-style table can be used in
such a process and the table should be updated with time as new attack vectors show up. Different
CMS enterprises can modify the checklist according to the different network environment.
7.1.4

Define the Attack Impact
According to the cross-domain attack taxonomy, the direct impact from a cyber-attack

incident can be but not limited to: privilege compromise, user compromise, file compromise,
denial of service, malware installation, etc. The attack impact is the direct result/payload of an
attack incident. It can help define cyber audit materials. For example, an attacker can use
shellshock attack gaining the super user privilege and change the CNC milling machine
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specification. The privilege elevation is the attack impact. Using network/host-based intrusion
detection can stop the intrusion at an early stage before causing any consequence. There are opensource tools that can be used to monitor the network and host activities such as SNORT, OSSEC,
etc.
7.1.5

Define the Attack Target
The attack target is the ultimate goal attackers aim for. In cyber-physical attacks, the targets

for attackers are physical targets. For example, the Stuxnet worm attack’s target was the controllers
of the centrifuge in a nuclear power plant. In a CMS environment, the physical target can be
sensors, controllers, actuators, machines and equipment, manufactured parts, or even human
beings.
The targets selected in CMS will be the source of physical audit data. After defining the
target, the next step is analyzing the consequences of the target under attack.
7.1.6

Define the Attack Consequence
Defining the attack consequence is a way to identify physical evidence of intrusions in

progress or after intrusions. Such evidence is sometimes referred as an attack’s manifestation
(Kemmerer and Vigna 2002). The physical consequence can be defective product, machine
manipulation, malfunction and breakage, or loss of system availability. With respect to the selected
attack consequence, physical auditing material such as side-channel monitoring data, inspection
rules can be defined in the next step for detection purpose.
One of the methods to explore the attack consequence is Failure Mode and Effects Analysis
(FMEA)—a structured systematic technique for failure analysis for reliability study. In intrusion
detection in a CMS environment, FMEA can be used for reviewing machines and assembly lines
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to identify the vulnerability and failure modes, consequences and effects. By creating a CMS
security FMEA worksheet, the potential failure modes and their effects on the whole CMS system
can be recorded. It can also give guidelines on the placement of monitoring systems and indicate
the criticality of the potential failure.
7.1.7

Define the Audit Data
The result of “Define” step will help define the audit data for intrusion detection. The audit

data includes data from cyber environments such as network activities and host log, and data from
physical environments such as temperature and energy consumption.
7.2

Audit
Audit, or data auditing, is the second stage of our approach. It is the process of collecting

data for intrusion detection. In CMS, two types of data are collected for intrusion detection purpose:
cyber data and physical data. Cyber data: (1) are capable of detecting amateur and known attacks,
and (2) are used as evidence in sophisticated attacks to correlate with physical anomaly occurrence.
Physical data: (1) are capable of detecting cyber-physical data quickly with high accuracy (Wu,
Song, and Moon 2019; Wu et al. 2017; Z. Song et al. 2017), and (2) can also prevent machine
malfunction and human mistakes as a by-product.
7.2.1

Cyber Data
Cyber audit data includes the data from network activity and host. In a computer network,

network activity log data can be information, such as login attempts, network connections, or every
data packet that appeared on the wire (Kemmerer and Vigna 2002). It can be monitored by
Network-based Intrusion Detection System (NIDS). For example, Software Snort is a packet
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sniffer that can monitor network traffic in real time. It checks each packet closely to detect a
dangerous payload or suspicious anomalies.
A network host is a computer or other device connected to a computer network. A network
host may offer information resources, services, and applications to users, or other nodes, on the
network. It can be monitored by a host-based intrusion detection system (HIDS). For example,
Software OSSEC can do log analysis, file integrity checking, Windows registry monitoring,
centralized policy enforcement, rootkit detection, real-time alerting and active response (Timofte
2008).
7.2.2

Physical Data
The next step is collecting physical data from the manufacturing process in CMS

environment. The manufacturing process is the main target of the cyber-physical attacks in CMS.
After defining step, it should be clear what manufacturing process is within the scope of intrusion
detection. In this section, the 3D printing process is analyzed.
3D printing, or additive manufacturing, is a key technology for future manufacturing
systems; it is typically computer-controlled and can be integrated with the Internet. 3D printing
systems have unique vulnerabilities presented by the ability to affect the internal layers of an object
without affecting the exterior layers. To attack this process, malicious users can change the design
or dimensions in the “.STL” file, so malicious defective parts could be manufactured without an
alert.
To detect this type of potential attack, multiple types of physical data can be selected as
audit data in 3D printing process. The vision monitoring method for additive manufacturing
malicious void defect is proven effective with an accuracy of 95.51% (Wu et al. 2016). To collect
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images from the additive manufacturing process, engineers can install cameras on top of the object
(Wu et al. 2017), so cameras can collect cross-sectional views.
Acoustic emission generated by onboard stepper motors as a side channel data has also
been used for monitoring additive manufacturing malicious infill void. By collecting the acoustic
data from the 3D printing process, and comparing it to the simulated original design data, the
method from Belikovetsky (Belikovetsky, Solewicz, et al. 2017b) can effectively detect the infill
defect and stop the printing process for compromised objects.
7.3

Correlate
With the similarity-based alert correlation method defined, an alert correlation process

provides a high-level view on the correlating process in a CMS environment. Based on previous
research, a five-step process is proposed as a general principle for cyber-physical alert correlation
in CMS.
7.3.1

Alert Normalization
The first step is to normalize the cyber and physical alerts collected from different nodes

of CMS. The IDS software generates alerts and encodes them in different formats. These alerts are
usually received by the correlation process from different software. The primary objective of alert
normalization is to translate the features of each sensor alert into a generic format to reduce the
number of alerts to be correlated.
For cyber alerts, the Internet Engineering Task Force (IETF) has proposed a generic
representation of intrusion alerts to develop a standard known as Intrusion Detection Message
Exchange Format (IDMEF). The IDMEF “defines data formats and exchange procedures for
sharing information of interest to intrusion detection and response systems and to the management
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systems that may need to interact with them” (H. Debar, Curry, and Feinstein 2007). An IDMEF
alert message is composed of nine different components including create time, detect time,
analyzer time, analyzer, source, target, classification, assessment and additional data. For cyber
alert generated by software such as Snort or OSSEC, the alert can be translated into IDMEF
message format.
For the physical alert, this work proposes a new Physical Intrusion Detection Alert
(PIDA) for reporting alerts in CMS physical environment. The PIDS alert format is composed of
11 components including Alert message title and ID, Create Time, Analyzer Time, Sensor ID,
Analyzer ID, User ID, Order ID, Equipment ID, Supplier ID, Manufacturing Process, Additional
Information.
7.3.2

Alert Aggregation
The purpose of the alert aggregation process is to combine the alert caused by the same

event or attack, create cyber meta-alerts and physical meta-alerts as defined in section 3.1 and 3.2.
For example, for cyber domain, the same attack caused five NIDS alerts from snort and seven
HIDS alerts from OSSEC need to be aggregated in this step into a cyber meta-alert. For the
physical domain, the alert from the camera and power consumption meter on a 3D printer should
be aggregated into a physical meta-alert.
The decision to aggregate two alerts based on the attribute feature varies between cyber
and physical alerts. For the cyber alert, source IP, destination IP can be the attribute to correlate
the

alerts.

For

the

physical

alert,

target

type/manufacturing

assessment/consequence can be the attribute to correlate the alerts.
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process,

attack

7.3.3

Cyber-Physical Alert Correlation
The cyber-physical alert correlation process is to generate a strong meta-alert between the

alert aggregation results. In this process, the temporal feature will not work because the window
time between a cyber intrusion and a physical consequence is uncertain: an attacker can hide the
payload of the malware long enough to make temporal feature fail.
The attribute-based technique can correlate the cyber and physical alerts based on CMS
production flow characteristics. For example, the attribute such as customer type, customer ID,
order ID, manufacturing process type, local supplier type, supplier ID can correlate the alerts in
the customer database, design process, and manufacturing environment. In this step, a high-level
cyber-physical meta-alert will be created.
7.3.4

Influence Analysis
To estimate the different impact of meta-alerts, factors such as the number of correlated

alerts, number of shared similar attributes, affected entity type and number can be utilized for
influence analysis. For example, a meta alert coming from multiple machines has more influence
on CMS than alerts coming from a single machine; Similarly, a meta-alert correlated with three
shared attributes will have a higher impact on another meta alert has only one shared attribute. The
impact analysis can be defined differently based on CMS manufacturing type, scope, etc.
7.3.5

Alert Prioritization
The alert prioritization process can effectively discard alerts that is irrelevant or less

important to a particular environment. For different environments, the security requirement and
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policy will lead to different alert prioritization policy. Therefore, there is no absolute priority for
an attack (Valeur et al. 2004). A general rule for CMS alert prioritization is a higher level of
correlation ranks the higher level of priority. For example, the cyber-physical meta alert owns
higher priority compared to cyber meta-alert or physical meta-alert; Cyber meta-alert or physical
meta-alert also own higher priority than cyber or physical alert.
7.4

Disclose
Disclose is the fourth stage of the approach. The purpose of intrusion detection is to become

aware of the intrusion and stop it as early as possible. The collection of methods from cybersecurity,
machine learning, and quality control are implemented for CMS and cyber-physical attacks. The
detection is therefore divided into three stages: pre-production, in-production and post-production.
7.4.1

Pre-production
In the pre-production stage, the inspecting relies on both human inspection and data

analysis. Attacks being detected in the pre-production stage can be terminated before entering the
production environment. It can reduce the influence of physical layer processes and reduce the
recovery time and cost. No physical material or machines are damaged or wasted. No customer is
influenced by the attack.
Digital file check is the first step of intrusion detection in CMS. The check can verify the
CAD/CAM file and determine if there are any holes or non-closed shells that could cause malicious
influence to the product or machine. The check is a part of the initial communication process with
the customer, along with the steps of verifying the compatibility of the design (dimensions,
complexity, material, etc.), as well as price estimation according to the material used, labor and
urgency.
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Production verification is a document sent from a CMS service provider to the customer.
The purpose of this document is to: (1) give customers a preview of their order status, (2) approve
the integrity of the order detail, such as design or parts, and (3) receive the approval from the
customer to proceed to manufacture. As illustrated in section 2.1, network activities and host logs
can be analyzed by software packages Snort and OSSEC. The results generated by the software
are alerts with some levels of urgency.
7.4.2

In-production
As large amounts of data can be collected to monitor the production process, the in-

production stage detection uses data analysis techniques. Attacks being detected during the
production stage can be terminated before the attack causes further damage to machines and
equipment, and reduces the waste of materials and time. Some material could be wasted, but the
machine should not be damaged. Customers’ orders can be processed by other machines or
suppliers to reduce the schedule delay. Statistical process control (SPC) is also adopted to detect
intrusions.
An example in Fig. 10 shows the malicious void attack on 3D printing. The attack makes
the number of the pixels whose grayscale value is higher than 120 go beyond its upper control
limits. The red dots higher than the upper control limits (UCL) are the defective areas malicious
void shows.
Machine learning is a core enabling technology for CMS and other future visions of
manufacturing systems. It has been used in quality control (Wuest, Irgens, and Thoben 2014),
defect detection (Pernkopf and O’Leary 2003) and attack detection (Wu, Song, and Moon 2019)
in manufacturing systems. It is also used in intrusion detection systems in cybersecurity. It can be
170

categorized as supervised learning and unsupervised learning. The signature-based detection is
broadly used in firewall and intrusion detection systems. It uses the rule of supervised learning for
the pattern of known attacks, such as detecting the syntax of a SQL code injection attack (Alnabulsi,
Islam, and Mamun 2014). In manufacturing systems, supervised learning can also detect issues
such as a malicious void in the 3D printing process (Wu, Song, and Moon 2019). Unsupervised
learning assumes that an intrusion can be detected by observing a deviation from the normal or
expected behavior of the system of the users using the rules of unsupervised learning. Compared
to signature-based detection, it can provide more protection facing unknown exploit.
7.4.3

Post-production
In the post-production stage of detection, quality control (QC) measures in manufacturing

processes are used. Attacks being detected in the post-production stage can be terminated before
the final product is delivered to the customer and causes further influence. Material and time are
wasted, and an apology could be needed for notifying the customer of the delay in manufacturing.
The physical domain inspection can be classified into three groups: physical characteristics,
mechanical properties and side-channel impacts (Pan et al. 2017a). QC measures for physical
characteristics, including visual inspection, dimension measure, weight measure, 3D laser
scanning, X-rays, and CTs. As nondestructive tests, it can be implemented on all products for
inspection. Mechanical property tests, such as the tensile test, can be used to test wire, strip or
machined samples with either circular or rectangular cross-section. It is a destructive test that can
be used in sampling inspection rather than 100% inspection.
Side-channel impacts are mostly discussed in cryptography and refer to cases where
attackers do not leverage information from plaintext or ciphertext, but from physical characteristics
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of cryptosystems (Pan et al. 2017a). Side channel information such as temperature, power
signature, timing, utilization rate, and queue time can be used for analyzing intrusion detection.
7.5

Improve
The last stage of DACDI approach is improving. It is a collection of countermeasures based

on the disclosed result to terminate the intrusion, improve the security of the victim system, and
respond to any damage to the system and the customers.
The first step after detection is stopping the damage. The methods of containment include,
but are not limited to, disconnection, blacklisting the attacker, and adding detection rule.
A radical way to contain the situation is to disconnect the host from the local network, or
even to disconnect the whole site from the connection; for example, disconnect a manufacturer
temporarily from CMS environment before the security team finds the cause of the problem. The
business impact can be migrated because the service can be taken over by other suppliers before
the recovery.
Security teams can collect attack information such as: IP address, attack payload, and
packet information. By putting the attacker’s IP address into blacklist, the CMS environment will
drop all future packets from that IP address. The attack information can be added to the blacklist,
and Snort/OSSEC detection rules can be used to improve the intrusion detection.
Once the attack is contained, the next step is the recovery stage. The attack has left the
CMS environment with backdoors and vulnerabilities. Before recovery production, the security
team must fix the bug before the attacker comes back. Reporting the problem to the service
provider, and updating software and the operating system is necessary. If the attacker manipulated
the database, the staff might be able to restore program and data files from the last trusted backup.
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In general, the system needs to be more secure than before, so that the attacker cannot come
back in CMS. Once an attacker has cracked a system, he or she often invites other attackers in to
prove his or her skills (Boyle and Panko 2013).
After recovery of the software, the next step is to recover the hardware. The machine and
equipment that have been manipulated need to go through a thorough inspection, repair,
maintenance, or even a replacement could be needed.
If the attack has not been detected before production, it is possible that it has caused a delay
in the customer’s production schedule. It could also cause harm to an employee. It is important to
give a prompt and sincere apology. From experience, downplaying the severity of the incident can
cause worse influence than being honest.
7.6

Summary
The DACDI framework is an implementational guideline for manufacturing enterprise

detecting and correlating cyber-physical attacks. Based on different operational structure, the data
type and algorithm for detection and correlation should be adjusted for optimal results.
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Chapter 8

8

Conclusion and Future Work

This dissertation presented a cyber-physical detection and correlation system for a cyberphysical manufacturing system. In this chapter, the conclusion, contribution and broad impact of
this work were summarized. The limitations of this work are presented along with necessary future
work.
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8.1

Summary
This dissertation presented a cyber-physical attack detection and correlation system. This

system is proposed for cyber-physical manufacturing systems, such as the Cyber-Manufacturing
System. It is designed for the detection of cyber-physical attacks: an emerging attack intrudes via
cyber-attack vector but causes physical consequences. To detect such an attack, this work utilizes
available network and host-based intrusion detection software to monitor the cyber security
domain, while applies supervised and unsupervised machine learning algorithms on physical
security domain. To reduce the false alarms via integrating cyber and physical alerts, this work
applies the similarity-based alert correlation method.
To better understand cyber-physical attacks, this work took a close look at cyber-physical
attacks in manufacturing systems. Existing cyber-physical industrial security incidents are
analyzed and further generalized into attack taxonomies to characterize cyber-physical attacks.
Systemic cyber-physical attack scenarios are designed based on the taxonomies targeting
manufacturing system physical domain in experiments.
To achieve a dataset to validate the method, this work also presented a security-oriented
cyber-physical manufacturing testbed. The testbed consists of a cyber network environment, as
well as physical manufacturing equipment and processes. Monitoring systems are integrated in
both cyber and physical domains. The data collected from the testbed with attack scenarios are
used in validation.
The intrusion detection heavily relies on training data. For this work, the historic data (Wu
et al. 2017, 2018; Wu, Song, and Moon 2019) is used as training data for manufacturing processes
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to detect generic issues in the manufacturing process; as the historic data accumulates by time, the
detection accuracy will also increase. The historic data is a reliable source for the manufacturing
process as the process is more under control compared to network activities. Attacks that act within
manufacturing constraint but change the design features, tolerances, or/and accuracy cannot be
guaranteed to be detected by historic data. This type of detection will reply more on design specific
training data generated by computer simulation, such as the 3D printing process image simulation
(Wu et al. 2016), CNC acoustic emission simulation (Wu, Song, and Moon 2019), and the growing
popular digital twin (Tao et al. 2018) concept. KCAD method (Chhetri, Canedo, and Faruque 2016)
proved the simulation data can be used in cyber-physical attack detection.
The experiments show that machine learning methods in physical domain detection give
high accuracy—overall higher than 90%, with some cases reaching 100%. The alert correlation
method can effectively reduce the total amount of alerts, especially the cyber alerts, by 99.1%; it
can correlate physical alerts to cyber alerts for root cause analysis; and it can prioritize the true
alarms and deprioritize the false alarms. It improves the overall detection accuracy from 49.6% to
100%, shortens the detection (investigation) time, and reduces the false alarm rate from 33.8% to
25% for the case studies.
The DACDI framework generalizes such a method into a five-step process. The process
can be applied to cyber-physical manufacturing systems such as Cyber-Manufacturing System,
Industry 4.0, or Smart Manufacturing system. Moreover, it could be modified to apply to different
or more general cyber-physical systems where cyber-physical attacks could intrude.
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8.2

Contribution
Machine Learning in cyber-physical intrusion detection. This work applied supervised

and unsupervised machine learning (Wu, Song, and Moon 2019) to the physical data from the
manufacturing process. For the 3D printing process, vision and the power consumption data source
for machine learning were used. Three different machine learning algorithms were implemented
with image classification. The anomaly detection method returned the highest accuracy of 96.1%
in detecting a malicious defect in the printing process. In the CNC milling process example, two
attack modes changing the part design and manufacture operation were designed. Acoustic signal
is selected as source of physical data for the machine learning process. The same three machine
learning algorithms implemented with the random forest algorithm returned the highest average
accuracy of 91.1%. The technique of detecting malicious activities during the manufacturing
process is validated with both simulation (Wu et al. 2016) and physical experiment (Wu et al.
2017).
Cyber-physical attack in manufacturing system analysis. The cyber-physical attack as
one of the cross-domain attacks was not well understood (Yampolskiy et al. 2013) at the beginning
of this research. To give an in-depth review, existing documentaries about Stuxnet and German
steel mill cyber-physical security incidents were studied for characterizing the cyber-physical
attacks. This work also provided the definitions, taxonomies and scenarios to provide a better
understanding of cyber-physical attacks. Two taxonomies are proposed from both intrusion
detection (Wu and Moon 2017b) and attacker (Wu and Moon 2018) perspectives. Moreover, a
discussion about the detection period of known attacks and unknown exploits regarding the
production period in a manufacturing system is presented.
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Similarity-based alert correlation method for cyber-physical attack. An alert
correlation methodology is developed for cyber-physical attacks in cyber-physical manufacturing
system. The method applies a similarity-based alert correlation technique with newly defined
attributes. It comprises three steps: cyber-alert correlation, physical-alert correlation, and cyberphysical alert correlation. In each step, attributes are defined based on the characteristic of cyberphysical attacks and CMS environment. The distinct manufacturing attributes, such as the sensor,
manufacturing process are created and employed for similarity-based alert correlation. Moreover,
a physical alert format PIDA (Physical Intrusion Detection Alert) is defined for cyber-physical
alert correlation. The format is defined with reference to Intrusion Detection Message Exchange
Format (IDMEF) with distinct manufacturing information. The manufacturing specific
information, such as user ID, machine ID, sensor ID, and manufacturing process establishes a
bridge between cyber and physical alert correlation.
Cyber-Manufacturing System Security Testbed (CSST). For CMS, the benchmark
dataset to evaluate the intrusion detection system is not available. One of the reasons is that the
cyber-physical attacks are new; researchers have limited knowledge and examples from real
production systems. Moreover, current manufacturing systems are not designed to monitor cyberphysical attacks. As a result, the CSST testbed is established for data collection and validation.
The physical components include equipment, controllers, sensors, and actuators from the
component level in CMS shop floor. The computational components include web interfaces, IDS,
and a discrete event simulation model from the system level of CMS. Both components collect
data for intrusion detection analyses. The testbed can illustrate the process of customer orders, job
allocation, manufacturing, post-processing, conveying, and transporting. The data collected from
this testbed is shared in the research community.
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Implementation framework for cyber-physical IDS in CMS. Previous intrusion
detection studies focus on individual manufacturing processes, such as additive manufacturing or
CNC machining, rather than considering the manufacturing system as a whole. Critical
components for intrusion detection such as network, host, and quality control inspections are
neglected in these works. A five-step intrusion detection framework—DACDI (Define, Audit,
Correlate, Disclose, and Improve)—is designed specifically for the CMS. A model CMS is used
to collect cyber as well as physical audit data, and to demonstrate the feasibility of operating the
intrusion detection system. It is a framework to implement the cyber-physical intrusion detection
system in different CMS environments. It is also a collection of systematic and statistical analysis
for detecting intrusions, reducing their influences, and improving the level of security after
detection. Professionals in manufacturing, cyber-security, and control systems can adapt it as a
guideline to detect intrusions in a CMS environment.
8.3

Limitations
While this work attempts to improve the intrusion detection of cyber-physical attacks in

CMS with presented method, it can never achieve 100% security. This work is presented with
some limitations.
Firstly, this work cannot effectively detect one of the attack types in manufacturing system:
intellectual property theft. This attack type is a broadline problem; in some cases, such as Dragon
fly attack, they are cyber-attacks, while in other cases, such as 3D printing smartphone (C. Song
et al. 2016) eavesdropping, they act like a cyber-physical attack. However, in both cases, the attack
payload does not leave consequences in the physical domain of CMS. As a result, this type of
attack is not compatible with the cyber-physical attack detection and correlation method.
179

Secondly, the machine learning algorithms implemented were selected based on accuracy
and previous work. More algorithms, such as deep neural networks, could be implemented to
compare with current results in terms of accuracy, false-positive rate, and detection speed.
8.4

Future Work
For the similarity-based alert correlation method, the cyber-physical attributes need to be

further developed and refined. Moreover, other alert correlation methods, such as sequential-based
alert correlation methods, can be applied in the CMS cyber-physical alert correlation domain.
For the machine learning in the detection system, alternative algorithms, such as anomaly
detection, and feature extraction techniques may be implemented to increase the physical alert
accuracy.
For the CSST tested, computer simulation can be integrated to collect long-term, largescale system level data from the physical domain for intrusion detection. Technologies such as
wireless network, digital twin, and special industrial protocols such as MQTT (S. Lee et al. 2013)
and MTconnect (Vijayaraghavan et al. 2008) can be integrated to simulate a cyber-physical
manufacturing system with different setups. Security countermeasures such as blockchain or a
software-defined network can be implemented with IDS to react to cyber-physical attacks.
To better study cyber-physical attacks, more taxonomies, attack scenarios can be published
in the research community. Moreover, a public repository that documents industry security
incidents can greatly help manufacturing security research.
To improve on DACDI framework, an application of such a process on a real
manufacturing environment can help disclose the limitations and shortcomings. Moreover, the
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framework can be extended to a broader audience, including the users of Industry 4.0 and Smart
Manufacturing, similar cyber-physical systems, critical infrastructure, and so on.
Finally, the experiments to validate and test the intrusion detection system can be improved
with more attack scenarios defined in Chapter four. Factors such as manufacturing defects,
different attack vectors, such as malware, and different manufacturing processes can be used to
test the effectiveness of the intrusion detection system.
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